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GPRE, Green Plains Inc.

Chemicals capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Revenue is Distiller Grains (50%) and Other (50%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GPRE · Green Plains Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$189M

+16.0% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $196M 5-yr avg $131M

Operating margin 20.3% 5-yr avg −41.2%

Owner-earnings margin 51% 5-yr avg −94%

Free cash flow margin 51% 5-yr avg −94%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A chemicals business, converting feedstocks into products at a spread the cycle moves.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 30% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −36%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 58% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Distiller Grains at 50%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Distiller Grains50%$95M
Other50%$94M
Ethanol0%$0
Corn Oil0%$0

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.4B	$3.3B	$332M	$84M	$50M	$86M	$79M	$136M	$163M	$189M	$196M	RevenueRevenue
3%	3%	33%	92%	169%	106%	151%	98%	72%	65%	51%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$92M	$24M	$90M	($143M)	($123M)	$26M	($99M)	($62M)	($47M)	($67M)	$40M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.7%	0.7%	27.1%	−169.6%	−244.7%	29.6%	−126.0%	−45.2%	−29.1%	−35.6%	20.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$11M	$61M	$16M	($167M)	($109M)	($66M)	($127M)	($93M)	($82M)	($121M)	($15M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$101M	($182M)	$39M	($10M)	$99M	$4M	$70M	$56M	($30M)	$111M	$126M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$84M	$104M	$98M	$72M	$78M	$92M	$93M	$98M	$91M	$98M	$100M	DepreciationDeprec.
($4M)	($359M)	($87M)	$76M	$122M	($28M)	$95M	$38M	($46M)	$117M	$32M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$58M	$45M	$41M	$75M	$111M	$187M	$212M	$108M	$95M	$37M	$27M	CapexCapex
1.7%	1.4%	12.2%	89.8%	220.6%	217.2%	270.3%	79.3%	58.3%	19.7%	13.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$43M	($227M)	($2M)	($85M)	($12M)	($183M)	($143M)	($52M)	($125M)	$74M	$99M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.2%	−6.9%	−0.5%	−101.2%	−23.3%	−212.3%	−181.6%	−38.0%	−76.7%	39.0%	50.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$43M	($227M)	($2M)	($85M)	($12M)	($183M)	($143M)	($52M)	($125M)	$74M	$99M	Free cash flowFCF
1.2%	−6.9%	−0.5%	−101.2%	−23.3%	−212.3%	−181.6%	−38.0%	−76.7%	39.0%	50.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$508M	$62M	$124M	—	$21M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$37M	$39M	$41M	$32M	$10M	$9M	$23M	$23M	$5M	$721K	$721K	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$6M	$7M	$3M	$62M	$11M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$30M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	—	-13%	-12%	—	-8%	-5%	-3%	-6%	—	ROICROIC
1%	6%	2%	-22%	-17%	-7%	-14%	-11%	-10%	-16%	-2%	Return on equityROE
−3%	2%	−3%	−26%	−18%	−8%	−16%	−14%	−10%	−16%	−2%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$304M	$267M	$252M	$246M	$234M	$551M	$445M	$350M	$173M	$182M	$96M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$147M	$151M	$89M	$107M	$56M	$120M	$109M	$94M	$95M	$74M	$86M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$192M	$205M	$136M	$157M	$140M	$146M	$234M	$187M	$155M	$135M	$89M	Accounts payablePayables
($45M)	($54M)	($47M)	($50M)	($84M)	($26M)	($126M)	($92M)	($60M)	($61M)	($3M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$668M	$642M	$1.1B	$929M	$733M	$569M	$482M	$542M	Current assetsCur. assets
$595M	$886M	$834M	$542M	$453M	$472M	$487M	$385M	$386M	$269M	$318M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.4×	1.4×	1.2×	1.4×	2.4×	1.9×	1.9×	1.5×	1.8×	1.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$184M	$183M	$35M	$35M	$11M	$29M	$29M	—	—	—	$29M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.5B	$2.8B	$2.2B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Total assetsAssets
$818M	$835M	$353M	$377M	$385M	$549M	$497M	$494M	$435M	$366M	$689M	Total debtDebt
$513M	$569M	$101M	$131M	$151M	($2M)	$52M	$144M	$262M	$184M	$593M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.8×	0.3×	1.0×	-3.5×	-3.1×	0.4×	-3.0×	-1.6×	-1.4×	-0.9×	0.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$863M	$942M	$947M	$752M	$647M	$951M	$910M	$844M	$865M	$766M	$785M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.4%	3.4%	11.5%	15.8%	7.0%	11.5%	9.6%	5.1%	9.1%	5.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
38.6M	50.2M	41.3M	38.1M	34.6M	46.7M	55.5M	58.8M	63.8M	67.5M	84.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$88.43	$65.48	$8.05	$2.21	$1.45	$1.85	$1.41	$2.32	$2.55	$2.80	$2.33	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.28	$1.22	$0.39	$-4.38	$-3.14	$-1.41	$-2.29	$-1.59	$-1.29	$-1.80	$-0.18	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.10	$-4.51	$-0.04	$-2.23	$-0.34	$-3.92	$-2.57	$-0.88	$-1.96	$1.09	$1.18	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.10	$-4.51	$-0.04	$-2.23	$-0.34	$-3.92	$-2.57	$-0.88	$-1.96	$1.09	$1.18	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.97	$0.78	$1.00	$0.83	$0.28	$0.20	$0.41	$0.39	$0.08	$0.01	$0.01	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.51	$0.89	$0.98	$1.98	$3.19	$4.01	$3.82	$1.84	$1.49	$0.55	$0.32	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.36	$18.75	$22.95	$19.73	$18.68	$20.37	$16.38	$14.35	$13.56	$11.35	$9.33	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−31.9%/yr	+14.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−0.1%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−39.4%/yr	−47.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	−10.6%/yr	−29.6%/yr
Book value / share	−7.3%/yr	−9.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

67Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−6%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$74Mowner earningsvs.($121M)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $121M loss into $74M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($121M)	($82M)	($93M)	($127M)	($66M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$98M	+$91M	+$98M	+$93M	+$92M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$17M	+$8M	+$13M	+$9M	+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$117M	−$46M	+$38M	+$95M	−$28M
Cash from operations	$111M	($30M)	$56M	$70M	$4M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$37M	−$95M	−$108M	−$212M	−$187M
Owner earnings	$74M	($125M)	($52M)	($143M)	($183M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	39%	-77%	-38%	-182%	-212%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $57M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.9×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($67M) ÷ interest expense $77M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $184M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $182M − debt $366M

What this means
Netting $182M of cash and short-term investments against $366M of debt leaves $184M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -8%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -13%–-3%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($53M) ÷ invested capital $950M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 39%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $74M = operating cash $111M − maintenance capex $37M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -38%)

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year, a -38% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $57M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $111M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($121M) · cash from operations $111M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 42%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $31M ÷ Owner Earnings $74M

What this means
Of $74M Owner Earnings, $31M (42%) went back to shareholders, $721K dividends, $30M buybacks. Net of $17M stock comp, the real buyback was about $13M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.38×

Harvesting

Capex $37M ÷ depreciation $98M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $189M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.79×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $366M vs $214M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −439%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.41/share (latest year $-1.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → −37% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −37% lately, median −36% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −244.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +6.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$542M

Cash & short-term investments$96M
Receivables$86M
Other current assets$361M

Current liabilities$318M

Debt due within a year$69M
Accounts payable$89M
Other current liabilities$160M

Current ratio1.71×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio

Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$224Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$69M due · $96M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−25.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$746Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($253M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$525M$67M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$9Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $258M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$969M · 376%
Dividends$220M · 85%
Buybacks$119M · 46%

Returned to owners$339M
$220M as dividends and $119M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $208M.
Average price paid for buybacks$12.00
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $83M, about $12.00 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $11.42 (2019) to $17.04 (2017); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $11.42 ($62M).
Net change in share count118.1%
The diluted count rose from 39M to 84M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.01/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 39% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$40M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity4%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$716Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $969M of capital spent building

$24M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Green Plains Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?118.1%
Diluted shares grew 118.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $119M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SXTSensient Technologies	$1.6B	33%	12.3%	9%	6%
WLKPWestlake Chemical Partners LP Common	$1.2B	35%	32.0%	—	32%
ALTOAlto Ingredients Inc.	$918M	1%	-1.8%	-7%	0%
REXREX American Resources Corporation	$650M	11%	6.8%	13%	8%
LXULSB Industries Inc.	$615M	5%	-2.7%	-1%	-3%
LXFRLuxfer Holdings PLC	$385M	24%	7.8%	10%	5%
GPREGreen Plains Inc.	$189M	—	-32.4%	-7%	-31%
GEVOGevo Inc.	$161M	-37%	-291.7%	-22%	-267%
Group median	—	—	2.5%	-1%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Green Plains Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle (($34M)) Net of stock comp (−$10M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $99M on 70M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $593M. The if-converted diluted count is 84M, 20% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GPRE against another business →

The owners of GPRE: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Green Plains Inc. (GPRE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GPRE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GPOR its page in the Manual GRAL →

Industry order: ← GEVO the Chemicals chapter HUN →