Share count
1.1Bpeak FY2018
← All companies ← MTZ Manual MUR → ← MTSI Semiconductors MX →
MU, Micron Technology Inc.
Micron makes memory and storage chips — mainly DRAM, the working memory inside computers and phones, and NAND flash, which holds data when the power is off. It sells these to the makers of computers, servers, phones and other electronics, and also under its own Micron and Crucial brands. It earns its money by running its own chip factories, so most of the cost is sunk in the plants and the bits they turn out.
We are an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all .
We manufacture our products at wholly-owned facilities and also utilize subcontractors for certain manufacturing processes.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$37.4B
+48.9% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $90.3B 5-yr avg $27.3B
Revenue $41.5B +345.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 80.4% yr-ago 23.3%
Net income $28.2B yr-ago $1.9B
Net margin 68.1% yr-ago 20.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is DRAM (76%) and NAND (23%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The question that governs a memory maker is franchise or commodity: a DRAM or NAND bit from one supplier is much like a bit from another, so the price is set by the whole industry's supply against demand, not by the seller — watch whether selling prices hold through a down stretch for any sign of pricing power, and the filing's own note on average selling prices is the place that test shows. Because the bit is interchangeable, the levers that decide the outcome are the cost position — whether scale and process let Micron print a bit cheaper than its rivals — and the capital treadmill, since the factories cost enormous sums and must be rebuilt each generation whether prices are high or low. The bad case is plain: prices break, the plants still must be fed, and a single customer and a handful of equipment and materials suppliers leave little slack. The margins, returns, and debt that show how this has actually played out are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →DRAM is 76% of revenue, with NAND the other meaningful line at 23%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- DRAM76%$28.6B
- NAND23%$8.5B
- Other Product Sales1%$297M
By geographyUnited States65%Taiwan15%China7%Other Asia Pacific5%Hong Kong SAR China3%Japan2%Other3%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $12.4B | $20.3B | $30.4B | $23.4B | $21.4B | $27.7B | $30.8B | $15.5B | $25.1B | $37.4B | $90.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 20% | 42% | 59% | 46% | 31% | 38% | 45% | −9% | 22% | 40% | 73% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 5% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 6% | 4% | 3% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 13% | 9% | 7% | 10% | 12% | 10% | 10% | 20% | 14% | 10% | 5% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $168M | $5.9B | $15.0B | $7.4B | $3.0B | $6.3B | $9.7B | ($5.7B) | $1.3B | $9.8B | $59.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.4% | 28.9% | 49.3% | 31.5% | 14.0% | 22.7% | 31.5% | −37.0% | 5.2% | 26.1% | 65.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($276M) | $5.1B | $14.1B | $6.3B | $2.7B | $5.9B | $8.7B | ($5.8B) | $778M | $8.5B | $50.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 2% | 1% | 10% | 9% | 6% | 9% | — | 37% | 12% | 15% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $3.2B | $8.2B | $17.4B | $13.2B | $8.3B | $12.5B | $15.2B | $1.6B | $8.5B | $17.5B | $51.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3.0B | $3.9B | $4.8B | $5.4B | $5.7B | $6.2B | $7.1B | $7.8B | $7.8B | $8.4B | $9.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $273M | ($1.0B) | ($1.7B) | $1.2B | ($359M) | $15M | ($1.1B) | ($960M) | ($884M) | ($338M) | ($9.3B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $5.8B | $4.7B | $8.9B | $9.8B | $8.2B | $10.0B | $12.1B | $7.7B | $8.4B | $15.9B | $25.3B | CapexCapex |
| 46.9% | 23.3% | 29.2% | 41.8% | 38.4% | 36.2% | 39.2% | 49.4% | 33.4% | 42.4% | 28.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $188M | $3.4B | $12.6B | $7.8B | $2.7B | $6.3B | $8.1B | ($6.1B) | $121M | $9.2B | $42.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.5% | 16.8% | 41.6% | 33.2% | 12.4% | 22.6% | 26.2% | −39.4% | 0.5% | 24.5% | 47.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($2.6B) | $3.4B | $8.5B | $3.4B | $83M | $2.4B | $3.1B | ($6.1B) | $121M | $1.7B | $26.2B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −21.4% | 16.8% | 28.0% | 14.6% | 0.4% | 8.8% | 10.1% | −39.4% | 0.5% | 4.5% | 29.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $2.6B | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $461M | $504M | $513M | $522M | $567M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $148M | $36M | $71M | $2.7B | $176M | $1.2B | $2.4B | $425M | $300M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 23% | 49% | 19% | 7% | 14% | 18% | -9% | 2% | 15% | 59% | ROICROIC |
