Owner Scorecard


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GGAL, Grupo Financiero Galicia S.A.

Banks financial

Galicia Banco Galicia is one of Argentina's largest full-service banks and is a leading provider of financial services in Argentina.

Its market share of private sector deposits and of loans to the private sector was 16.21% and 14.31%, respectively, as of December 31, 2025.

Furthermore, in 2025, following the successful completion of the integration process of Galicia M s businesses, which began in 2024, Banco Galicia consolidated its position as Argentina's leading privately held financial services platform.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · figures as filed, in ARS · 1 ADS = 10 ordinary shares
GGAL · Grupo Financiero Galicia S.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
ARS 6.42T
+29.6% YoY · 114% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue ARS 6.42T 5-yr avg ARS 3.00T
Return on equity 27% 5-yr avg 24%
Return on tangible equity 28% 5-yr avg 26%
Equity / assets 18.6% 5-yr avg 18.4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has run high across the record (median 26%, above 12% in 7 of 8 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, charted

FY2017–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.5Bpeak FY2024
Revenue
ARS 6.42Tlow FY2017
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥17%)
    Net income ARS 1.62T ÷ equity ARS 6.06T
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Very high (≥18%)
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill ARS 0 − intangibles ARS 304.5B)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 62%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 18.6%
    Well capitalized
    Equity ARS 6.06T ÷ assets ARS 32.52T
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Mostly deposit-funded
    Deposits ARS 18.63T ÷ assets ARS 32.52T
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“On January 21, 2019 Banco Galicia, sold to AI Zenith (Netherlands) B.V. 3,182,444 book-entry common shares, with face value of Ps.1 each and one vote per share, representing 7.7007% of Prisma Medios de Pago S.A.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
JPMJPMorgan Chase & Co.$182.4B13%16%57%2.0%
BACBank of America Corp.$113.1B10%13%64%1.8%
CCitigroup Inc.$85.2B7%8%62%2.3%
WFCWells Fargo & Co.$83.7B11%13%67%2.5%
COFCapital One Financial Corporation$53.4B8%12%54%6.0%
USBU.S. Bancorp$28.7B12%17%59%2.5%
TFCTruist Financial Corporation$20.3B8%11%63%2.7%
GGALGrupo Financiero Galicia S.A.ARS 6.42T26%27%27%12.2%
Group median10%13%61%2.5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing the right to receive ten ordinary”; Grupo Financiero Galicia S.A. reports in ARS, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at ARS 1 = $0.001 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in ARS.

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Grupo Financiero Galicia S.A.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered127%/yr’19→’24

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity27%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $3.9B on 148M shares, a 27% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Grupo Financiero Galicia S.A. (GGAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GGAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GFS its page in the Manual GGB →

Industry order: ← GCBC the Banks chapter GSBC →