Share count
1.7Bpeak FY2016
← All companies ← GGAL Manual GGR → ← CRS Steel IIIN →
GGB, Gerdau S.A.
A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
R$69.9B
+4.2% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$69.9B 5-yr avg R$73.3B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 13% and operating margin about 8.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.3% and 27% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest North America at 51%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- North America51%R$35.8B
- Brazil41%R$28.5B
- South America8%R$5.6B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| R$37.7B | R$36.9B | R$46.2B | R$39.6B | R$43.8B | R$78.3B | R$82.4B | R$68.9B | R$67.0B | R$69.9B | R$69.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 10% | 13% | 11% | 14% | 27% | 23% | 16% | 14% | 11% | 11% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (R$1.6B) | R$1.1B | R$4.0B | R$3.2B | R$5.2B | R$21.0B | R$17.8B | R$10.5B | R$7.5B | R$3.7B | R$3.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −4.3% | 3.0% | 8.8% | 8.0% | 11.9% | 26.8% | 21.5% | 15.2% | 11.2% | 5.4% | 5.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (R$2.9B) | (R$359M) | R$2.3B | R$1.2B | R$2.4B | R$15.5B | R$11.4B | R$7.5B | R$4.6B | R$1.4B | R$1.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | -8% | 28% | 32% | 23% | 28% | 19% | 16% | 44% | 44% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| R$3.5B | R$2.1B | R$2.0B | R$1.6B | R$6.4B | R$12.5B | R$11.2B | R$11.1B | R$11.4B | R$8.0B | R$8.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| R$2.5B | R$2.1B | R$1.9B | R$2.1B | R$2.5B | R$2.7B | R$2.9B | R$3.0B | R$3.1B | R$3.7B | R$3.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| R$3.9B | R$343M | (R$2.2B) | (R$1.6B) | R$1.5B | (R$5.6B) | (R$3.1B) | R$590M | R$3.7B | R$2.9B | R$2.9B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| R$1.3B | R$873M | R$1.2B | R$1.7B | R$1.7B | R$3.0B | R$4.3B | R$5.2B | R$5.8B | R$6.7B | R$6.7B | CapexCapex |
| 3.5% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 4.4% | 3.8% | 3.9% | 5.2% | 7.6% | 8.6% | 9.6% | 9.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| R$2.2B | R$1.2B | R$805M | (R$104M) | R$4.8B | R$9.5B | R$8.3B | R$8.1B | R$8.3B | R$4.3B | R$4.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.8% | 3.3% | 1.7% | −0.3% | 10.9% | 12.1% | 10.1% | 11.7% | 12.3% | 6.2% | 6.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| R$2.2B | R$1.2B | R$805M | (R$104M) | R$4.8B | R$9.5B | R$6.9B | R$5.9B | R$5.6B | R$1.3B | R$1.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.8% | 3.3% | 1.7% | −0.3% | 10.9% | 12.1% | 8.3% | 8.6% | 8.4% | 1.9% | 1.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| R$86M | R$86M | R$599M | R$484M | R$275M | R$5.3B | R$5.9B | R$2.7B | R$1.7B | R$1.3B | R$1.3B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| R$95M | — | R$243M | R$0 | R$0 | — | R$1.1B | — | R$1.2B | R$1.2B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -12% | -2% | 9% | 4% | 8% | 36% | 25% | 15% | 8% | 3% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| −12% | −2% | 7% | 3% | 7% | 24% | 12% | 10% | 5% | 0% | 0% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| R$5.7B | R$3.0B | R$3.7B | R$3.3B | R$4.6B | R$4.2B | R$2.5B | R$3.0B | R$7.8B | R$5.9B | R$6.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| R$3.6B | R$2.8B | R$3.2B | R$2.7B | R$3.7B | R$5.4B | R$5.0B | R$4.9B | R$5.2B | R$4.8B | R$4.8B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| R$6.3B | R$6.7B | R$9.2B | R$7.7B | R$9.2B | R$16.9B | — | — | — | — | R$16.9B | InventoryInvent. |
| R$9.9B | R$9.5B | R$12.4B | R$10.3B | R$12.9B | R$22.3B | R$5.0B | R$4.9B | R$5.2B | R$4.8B | R$21.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| R$17.8B | R$18.0B | R$17.5B | R$18.2B | R$23.4B | R$32.6B | R$31.3B | R$29.2B | R$32.7B | R$28.6B | R$28.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| R$8.6B | R$7.7B | R$8.5B | R$7.4B | R$11.5B | R$14.0B | R$13.5B | R$11.3B | R$10.9B | R$9.9B | R$9.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 2.3× | 2.1× | 2.5× | 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.6× | 3.0× | 2.9× | 2.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| R$9.5B | R$7.9B | R$9.1B | R$9.5B | R$12.1B | R$12.4B | R$11.6B | R$10.8B | R$13.9B | R$12.0B | R$12.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| R$54.6B | R$50.3B | R$51.3B | R$54.0B | R$63.1B | R$73.8B | R$73.8B | R$74.9B | R$86.8B | R$81.7B | R$81.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| -0.8× | 0.6× | 2.6× | 2.2× | 3.6× | 14.7× | 11.4× | 7.5× | 5.0× | 1.8× | 1.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| R$24.0B | R$23.6B | R$25.7B | R$27.0B | R$30.9B | R$42.6B | R$46.1B | R$49.1B | R$57.9B | R$53.6B | R$53.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.72B | 1.72B | 1.70B | 1.70B | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.70B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| R$21.94 | R$21.52 | R$27.12 | R$23.36 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$41.16 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| R$-1.68 | R$-0.21 | R$1.35 | R$0.71 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$0.82 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| R$1.28 | R$0.70 | R$0.47 | R$-0.06 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$2.54 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| R$1.28 | R$0.70 | R$0.47 | R$-0.06 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$0.77 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| R$0.05 | R$0.05 | R$0.35 | R$0.29 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$0.76 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| R$0.77 | R$0.51 | R$0.70 | R$1.03 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$3.94 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| R$14.00 | R$13.78 | R$15.12 | R$15.88 | — | — | — | — | — | — | R$31.57 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.1%/yr (3-yr) | +2.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Dividends / share | +78.6%/yr (3-yr) | +78.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +10.1%/yr (3-yr) | +10.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +4.3%/yr (3-yr) | +4.3%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Gross margin
