Share count
370Mpeak FY2024
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GFL, GFL Environmental Inc.
We are the fourth largest diversified environmental services company in North America, as measured by revenue and North American operating footprint.
We retained a 44% non-controlling equity interest in Environmental Services with the Apollo Funds and BC Funds each holding a 28% equity interest.
As a result of the subscription by HPS for its approximately 22% interest, our equity investment in Environmental Services was reduced to approximately 34.0% and each of the BC Funds' and Apollo Funds' equity investment was reduced to approximately 22%.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
C$6.6B
+7.8% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$6.6B 5-yr avg C$6.4B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Collection (68%) and Landfills (18%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 65% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.1%) on a 9.2% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −30 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Collection is 68% of revenue, with Landfills the other meaningful line at 18%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Collection68%C$4.5B
- Landfills18%C$1.2B
- Material Recovery8%C$504M
- Other5%C$363M
By geographyUSA67%Canada33%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| C$3.3B | C$4.2B | C$5.1B | C$6.8B | C$7.5B | C$6.1B | C$6.6B | C$6.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 8% | 5% | 9% | 12% | 17% | 18% | — | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (C$137M) | (C$983M) | (C$392M) | (C$61M) | C$738M | (C$386M) | C$4.3B | C$4.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −4.1% | −23.4% | −7.6% | −0.9% | 9.8% | −6.3% | 64.6% | 64.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (C$452M) | (C$1.1B) | (C$607M) | (C$312M) | C$45M | (C$723M) | C$3.8B | C$3.8B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| C$251M | C$502M | C$898M | C$1.1B | C$980M | C$1.5B | C$1.3B | C$1.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| C$703M | C$1.6B | C$1.5B | C$1.4B | C$935M | C$2.3B | (C$2.5B) | (C$2.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| C$458M | C$428M | C$647M | C$765M | C$1.1B | C$1.2B | C$1.1B | C$1.1B | CapexCapex |
| 13.7% | 10.2% | 12.6% | 11.3% | 14.0% | 19.4% | 17.3% | 17.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (C$207M) | C$74M | C$251M | C$331M | (C$75M) | C$347M | C$175M | C$175M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −6.2% | 1.8% | 4.9% | 4.9% | −1.0% | 5.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (C$207M) | C$74M | C$251M | C$331M | (C$75M) | C$347M | C$175M | C$175M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −6.2% | 1.8% | 4.9% | 4.9% | −1.0% | 5.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| C$0 | C$13M | C$18M | C$21M | C$25M | C$28M | C$31M | C$31M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -1% | -7% | -2% | -0% | 2% | -2% | 29% | 29% | ROICROIC |
| -16% | -20% | -11% | -5% | 1% | -10% | 53% | 53% | Return on equityROE |
| −16% | −20% | −11% | −6% | 0% | −11% | 52% | 52% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| C$575M | C$27M | C$190M | C$82M | C$136M | C$134M | C$86M | C$86M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$713M | C$867M | C$1.1B | C$1.1B | C$1.1B | C$1.2B | C$802M | C$802M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| C$51M | C$57M | C$82M | C$84M | C$98M | C$108M | C$61M | C$61M | InventoryInvent. |
| C$732M | C$1.0B | C$1.3B | C$1.6B | C$1.7B | C$1.9B | C$1.9B | C$1.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| C$32M | (C$90M) | (C$103M) | (C$355M) | (C$501M) | (C$597M) | (C$1.0B) | (C$1.0B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| C$1.4B | C$1.0B | C$1.5B | C$1.4B | C$1.5B | C$1.7B | C$1.2B | C$1.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| C$865M | C$1.2B | C$1.5B | C$2.7B | C$1.8B | C$3.2B | C$2.0B | C$2.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.5× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| C$5.2B | C$6.5B | C$7.5B | C$8.2B | C$7.9B | C$8.1B | C$6.9B | C$6.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| C$12.3B | C$15.7B | C$18.4B | C$19.8B | C$19.9B | C$21.2B | C$19.3B | C$19.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| C$7.6B | C$6.2B | C$8.0B | C$9.2B | C$8.8B | C$8.9B | C$7.4B | C$7.4B | Total debtDebt |
| C$7.0B | C$6.1B | C$7.8B | C$9.2B | C$8.7B | C$8.7B | C$7.3B | C$7.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.3× | -2.6× | -1.2× | -0.1× | 1.4× | -0.7× | 9.4× | 9.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| C$2.8B | C$5.6B | C$5.8B | C$6.0B | C$7.2B | C$7.0B | C$7.3B | C$7.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 361M | 360M | 362M | 367M | 370M | 381M | 370M | 371M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$9.27 | C$11.64 | C$14.21 | C$18.41 | C$20.33 | C$16.12 | C$17.90 | C$17.83 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$-1.25 | C$-3.06 | C$-1.68 | C$-0.85 | C$0.12 | C$-1.90 | C$10.37 | C$10.33 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$-0.57 | C$0.21 | C$0.69 | C$0.90 | C$-0.20 | C$0.91 | C$0.47 | C$0.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| C$-0.57 | C$0.21 | C$0.69 | C$0.90 | C$-0.20 | C$0.91 | C$0.47 | C$0.47 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| C$0.00 | C$0.04 | C$0.05 | C$0.06 | C$0.07 | C$0.07 | C$0.08 | C$0.08 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| C$1.27 | C$1.19 | C$1.79 | C$2.08 | C$2.85 | C$3.13 | C$3.09 | C$3.08 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| C$7.67 | C$15.46 | C$15.98 | C$16.44 | C$19.42 | C$18.32 | C$19.76 | C$19.68 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2020 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.6%/yr | +9.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +18.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | +18.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +16.0%/yr | +21.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +17.1%/yr | +5.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
