← All companies ← QBTS Manual QCRH → ← PL Communications Equipment SATL →
QCOM, QUALCOMM Incorporated
Qualcomm designs the chips and holds the patents that make wireless devices work. It sells Snapdragon processors and modems to the companies that build smartphones, cars, and other connected gadgets, and it separately licenses its portfolio of wireless-standard patents to nearly every handset maker, taking a royalty on each device sold. The chip sales carry the bulk of the revenue; the patent royalties carry an outsized share of the profit. Qualcomm does the engineering and farms the actual manufacturing out to others.
Our platforms help power intelligent devices that people and businesses rely on every day across industries and applications from handsets to other areas, including automotive and the internet of things (IoT).
In automotive, our Snapdragon Digital Chassis platforms, including connectivity, digital cockpit and advanced driver assistance and automated driving (ADAS/AD), are helping to connect the car to its environment and the cloud, creating unique in-cabin experiences and enabling a comprehensive assisted and automated driving solution.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The business runs on two engines, and the value-investor's job is to judge each. The licensing arm poses the franchise question: its patents sit inside the cellular standards the whole industry must build to, so the test is whether that toll holds as agreements come up for renewal and as challengers contest the rate — the filing itself flags the patent litigation and the periodic re-negotiation that could chip away at it. The chip arm poses the commodity question: it sits in the cyclical semiconductor trade, leans on a concentrated set of large customers (some of whom can design their own silicon and walk), and must out-engineer rivals to earn its keep. The bad case is a few big buyers leaving, the royalty pressed down, and a downturn landing together; weigh the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt against the cash in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $23.6B | $22.3B | $22.6B | $24.3B | $23.5B | $33.6B | $44.2B | $35.8B | $39.0B | $44.3B | $44.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 59% | 56% | 55% | 65% | 61% | 58% | 58% | 56% | 56% | 55% | 55% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 10% | 12% | 13% | 9% | 9% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 22% | 25% | 25% | 22% | 25% | 21% | 19% | 25% | 23% | 20% | 21% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $6.5B | $2.6B | $621M | $7.7B | $6.3B | $9.8B | $15.9B | $7.8B | $10.1B | $12.4B | $11.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 27.6% | 11.6% | 2.7% | 31.6% | 26.6% | 29.2% | 35.9% | 21.7% | 25.8% | 27.9% | 25.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $5.7B | $2.4B | ($5.0B) | $4.4B | $5.2B | $9.0B | $12.9B | $7.2B | $10.1B | $5.5B | $9.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 17% | 18% | — | 41% | 9% | 12% | 13% | 1% | 2% | 56% | 15% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $7.6B | $5.0B | $3.9B | $7.3B | $5.8B | $10.5B | $9.1B | $11.3B | $12.2B | $14.0B | $14.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($444M) | $181M | $6.4B | $462M | ($2.0B) | ($1.8B) | ($7.6B) | ($226M) | ($2.3B) | $4.1B | ($285M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $539M | $690M | $784M | $887M | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $1.4B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.8B | CapexCapex |
| 2.3% | 3.1% | 3.5% | 3.7% | 6.0% | 5.6% | 5.1% | 4.0% | 2.7% | 2.7% | 4.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $7.1B | $4.3B | $3.1B | $6.4B | $4.4B | $8.6B | $7.3B | $9.8B | $11.2B | $12.8B | $12.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 30.1% | 19.4% | 13.8% | 26.4% | 18.7% | 25.8% | 16.6% | 27.5% | 28.6% | 28.9% | 28.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $7.1B | $4.3B | $3.1B | $6.4B | $4.4B | $8.6B | $6.8B | $9.8B | $11.2B | $12.8B | $12.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 30.1% | 19.4% | 13.8% | 26.4% | 18.7% | 25.8% | 15.5% | 27.5% | 28.6% | 28.9% | 28.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $3.9B | $1.3B | $22.6B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $4.1B | $8.8B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 13% | 7% | 53% | 39% | 48% | 45% | 27% | 30% | 20% | 26% | ROICROIC |