| -2% | 27% | 44% | 18% | 7% | 13% | 17% | -13% | 2% | 16% | 50% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | — | 7% | 13% | 16% | −14% | 1% | 15% | 50% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $4.8B | $6.0B | $7.3B | $7.2B | $7.6B | $7.8B | $8.3B | $8.6B | $7.0B | $9.6B | $27.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.8B | $3.5B | $5.1B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $2.0B | $5.4B | $7.2B | $26.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $5.1B | $5.4B | $4.5B | $6.7B | $8.4B | $8.9B | $8.4B | $8.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.6B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $3.5B | $5.3B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $6.7B | $7.7B | $9.3B | $8.7B | $11.6B | $12.4B | $31.8B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $9.5B | $12.5B | $16.0B | $16.5B | $18.0B | $19.9B | $21.8B | $21.2B | $24.4B | $28.8B | $66.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4.8B | $5.3B | $5.8B | $6.4B | $6.6B | $6.4B | $7.5B | $4.8B | $9.2B | $11.5B | $19.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.8× | 2.6× | 2.7× | 3.1× | 2.9× | 4.5× | 2.6× | 2.5× | 3.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $104M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $27.5B | $35.3B | $43.4B | $48.9B | $53.7B | $58.8B | $66.3B | $64.3B | $69.4B | $82.8B | $134.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $9.9B | $11.1B | $4.6B | $5.9B | $6.6B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $13.3B | $13.4B | $14.6B | $9.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $5.1B | $5.1B | ($2.6B) | ($1.3B) | ($981M) | ($987M) | ($1.4B) | $4.8B | $6.4B | $4.9B | ($18.3B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.4× | 9.8× | 43.8× | 57.6× | 15.5× | 34.3× | 51.3× | -14.8× | 2.3× | 20.5× | 257.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $12.1B | $18.6B | $32.3B | $35.9B | $39.0B | $43.9B | $49.9B | $44.1B | $45.1B | $54.2B | $100.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.5% | 1.1% | 0.7% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 3.8% | 3.3% | 2.6% | 1.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.04B | 1.15B | 1.23B | 1.14B | 1.13B | 1.14B | 1.12B | 1.09B | 1.12B | 1.13B | 1.14B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.97 | $17.61 | $24.73 | $20.48 | $18.95 | $24.28 | $27.41 | $14.22 | $22.46 | $33.22 | $79.05 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.27 | $4.41 | $11.50 | $5.52 | $2.38 | $5.14 | $7.74 | $-5.34 | $0.70 | $7.59 | $44.19 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.18 | $2.96 | $10.29 | $6.79 | $2.35 | $5.48 | $7.19 | $-5.60 | $0.11 | $8.15 | $37.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.56 | $2.96 | $6.93 | $2.98 | $0.07 | $2.14 | $2.78 | $-5.60 | $0.11 | $1.48 | $22.92 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.41 | $0.46 | $0.46 | $0.46 | $0.50 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $5.61 | $4.10 | $7.22 | $8.56 | $7.27 | $8.79 | $10.75 | $7.02 | $7.50 | $14.10 | $22.12 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $11.66 | $16.14 | $26.28 | $31.39 | $34.48 | $38.50 | $44.48 | $40.37 | $40.37 | $48.15 | $88.20 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.0%/yr | +11.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +52.6%/yr | +28.3%/yr |
| EPS | — | +26.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +10.8%/yr | +14.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +17.1%/yr | +6.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+48.9%
“Total revenue for 2025 increased 49% as compared to 2024 primarily due to increases in sales of both DRAM and NAND products. •Sales of DRAM products increased 62% primarily due to a low-40% range increase in average selling prices and a mid-teen percentage increase in bit shipments. •Sales of NAND products increased 18% primarily due to a high-teen percentage increase in bit shipments.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - NAND+17.7%
“In 2025, NAND revenue increased from 2024 on higher bit shipments due to demand growth.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
15%low FY2023
Gross margin
40%low FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$9.2Bowner earningsvs.$8.5Bnet incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $9.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $8.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put $7.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.7B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $8.5B | $778M | ($5.8B) | $8.7B | $5.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$8.4B | +$7.8B | +$7.8B | +$7.1B | +$6.2B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$972M | +$833M | +$596M | +$514M | +$378M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$338M | −$884M | −$960M | −$1.1B | +$15M |
| Cash from operations | $17.5B | $8.5B | $1.6B | $15.2B | $12.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$8.4B | −$8.4B | −$7.7B | −$7.1B | −$6.2B |
| Owner earnings | $9.2B | $121M | ($6.1B) | $8.1B | $6.3B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$7.5B | — | — | −$5.0B | −$3.8B |
| Free cash flow | $1.7B | $121M | ($6.1B) | $3.1B | $2.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 25% | 0% | -39% | 26% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $8.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $972M), owner earnings is nearer $8.2B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 20.5×ComfortableOperating income $9.8B ÷ interest expense $477M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.6B · 0.5× operating profitModest net debtCash $9.6B + ST investments $296M − debt $14.6B
What this means
Netting $9.9B of cash and short-term investments against $14.6B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $473M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $4.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 70 + DIO 136 − DPO 51 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median, range -9%–49%; 15% latest = NOPAT $8.6B ÷ invested capital $59.1BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -39%–42%; latest $9.2B = operating cash $17.5B − maintenance capex $8.4BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. It chose to put $7.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.7B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $972M of SBC) leaves $8.2B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $17.5B ÷ net income $8.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $522M ÷ Owner Earnings $9.2B
