Owner Scorecard


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WM, Waste Management Inc.

Waste Management capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Waste Management, Inc. is a holding company and all operations are conducted by its subsidiaries.

We are North America's leading provider of comprehensive environmental solutions, providing services throughout the United States ("U.S.") and Canada.

We partner with our customers and the communities we serve to manage and reduce waste at each stage from collection to disposal, while recovering valuable resources and creating clean, renewable energy.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
WM · Waste Management Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$25.2B
+14.2% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $25.4B 5-yr avg $21.1B
Gross margin 41% 5-yr avg 39%
Operating margin 17.3% 5-yr avg 17.3%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by East Tier (36%) and West Tier (35%), with 4 more segments behind.
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 39% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 16%–19% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Capital spending runs about 11% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest East Tier at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • East Tier36%$9.0B
  • West Tier35%$8.7B
  • Other Ancillary12%$2.9B
  • Healthcare Solutions10%$2.5B
  • Recycling Processing and Sales6%$1.5B
  • Renewable Energy2%$478M
  • Corporate and Other0%$22M
By geographyUnited States95%Canada4%Western Europe and other1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$13.6B$14.5B$14.9B$15.5B$15.2B$17.9B$19.7B$20.4B$22.1B$25.2B$25.4BRevenueRevenue
38%38%38%39%39%38%38%38%39%40%41%Gross marginGross mgn
10%10%10%11%11%10%10%9%10%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$2.3B$2.6B$2.8B$2.7B$2.4B$3.0B$3.4B$3.6B$4.1B$4.3B$4.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
16.9%18.2%18.7%17.5%16.0%16.5%17.1%17.5%18.4%17.1%17.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.2B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$1.5B$1.8B$2.2B$2.3B$2.7B$2.7B$2.8BNet incomeNet inc.
35%11%19%21%21%23%23%24%21%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.0B$3.2B$3.6B$3.9B$3.4B$4.3B$4.5B$4.7B$5.4B$6.0B$6.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.3B$2.9B$2.9BDepreciationDeprec.
$430M($246M)$79M$544M$142M$415M$176M$251M$259M$303M$465MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1.3B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.6B$2.0B$2.8B$2.9B$3.2B$3.2B$3.0BCapexCapex
9.9%10.8%11.2%11.7%10.4%11.4%14.3%14.2%14.6%12.8%12.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.7B$1.6B$1.9B$2.1B$1.8B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6B$3.1B$2.8B$3.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.2%11.1%12.7%13.3%11.9%12.8%12.7%13.0%14.2%11.2%12.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.7B$1.6B$1.9B$2.1B$1.8B$2.3B$1.7B$1.8B$2.2B$2.8B$3.3BFree cash flowFCF
12.2%11.1%12.7%13.3%11.9%12.8%8.8%8.9%9.8%11.2%12.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$608M$198M$460M$521M$4.1B$75M$377M$170M$7.5B$395M$395MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$726M$750M$802M$876M$927M$970M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
$725M$750M$1.0B$248M$402M$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$262MBuybacksBuybacks
10%15%14%13%9%11%12%12%10%10%11%ROICROIC
22%32%31%24%20%25%33%33%33%27%28%Return on equityROE
9%20%18%11%8%12%17%17%19%14%14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$32M$22M$61M$3.6B$553M$118M$351M$458M$414M$201M$335MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$2.1B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6B$3.3B$3.4B$3.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$799M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.4B$1.8B$1.7B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8BAccounts payablePayables
$901M$765M$894M$884M$976M$903M$695M$924M$1.2B$1.6B$1.6BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.4B$2.7B$2.6B$6.2B$3.5B$3.1B$3.6B$3.8B$4.8B$4.9B$4.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.8B$3.3B$3.1B$3.1B$3.6B$4.1B$4.4B$4.2B$6.3B$5.5B$5.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.8×0.9×2.0×1.0×0.8×0.8×0.9×0.8×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.2B$6.2B$6.4B$6.5B$9.0B$9.0B$9.3B$9.3B$13.4B$13.9B$13.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$20.9B$21.8B$22.6B$27.7B$29.3B$29.1B$31.4B$32.8B$44.6B$45.8B$45.7BTotal assetsAssets
$9.3B$9.5B$10.0B$13.5B$13.8B$13.4B$15.0B$16.2B$23.9B$22.9B$22.9BTotal debtDebt
$9.3B$9.5B$10.0B$9.9B$13.3B$13.3B$14.6B$15.8B$23.5B$22.7B$22.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$5.3B$6.0B$6.3B$7.1B$7.5B$7.1B$6.8B$6.9B$8.3B$10.0B$10.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$12M$34M$6M$27M$168M$16M$16MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
447M442M432M428M425M423M415M407M403M404M404MShares out (diluted)Shares
$30.48$32.78$34.51$36.15$35.80$42.40$47.47$50.20$54.69$62.36$62.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.65$4.41$4.45$3.91$3.52$4.29$5.39$5.66$6.81$6.70$6.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.71$3.65$4.39$4.82$4.28$5.44$6.02$6.51$7.74$6.97$8.14Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.71$3.65$4.39$4.82$4.28$5.44$4.16$4.48$5.35$6.97$8.14Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.63$1.70$1.86$2.05$2.18$2.29$2.60$2.79$3.00$3.30$3.42Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.02$3.55$3.87$4.25$3.73$4.82$6.77$7.11$8.01$7.98$7.53Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.86$13.62$14.52$16.53$17.53$16.85$16.50$16.96$20.46$24.72$24.78Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.3%/yr+11.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.3%/yr+10.3%/yr
EPS+10.9%/yr+13.7%/yr
Dividends / share+8.2%/yr+8.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.4%/yr+16.4%/yr
Book value / share+8.5%/yr+7.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Recycling Processing and Sales-6.9%
    “Recycling Processing and Sales and Renewable Energy — Recycling Processing and Sales revenues attributable to yield decreased $166 million in 2025 as compared to prior year.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
404Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
10%low FY2020
Gross margin
40%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
8.1×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.8Bowner earningsvs.$2.7Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2.7B of profit into $2.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2.7B
Owner earnings$2.8B · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$2.7B$2.7B$2.3B$2.2B$1.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.9B+$2.3B+$2.1B+$2.0B+$2.0B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$169M+$118M+$93M+$84M+$108M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$303M+$259M+$251M+$176M+$415M
Cash from operations$6.0B$5.4B$4.7B$4.5B$4.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$3.2B−$2.3B−$2.1B−$2.0B−$2.0B
Owner earnings$2.8B$3.1B$2.6B$2.5B$2.3B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$964M−$824M−$771M
Free cash flow$2.8B$2.2B$1.8B$1.7B$2.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%14%13%13%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $169M), owner earnings is nearer $2.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“Our consolidated financial statements have not been retroactively restated to include Stericycle's historical financial position or results of operations.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $4.3B ÷ interest expense $500M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $22.5B · 5.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $201M + ST investments $177M − debt $22.9B
    What this means