| 18% | 8% | -615% | 89% | 86% | 91% | 72% | 34% | 39% | 26% | 36% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $32.4B | $38.6B | $12.1B | $12.3B | $11.2B | $12.4B | $6.4B | $11.3B | $13.3B | $10.2B | $9.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2.2B | $3.6B | $2.7B | $1.0B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $4.2B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $2.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $1.6B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.4B | $6.5B | $7.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.9B | $3.6B | $2.5B | $1.1B | $3.0B | $2.7B | $6.7B | $6.4B | $6.2B | $6.6B | $7.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $23.0B | $43.6B | $17.4B | $16.8B | $18.5B | $20.1B | $20.7B | $22.5B | $25.2B | $25.8B | $23.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7.3B | $10.9B | $11.4B | $8.9B | $8.7B | $12.0B | $11.9B | $9.6B | $10.5B | $9.1B | $9.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.1× | 4.0× | 1.5× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 2.3× | 2.4× | 2.8× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5.7B | $6.6B | $6.5B | $6.3B | $6.3B | $7.2B | $10.5B | $10.6B | $10.8B | $11.4B | $14.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $52.4B | $65.5B | $32.7B | $33.0B | $35.6B | $41.2B | $49.0B | $51.0B | $55.2B | $50.1B | $57.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $10.0B | $20.9B | $15.4B | $15.4B | $15.2B | $15.2B | $15.0B | $15.4B | $14.6B | $14.8B | $15.3B | Total debtDebt |
| ($22.3B) | ($17.7B) | $3.2B | $3.1B | $4.0B | $2.8B | $8.6B | $4.1B | $1.3B | $4.7B | $5.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 21.9× | 5.2× | 0.8× | 12.2× | 10.4× | 17.5× | 32.4× | 11.2× | 14.4× | 18.6× | 16.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $31.8B | $30.7B | $807M | $4.9B | $6.1B | $9.9B | $18.0B | $21.6B | $26.3B | $21.2B | $27.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 4.0% | 4.1% | 3.9% | 4.3% | 5.2% | 5.0% | 4.6% | 6.9% | 6.8% | 6.3% | 6.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $17M | — | $129M | $146M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $146M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.50B | 1.49B | 1.46B | 1.22B | 1.15B | 1.15B | 1.14B | 1.13B | 1.13B | 1.10B | 1.07B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.72 | $14.94 | $15.46 | $19.90 | $20.48 | $29.21 | $38.87 | $31.81 | $34.48 | $40.08 | $41.38 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.81 | $1.64 | $-3.39 | $3.60 | $4.52 | $7.87 | $11.38 | $6.42 | $8.98 | $5.01 | $9.23 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.73 | $2.89 | $2.14 | $5.25 | $3.84 | $7.53 | $6.45 | $8.75 | $9.88 | $11.60 | $11.63 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.73 | $2.89 | $2.14 | $5.25 | $3.84 | $7.53 | $6.01 | $8.75 | $9.88 | $11.60 | $11.63 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.36 | $0.46 | $0.54 | $0.73 | $1.22 | $1.64 | $1.99 | $1.29 | $0.92 | $1.08 | $1.66 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $21.21 | $20.62 | $0.55 | $4.02 | $5.29 | $8.66 | $15.84 | $19.17 | $23.25 | $19.19 | $25.37 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.0%/yr | +14.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.5%/yr | +24.8%/yr |
| EPS | +3.1%/yr | +2.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +13.0%/yr | −2.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −1.1%/yr | +29.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $5.5B of profit into $12.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $5.5B | $10.1B | $7.2B | $12.9B | $9.0B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.6B | +$1.7B | +$1.8B | +$1.8B | +$1.6B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$2.8B | +$2.6B | +$2.5B | +$2.0B | +$1.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$4.1B | −$2.3B | −$226M | −$7.6B | −$1.8B |
| Cash from operations | $14.0B | $12.2B | $11.3B | $9.1B | $10.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1.2B | −$1.0B | −$1.4B | −$1.8B | −$1.9B |
| Owner earnings | $12.8B | $11.2B | $9.8B | $7.3B | $8.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$500M | — |
| Free cash flow | $12.8B | $11.2B | $9.8B | $6.8B | $8.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 29% | 29% | 27% | 17% | 26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2.8B), owner earnings is nearer $10.0B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 18.6×ComfortableOperating income $12.4B ÷ interest expense $664M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.7B · 0.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $5.5B + ST investments $4.6B − debt $14.8B
What this means