What this means
Of $9.2B Owner Earnings, $522M (6%) went back to shareholders, $522M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.90×ExpandingCapex $15.9B ÷ depreciation $8.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $37.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.52×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $14.6B vs $17.4B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −82%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.03/share (latest year $7.56), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $47.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 27% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
The recent-years average (−2%) sits below the early years (27%), but the latest year (26%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 23% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −18%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −37.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.9%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$66.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$26.1B
- Receivables$26.9B
- Inventory$8.6B
- Other current assets$5.2B
Current liabilities$19.5B
- Debt due within a year$582M
- Accounts payable$3.6B
- Other current liabilities$15.3B
Current ratio3.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$47.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$582M due · $26.1B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+345.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 3.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$99.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$33.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10.1B$722M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $18.4B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$26Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.0Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$4.2Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $14.6B of debt in all
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Aug 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$767Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$4.6Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$3.8Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$14.6B
Lease obligations (present value)$3.8B
Total fixed claims on the business$18.4B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $18.4B, of which the leases are 21%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Aug 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $105.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$91.4B · 87%
- Dividends$2.0B · 2%
- Buybacks$7.5B · 7%
- Retained (debt / cash)$4.5B · 4%
- Returned to owners$9.5B
22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.0B as dividends and $7.5B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $484M and cash and short-term investments rose $21.7B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $7.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count10.2%
The diluted count rose from 1036M to 1142M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.46/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($36.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $4.4B, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Sanjay Mehrotra | $25.3M | $68.0M | $6.3B |
| 2022 | Sanjay Mehrotra | $28.8M | $13.5M | $8.1B |
| 2023 | Sanjay Mehrotra | $25.3M | $42.5M | ($6.1B) |
| 2024 | Sanjay Mehrotra | $30.1M | $72.8M | $121M |
| 2025 | Sanjay Mehrotra | $30.9M | $86.6M | $9.2B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio529:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$972M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Micron Technology Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.2%
Diluted shares grew 10.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $7.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$15.3B · 17% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Revenue from one customer was 17 % (primarily included in the CMBU segment) of total revenue for 2025.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTCIntel Corporation | $52.9B | 56% | 23.4% | 11% | 15% |
| GEGE Aerospace | $45.9B | 36% | -2.2% | -2% | 6% |
| QCOMQUALCOMM Incorporated | $44.3B | 57% | 27.1% | 28% | 26% |
| GEVGE Vernova Inc. | $38.1B | 16% | -0.7% | -3% | 3% |
| MUMicron Technology Inc. | $37.4B | 39% | 24.4% | 15% | 20% |
| TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated | $17.7B | 64% | 40.7% | 35% | 35% |
| AMKRAmkor Technology | $6.7B | 17% | 7.5% | 10% | 6% |
| FSLRFirst Solar | $5.2B | 23% | 8.9% | 5% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 37% | 16.1% | 11% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Micron Technology Inc. has delivered.
Micron Technology Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Micron Technology Inc. earns about $7.4B on its 19.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $26.2B on 1129M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-17; net cash $18.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($25.3B) runs well above depreciation ($9.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $43.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Micron Technology Inc. (MU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MU, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MTZ its page in the Manual MUR →
Industry order: ← MTSI the Semiconductors chapter MX →