← All companies ← GEV Manual GFF → ← FUL Chemicals GPRE →

GEVO, Gevo Inc.

Chemicals capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We produce and sell renewable, drop-in products for these sectors, and generate carbon abatement value through our processes, plant designs and business systems.

Carbon abatement value can be valorized via Renewable Identification Numbers ("RINs"), state credits, Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA") tax credits, and various voluntary carbon credits including value creation from Scope 1 and 3 greenhouse gas emissions reductions for end customers.

Gevo is primarily a project development, investment, and technology company, which also holds certain operating assets with the intent of generating cash flow.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GEVO · Gevo Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$161M

+849.3% YoY · 96% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $174M 5-yr avg $39M

Operating margin −2.9% 5-yr avg −4214.4%

ROIC −1% 5-yr avg −14%

Owner-earnings margin −25% 5-yr avg −3072%

Free cash flow margin −25% 5-yr avg −6386%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is GevoND (85%), GevoRNG (11%) and Gevo (4%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −476% through the cycle on a −39% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 27% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −22%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

GevoND is 85% of revenue, with GevoRNG the other meaningful segment at 11%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

GevoND85%$137M
GevoRNG11%$18M
Gevo4%$6M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$27M	$28M	$33M	$24M	$6M	$533K	$1M	$17M	$17M	$161M	$174M	RevenueRevenue
−36%	−39%	−26%	−50%	—	—	—	—	—	—	91%	Gross marginGross mgn
33%	27%	25%	40%	202%	n/m	n/m	248%	271%	32%	32%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
19%	19%	16%	16%	63%	n/m	632%	39%	33%	3%	3%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($24M)	($23M)	($22M)	($26M)	($27M)	($60M)	($103M)	($82M)	($91M)	($20M)	($5M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−88.1%	−84.6%	−67.6%	−107.6%	−487.0%	n/m	n/m	−475.8%	−536.9%	−12.6%	−2.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($37M)	($25M)	($28M)	($29M)	($40M)	($59M)	($98M)	($66M)	($79M)	($34M)	($34M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($21M)	($21M)	($16M)	($21M)	($19M)	($48M)	($44M)	($54M)	($57M)	($13M)	($10M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$6M	$5M	$8M	$19M	$18M	$25M	$27M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	($3M)	$5M	($184K)	$13M	($4M)	$28M	($24M)	($12M)	($14M)	($13M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$6M	$2M	$2M	$6M	$6M	$57M	$84M	$54M	$51M	$30M	$33M	CapexCapex
21.8%	6.9%	6.8%	26.5%	112.3%	n/m	n/m	316.6%	302.0%	18.8%	19.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($26M)	($23M)	($18M)	($27M)	($26M)	($53M)	($52M)	($73M)	($76M)	($44M)	($44M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−97.2%	−81.8%	−55.0%	−111.6%	−461.6%	n/m	n/m	−422.8%	−447.4%	−27.1%	−25.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($26M)	($23M)	($18M)	($27M)	($26M)	($105M)	($128M)	($108M)	($108M)	($44M)	($44M)	Free cash flowFCF
−97.2%	−81.8%	−55.0%	−111.6%	−461.6%	n/m	n/m	−628.9%	−641.3%	−27.1%	−25.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$6M	$198M	$198M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
-25%	-35%	-26%	-37%	-31%	-8%	-19%	-20%	-20%	-3%	-1%	ROICROIC
-54%	-39%	-32%	-40%	-27%	-11%	-16%	-12%	-16%	-7%	-8%	Return on equityROE
−54%	−39%	−32%	−40%	−27%	−11%	−16%	−12%	−16%	−7%	−8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$28M	$12M	$34M	$16M	$78M	$381M	$405M	$298M	$189M	$81M	$246M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1M	$1M	$526K	$1M	$527K	$978K	$476K	$3M	$2M	$8M	$10M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$3M	$4M	$3M	$3M	$2M	$3M	$6M	$4M	$5M	$19M	$22M	InventoryInvent.
$3M	$666K	$2M	$1M	$897K	$5M	$5M	$3M	$539K	$1M	$6M	Accounts payablePayables
$2M	$5M	$2M	$3M	$2M	($1M)	$2M	$4M	$6M	$26M	$26M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$33M	$18M	$39M	$24M	$83M	$349M	$415M	$386M	$204M	$143M	$116M	Current assetsCur. assets
$35M	$11M	$5M	$20M	$5M	$29M	$25M	$91M	$24M	$79M	$27M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	1.6×	7.3×	1.2×	16.9×	12.0×	16.3×	4.2×	8.4×	1.8×	4.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$4M	$44M	$44M	GoodwillGoodwill
$112M	$89M	$107M	$93M	$152M	$645M	$701M	$650M	$584M	$719M	$654M	Total assetsAssets
$36M	—	$13M	$749K	$1M	$67M	$68M	$68M	$67M	$165M	$197M	Total debtDebt
$8M	—	($21M)	($16M)	($77M)	($314M)	($337M)	($230M)	($122M)	$84M	($49M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.1×	-7.9×	—	-9.6×	-12.9×	-240.1×	-88.0×	-37.9×	-23.4×	-1.2×	-0.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$69M	$64M	$89M	$73M	$146M	$547M	$605M	$557M	$489M	$466M	$448M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.3%	1.5%	2.1%	5.5%	38.4%	n/m	n/m	99.3%	87.1%	5.7%	5.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
192M	815K	4.9M	12.2M	56.9M	196M	222M	239M	232M	234M	237M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.14	$33.79	$6.74	$2.01	$0.10	$0.00	$0.01	$0.07	$0.07	$0.69	$0.74	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.19	$-30.23	$-5.74	$-2.35	$-0.71	$-0.30	$-0.44	$-0.28	$-0.34	$-0.14	$-0.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.14	$-27.65	$-3.71	$-2.24	$-0.45	$-0.27	$-0.24	$-0.30	$-0.33	$-0.19	$-0.18	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.14	$-27.65	$-3.71	$-2.24	$-0.45	$-0.54	$-0.58	$-0.45	$-0.47	$-0.19	$-0.18	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$2.34	$0.46	$0.53	$0.11	$0.29	$0.38	$0.23	$0.22	$0.13	$0.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.36	$77.97	$18.21	$5.95	$2.57	$2.80	$2.73	$2.34	$2.11	$1.99	$1.89	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/236.1 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×5.99 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.5 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×4.67 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.44 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+19.2%/yr	+47.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+17.2%/yr	+3.3%/yr
Book value / share	+20.9%/yr	−5.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

234Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

−3%low FY2019

Gross margin

−50%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($44M)owner earningsvs.($34M)net incomelow FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $34M loss but ($44M) of owner earnings: $10M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($34M)	($79M)	($66M)	($98M)	($59M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$25M	+$18M	+$19M	+$8M	+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$15M	+$17M	+$17M	+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$14M	−$12M	−$24M	+$28M	−$4M
Cash from operations	($13M)	($57M)	($54M)	($44M)	($48M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$30M	−$18M	−$19M	−$8M	−$5M
Owner earnings	($44M)	($76M)	($73M)	($52M)	($53M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$33M	−$35M	−$76M	−$52M
Free cash flow	($44M)	($108M)	($108M)	($128M)	($105M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-27%	-447%	-423%	-4442%	-10019%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer ($53M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“Management identified a material weakness in the Company's internal control over financial reporting related to information technology general controls within certain financial systems of a recently acquired entity.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.2×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($20M) ÷ interest expense $18M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$84M

Net cash

Cash $81M + ST investments $167M − debt $165M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $84M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 457d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 19 + DIO 464 − DPO 26 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -25%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -37%–-3%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($16M) ÷ invested capital $550M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -423%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -10019%–-27%; latest ($44M) = operating cash ($13M) − maintenance capex $30M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -27% of revenue this year, a -423% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves ($53M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($13M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($34M) · cash from operations ($13M)

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.19×

Maintaining

Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $25M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $161M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.82×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $165M vs $65M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.24/share (latest year $-0.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −80% → −342% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
The recent-years average (−342%) sits below the early years (−80%), but the latest year (−13%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −476% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −9%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2021 · −11307.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +2.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“In connection with our September 2024 acquisition of Cultivate AI we recorded approximately $3.7 million of goodwill.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$116M

Cash & short-term investments$246M
Receivables$10M
Inventory$22M

Current liabilities$27M

Debt due within a year$30M
Accounts payable$6M

Current ratio4.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.51×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio9.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$89Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$30M due · $246M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway5.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+47.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters10.2× → 4.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$344Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($83M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$200M$3M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$139M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity9%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$205Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $299M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Gruber	$11.0M	$11.9M	($53M)
2022	Mr. Gruber	$3.5M	−$3.2M	($52M)
2023	Mr. Gruber	$3.7M	$1.5M	($73M)
2024	Mr. Gruber	$3.1M	$6.5M	($76M)
2025	Mr. Gruber	$3.5M	$3.0M	($44M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership7.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gevo Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$36M → $197M
Debt rose from $36M to $197M while owner earnings went from about ($22M) to ($64M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SXTSensient Technologies	$1.6B	33%	12.3%	9%	6%
WLKPWestlake Chemical Partners LP Common	$1.2B	35%	32.0%	—	32%
ALTOAlto Ingredients Inc.	$918M	1%	-1.8%	-7%	0%
REXREX American Resources Corporation	$650M	11%	6.8%	13%	8%
LXULSB Industries Inc.	$615M	5%	-2.7%	-1%	-3%
LXFRLuxfer Holdings PLC	$385M	24%	7.8%	10%	5%
GPREGreen Plains Inc.	$189M	—	-32.4%	-7%	-31%
GEVOGevo Inc.	$161M	-37%	-291.7%	-22%	-267%
Group median	—	11%	2.5%	-1%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Gevo Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered174%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−25%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh GEVO against another business →

The owners of GEVO: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gevo Inc. (GEVO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GEVO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GEV its page in the Manual GFF →

Industry order: ← FUL the Chemicals chapter GPRE →