Netting $10.2B of cash and short-term investments against $14.8B of debt leaves $4.7B owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (1.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 24 + DIO 121 − DPO 52 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range 7%–53%; 20% latest = NOPAT $6.2B ÷ invested capital $30.5BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 14%–30%; latest $12.8B = operating cash $14.0B − maintenance capex $1.2BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2.8B of SBC) leaves $10.0B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $14.0B ÷ net income $5.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $10.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $12.8B
What this means
Of $12.8B Owner Earnings, $10.8B (85%) went back to shareholders, $2.1B dividends, $8.8B buybacks. Net of $2.8B stock comp, the real buyback was about $6.0B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.74×HarvestingCapex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $1.6B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $44.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.82×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $14.8B vs $16.6B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +619%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.25/share (latest year $5.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 14% early to 25% lately, median 27% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 45%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 2.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −3.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$9.8B
- Receivables$2.9B
- Inventory$7.4B
- Other current assets$3.1B
- Debt due within a year$498M
- Accounts payable$3.0B
- Other current liabilities$6.3B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $86.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$12.1B · 14%
- Buybacks$54.5B · 63%
- Retained (debt / cash)$20.2B · 23%
- Returned to owners$54.5B
72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $54.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$94.57
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 557M shares were bought for $52.7B, about $94.57 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $53.74 (2016) to $164.84 (2024); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $80.93 ($22.6B).
- Net change in share count−28.2%
The diluted count fell from 1498M to 1075M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$292M written down across 3 years (2016, 2018, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Cristiano R. Amon | $20.6M | $39.0M | $8.6B |
| 2021 | Cristiano R. Amon | $7.4M | $40.8M | $8.6B |
| 2022 | Cristiano R. Amon | $4.8M | $5.2M | $7.3B |
| 2023 | Cristiano R. Amon | $23.5M | $8.6M | $9.8B |
| 2024 | Cristiano R. Amon | $25.9M | $48.4M | $11.2B |
| 2025 | Cristiano R. Amon | $29.7M | $29.6M | $12.8B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio292:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$2.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why QUALCOMM Incorporated is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 23% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $3.8B to $10.2B while revenue grew 89%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $1.2B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Communications Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTCIntel Corporation | $52.9B | 56% | 23.4% | 11% | 15% |
| GEGE Aerospace | $45.9B | 36% | -2.2% | -2% | 6% |
| QCOMQUALCOMM Incorporated | $44.3B | 57% | 27.1% | 28% | 26% |
| GEVGE Vernova Inc. | $38.1B | 16% | -0.7% | -3% | 3% |
| MUMicron Technology Inc. | $37.4B | 39% | 24.4% | 15% | 20% |
| EMREmerson Electric Company | $18.0B | 43% | 15.3% | 17% | 14% |
| WHRWhirlpool | $15.5B | 17% | 5.4% | 12% | 3% |
| MSIMotorola Solutions Inc. | $11.7B | 49% | 20.1% | 36% | 18% |
| Group median | — | 41% | 17.7% | 14% | 14% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what QUALCOMM Incorporated has delivered.
Through the cycle, QUALCOMM Incorporated earns about $11.5B on its 26.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 28.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $12.5B on 1054M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $5.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.8B) runs well above depreciation ($1.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $13.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← QBTS its page in the Manual QCRH →
Industry order: ← PL the Communications Equipment chapter SATL →