11%low FY2016
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
R$4.3Bowner earningsvs.R$1.4Bnet incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned R$4.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the R$3.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put R$3.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was R$1.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | R$1.4B | R$4.6B | R$7.5B | R$11.4B | R$15.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +R$3.7B | +R$3.1B | +R$3.0B | +R$2.9B | +R$2.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +R$2.9B | +R$3.7B | +R$590M | −R$3.1B | −R$5.6B |
| Cash from operations | R$8.0B | R$11.4B | R$11.1B | R$11.2B | R$12.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −R$3.7B | −R$3.1B | −R$3.0B | −R$2.9B | −R$3.0B |
| Owner earnings | R$4.3B | R$8.3B | R$8.1B | R$8.3B | R$9.5B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −R$3.0B | −R$2.7B | −R$2.2B | −R$1.4B | — |
| Free cash flow | R$1.3B | R$5.6B | R$5.9B | R$6.9B | R$9.5B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 12% | 12% | 10% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about R$3.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other R$3.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income R$3.7B ÷ interest expense R$2.1B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -0%–12%; latest R$4.3B = operating cash R$8.0B − maintenance capex R$3.7BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put R$3.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was R$1.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops R$8.0B ÷ net income R$1.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks R$2.5B ÷ Owner Earnings R$4.3B
What this means
Of R$4.3B Owner Earnings, R$2.5B (57%) went back to shareholders, R$1.3B dividends, R$1.2B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.81×ExpandingCapex R$6.7B ÷ depreciation R$3.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R$69.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.89×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R$2.64/share (latest year R$0.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R$31.57/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 2% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 11% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −4.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsR$28.6B
- Cash & short-term investmentsR$6.5B
- ReceivablesR$4.8B
- InventoryR$16.9B
- Other current assetsR$385M
Current liabilitiesR$9.9B
- Other current liabilitiesR$9.9B
Current ratio2.89×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.66×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalR$18.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueR$40.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueR$715MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesR$1.4BR$1.4B of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated R$69.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedR$31.8B · 46%
- DividendsR$18.4B · 26%
- BuybacksR$3.8B · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)R$15.9B · 23%
- Returned to ownersR$22.2B
47% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R$18.4B as dividends and R$3.8B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran R$3.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.1%
The diluted count fell from 1716M to 1697M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordR$0.29/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 79% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained26%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (R$20.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew R$5.5B, so each retained R$1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Gerdau S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Steel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GGBGerdau S.A. | R$69.9B | 13% | 10.0% | — | 8% |
| NUENucor Corporation | $32.5B | 13% | 9.2% | 12% | 9% |
| STLDSteel Dynamics Inc. | $18.2B | 16% | 11.2% | 17% | 9% |
| XUnited States Steel | $15.6B | 8% | 3.0% | 3% | 3% |
| GLWCorning Incorporated | $15.6B | 36% | 12.7% | 6% | 7% |
| AAAlcoa | $12.8B | — | 4.6% | 5% | 2% |
| CMCCommercial Metals | $7.8B | 16% | 5.7% | 9% | 6% |
| WSWorthington Steel Inc. | $3.1B | 11% | 5.2% | 12% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 13% | 7.5% | — | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Gerdau S.A. reports in BRL, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that BRL, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in BRL. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gerdau S.A. has delivered.
R$
Through the cycle, Gerdau S.A. earns about R$5.7B on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow R$1.3B on 1697M diluted shares; net cash R$6.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (R$6.7B) runs well above depreciation (R$3.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about R$4.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gerdau S.A. (GGB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GGB, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GGAL its page in the Manual GGR →
Industry order: ← CRS the Steel chapter IIIN →