    Netting $378M of cash and short-term investments against $22.9B of debt leaves $22.5B owed, about 5.2× a year's operating profit (5.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 50 + DIO 0 − DPO 45 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 9%–15%; 10% latest = NOPAT $3.4B ÷ invested capital $32.7B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 11%–14%; latest $2.8B = operating cash $6.0B − maintenance capex $3.2B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $169M of SBC) leaves $2.6B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $6.0B ÷ net income $2.7B

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.8B
    What this means

    Of $2.8B Owner Earnings, $1.6B (57%) went back to shareholders, $1.3B dividends, $262M buybacks. Net of $169M stock comp, the real buyback was about $93M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.13×
    Maintaining
    Capex $3.2B ÷ depreciation $2.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $25.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $22.9B vs ($614M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +53%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.44/share (latest year $6.74), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 18% lately, median 17%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 16.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$335M
  • Receivables$3.4B
  • Other current assets$1.1B
Current liabilities$5.1B
  • Debt due within a year$641M
  • Accounts payable$1.8B
  • Other current liabilities$2.7B
Current ratio0.93×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.93×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.07×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($338M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$641M due · $335M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($7.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($30.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$1.0B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$764Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $42.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$22.2B · 53%
  • Dividends$9.8B · 23%
  • Buybacks$7.5B · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.5B · 6%
  • Returned to owners$17.4B

    77% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9.8B as dividends and $7.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $13.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $303M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$112.97

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 67M shares were bought for $7.5B, about $112.97 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $64.50 (2016) to $175.37 (2024); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $153.12 ($1.5B).

  • Net change in share count−9.4%

    The diluted count fell from 447M to 404M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.30/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained42%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.1B, so each retained $1 added about 0.42 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$17.6B39% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$14.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $22.2B of capital spent building

$263M written down across 6 years (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. James C. Fish, Jr.$13.1M$44.3M$2.3B
2022Mr. James C. Fish, Jr.$14.8M$13.0M$2.5B
2023Mr. James C. Fish, Jr.$14.6M$26.6M$2.6B
2024Mr. James C. Fish, Jr.$17.1M$24.5M$3.1B
2025Mr. James C. Fish, Jr.$19.0M$27.5M$2.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$169M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Waste Management Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$9.3B → $22.9B

    Debt rose from $9.3B to $22.9B while owner earnings went from about $1.7B to $2.9B — about 5.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $1.2B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$1.3B · 5% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “During 2025, our largest customer represented less than 5% of annual revenues.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Waste Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OKEONEOK Inc.$33.6B29%15.8%8%13%
NRGNRG Energy$30.3B24%7.6%13%9%
WMWaste Management Inc.$25.2B38%17.3%12%13%
CEGConstellation Energy$22.7B5.0%8%-17%
AEPAmerican Electric Power Company Inc.$21.7B19.2%6%26%
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.$19.5B45%25.7%19%18%
RSGRepublic Services Inc.$16.6B40%17.5%9%13%
WCNWaste Connections Inc.$9.5B41%15.5%6%15%
Group median39%16.6%9%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Waste Management Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Waste Management Inc. earns about $3.2B on its 12.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.3B on 402M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $22.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Waste Management Inc. (WM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WLYB its page in the Manual WMB →

Industry order: ← WCN the Waste Management chapter