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GFI, Gold Fields Limited

Gold & Precious Metals capital-intensive Cyclical

A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share

GFI · Gold Fields Limited

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$5.2B

+15.6% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.2B 5-yr avg $4.4B

Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 42%

Operating margin 17.6% 5-yr avg 31.7%

ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 18%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 13%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −13% and 38% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 24% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMDec 2024
											Income statement
$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$4.3B	$4.5B	$5.2B	$5.2B	RevenueRevenue
19%	25%	24%	21%	31%	45%	43%	39%	39%	45%	45%	Gross marginGross mgn
$84M	$426M	$236M	($326M)	$439M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.0B	$915M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.4%	16.0%	8.5%	−12.7%	14.8%	32.9%	31.3%	28.6%	27.4%	38.3%	17.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($247M)	$158M	($19M)	($348M)	$162M	$723M	$789M	$711M	$703M	$1.2B	$1.2B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	55%	—	—	52%	37%	35%	38%	40%	36%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.0B	$918M	$732M	$569M	$845M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$592M	$671M	$748M	$668M	$610M	$661M	$713M	$844M	$795M	$627M	$627M	DepreciationDeprec.
$688M	$88M	$3M	$249M	$73M	($273M)	($272M)	($176M)	($306M)	($265M)	($265M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$614M	$629M	$834M	$814M	$613M	$584M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	CapexCapex
25.0%	23.6%	30.2%	31.6%	20.6%	15.0%	26.0%	24.9%	23.4%	22.8%	22.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$418M	$289M	($102M)	($246M)	$233M	$528M	$517M	$535M	$398M	$980M	$980M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
17.0%	10.8%	−3.7%	−9.5%	7.8%	13.6%	12.3%	12.5%	8.8%	18.8%	18.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$418M	$289M	($102M)	($246M)	$233M	$528M	$142M	$310M	$138M	$424M	$424M	Free cash flowFCF
17.0%	10.8%	−3.7%	−9.5%	7.8%	13.6%	3.4%	7.2%	3.1%	8.1%	8.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$15M	$39M	$63M	$46M	$46M	$138M	$322M	$304M	$369M	$351M	$351M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
1%	5%	3%	-6%	6%	19%	19%	17%	15%	19%	9%	ROICROIC
-9%	5%	-1%	-11%	6%	20%	20%	17%	16%	24%	24%	Return on equityROE
−10%	4%	−2%	−12%	4%	16%	12%	10%	7%	17%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$440M	$471M	$394M	$220M	$515M	$887M	$525M	$769M	$649M	$860M	$860M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$68M	$170M	$172M	$172M	$136M	$240M	$264M	$198M	$251M	$338M	$338M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$294M	$329M	$394M	$394M	$418M	$522M	$628M	$759M	$828M	$699M	$699M	InventoryInvent.
—	$543M	$463M	$463M	$467M	$551M	$578M	$601M	$644M	$651M	$651M	Accounts payablePayables
$363M	($44M)	$102M	$102M	$87M	$211M	$314M	$356M	$435M	$386M	$386M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$904M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$959M	$1.1B	$1.7B	—	—	—	—	$1.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$522M	$859M	$854M	$739M	$1.4B	$917M	$822M	$785M	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.2×	1.3×	1.3×	0.8×	1.9×	—	—	—	—	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$295M	$318M	$77M	$77M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$5.9B	$6.3B	$6.5B	$6.5B	$6.6B	$7.5B	$7.3B	$7.3B	$8.2B	$10.1B	$10.1B	Total assetsAssets
$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$2.5B	$2.5B	Total debtDebt
$1.4B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$646M	$557M	$553M	$310M	$588M	$1.6B	$1.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.0×	5.5×	2.9×	-3.7×	4.3×	10.1×	13.0×	16.9×	19.6×	39.5×	18.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.8B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.3B	$2.8B	$3.7B	$4.0B	$4.2B	$4.5B	$5.2B	$5.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
775M	810M	821M	822M	827M	879M	887M	891M	893M	895M	771M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$3.17	$3.29	$3.37	$3.14	$3.59	$4.43	$4.73	$4.81	$5.04	$5.81	$6.74	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.32	$0.20	$-0.02	$-0.42	$0.20	$0.82	$0.89	$0.80	$0.79	$1.39	$1.61	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.54	$0.36	$-0.12	$-0.30	$0.28	$0.60	$0.58	$0.60	$0.44	$1.09	$1.27	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.54	$0.36	$-0.12	$-0.30	$0.28	$0.60	$0.16	$0.35	$0.15	$0.47	$0.55	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.05	$0.08	$0.06	$0.05	$0.16	$0.36	$0.34	$0.41	$0.39	$0.45	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.79	$0.78	$1.02	$0.99	$0.74	$0.66	$1.23	$1.20	$1.18	$1.32	$1.53	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.56	$3.77	$3.99	$3.99	$3.36	$4.17	$4.48	$4.72	$5.01	$5.81	$6.74	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.0%/yr	+10.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+8.2%/yr	+31.3%/yr
EPS	—	+48.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+39.6%/yr	+48.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.9%/yr	+12.3%/yr
Book value / share	+5.6%/yr	+11.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

895Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

19%low FY2018

Gross margin

45%low FY2015

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.7×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$980Mowner earningsvs.$1.2Bnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned $980M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $627M it takes just to hold its position. It put $556M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $424M.

Reported net income$1.2B

Owner earnings$980M · 19% of revenue

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	$1.2B	$703M	$711M	$789M	$723M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$627M	+$795M	+$844M	+$713M	+$661M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$265M	−$306M	−$176M	−$272M	−$273M
Cash from operations	$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$627M	−$795M	−$844M	−$713M	−$584M
Owner earnings	$980M	$398M	$535M	$517M	$528M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$556M	−$259M	−$225M	−$376M	—
Free cash flow	$424M	$138M	$310M	$142M	$528M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	9%	12%	12%	14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $627M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $556M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 18.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $915M ÷ interest expense $50M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 1.8× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $860M − debt $2.5B

What this means
Netting $860M of cash and short-term investments against $2.5B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 30d

Tight

DSO 24 + DIO 90 − DPO 84 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -6%–19%; 9% latest = NOPAT $586M ÷ invested capital $6.8B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -10%–19%; latest $980M = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $627M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. It chose to put $556M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $424M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.29×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.6B ÷ net income $1.2B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 36%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $351M ÷ Owner Earnings $980M

What this means
Of $980M Owner Earnings, $351M (36%) went back to shareholders, $351M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.89×

Expanding

Capex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $627M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.01×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.5B vs $20M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.99/share (latest year $1.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 31% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · −12.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“On a macro level, while AI is disrupting global markets and business models, it also offers opportunities for efficiency gains.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2020

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B

Cash & short-term investments$860M
Receivables$338M
Inventory$699M

Current liabilities$1.7B

Debt due within a year$719M
Accounts payable$651M
Other current liabilities$340M

Current ratio1.01×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.60×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$20Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$719M due · $860M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2020 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$5.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.9B$450M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $10.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$8.5B · 80%
Dividends$1.7B · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$441M · 4%

Returned to owners$1.7B
48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.7B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Net change in share count−0.4%
The diluted count barely moved (775M to 771M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.39/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 40% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained20%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $436M, so each retained $1 added about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gold Fields Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 20% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $363M to $1.0B while revenue grew 112%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 20% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Gold & Precious Metals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc.	$25.2B	29%	25.5%	15%	13%
NEMNewmont Corporation	$22.7B	—	12.0%	4%	19%
CLFCleveland-Cliffs	$18.6B	14%	8.4%	16%	9%
SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation	$13.4B	52%	41.5%	18%	24%
GFIGold Fields Limited	$5.2B	35%	21.7%	11%	12%
CDECoeur Mining Inc.	$2.1B	79%	4.3%	2%	2%
MUXMcEwen Inc.	$198M	77%	-43.0%	-9%	-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.	$95M	—	-177.0%	-15%	-157%
Group median	—	44%	10.2%	7%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one ordinary”; Gold Fields Limited reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gold Fields Limited has delivered.

Gold Fields Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Gold Fields Limited earns about $602M on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($602M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($980M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $424M on 895M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2024-12-31; net debt $1.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.2B) runs well above depreciation ($627M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $980M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GFI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gold Fields Limited (GFI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GFI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GENI its page in the Manual GFL →

Industry order: ← FSM the Gold & Precious Metals chapter GROY →