29%low FY2020
Gross margin
18%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
42.0×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
C$175Mowner earningsvs.C$3.8Bnet incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported C$3.8B of profit but C$175M of owner earnings: C$3.7B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | C$3.8B | (C$723M) | C$45M | (C$312M) | (C$607M) |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −C$2.5B | +C$2.3B | +C$935M | +C$1.4B | +C$1.5B |
| Cash from operations | C$1.3B | C$1.5B | C$980M | C$1.1B | C$898M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −C$1.1B | −C$1.2B | −C$1.1B | −C$765M | −C$647M |
| Owner earnings | C$175M | C$347M | (C$75M) | C$331M | C$251M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 6% | -1% | 5% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income C$4.3B ÷ interest expense C$456M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? C$7.3B · 1.7× operating profitModest net debtCash C$86M − debt C$7.4B
What this means
Netting C$86M of cash and short-term investments against C$7.4B of debt leaves C$7.3B owed, about 1.7× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 44 + DIO 4 − DPO 131 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -7%–29%; 29% latest = NOPAT C$4.3B ÷ invested capital C$14.6BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 29% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -6%–6%; latest C$175M = operating cash C$1.3B − maintenance capex C$1.1BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 7 years.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops C$1.3B ÷ net income C$3.8B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks C$3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings C$175M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against C$175M of Owner Earnings, C$3.0B (1717%) went back to shareholders, C$31M dividends, C$3.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$6.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.58×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · C$7.4B vs (C$834M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$2.84/share (latest year C$10.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$19.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −12% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −12% early to 23% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 50%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2020 · −23.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Single-stream recycling is possible through the use of various artificial intelligence and optical sorting technologies installed at MRFs.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsC$1.2B
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$86M
- ReceivablesC$802M
- InventoryC$61M
- Other current assetsC$216M
Current liabilitiesC$2.0B
- Accounts payableC$1.9B
- Other current liabilitiesC$110M
Current ratio0.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(C$834M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(C$1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(C$10.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$7.9BC$511M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated C$6.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedC$5.7B · 86%
- DividendsC$136M · 2%
- BuybacksC$3.0B · 45%
- Returned to ownersC$3.1B
346% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$136M as dividends and C$3.0B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−C$2.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran C$2.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down C$489M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran C$3.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count2.7%
The diluted count rose from 361M to 371M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordC$0.08/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangiblesC$8.7B45% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity94%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiringC$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against C$5.7B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GFL Environmental Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Waste Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMWaste Management Inc. | $25.2B | 38% | 17.3% | 12% | 13% |
| RSGRepublic Services Inc. | $16.6B | 40% | 17.5% | 9% | 13% |
| WCNWaste Connections Inc. | $9.5B | 41% | 15.5% | 6% | 15% |
| CMSCMS Energy Corporation | $8.3B | — | 18.7% | 5% | 12% |
| UGIUGI Corporation | $7.1B | — | 15.2% | 10% | 5% |
| GFLGFL Environmental Inc. | C$6.6B | 11% | -4.1% | -1% | 3% |
| CLHClean Harbors Inc. | $6.0B | 31% | 8.6% | 8% | 6% |
| CWSTCasella Waste Systems Inc. | $1.8B | 33% | 6.8% | 4% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 36% | 15.3% | 7% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. GFL Environmental Inc. reports in CAD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that CAD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in CAD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GFL Environmental Inc. has delivered.
C$
Through the cycle, GFL Environmental Inc. earns about C$175M on its 2.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−50%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−50%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings C$175M on 371M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net debt C$7.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GFL Environmental Inc. (GFL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GFL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GFI its page in the Manual GFR →
Industry order: ← CWST the Waste Management chapter OIO →