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GIL, Gildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot.
Gildan acquired is a global leader in everyday iconic apparel.
We made further progress in expanding and optimizing our manufacturing footprint by completing the ramp-up of our new state-of-the-art Bangladesh facility, driving innovation across products and processes, and strengthening our leadership in ESG.
HanesBrands' products are distributed and available to consumers in mass merchants, mid-tier and department stores, specialty stores, company-owned retail stores as well as both retailer and company-owned e-commerce websites.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −9.1% to 22% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 34% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 3 of 8 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $2.8B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.0B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 29% | 28% | 25% | 13% | 32% | 28% | 31% | 31% | 31% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $401M | $403M | $289M | ($181M) | $652M | $644M | $618M | $620M | $620M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.6% | 13.9% | 10.2% | −9.1% | 22.3% | 20.1% | 18.9% | 17.1% | 17.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $362M | $351M | $260M | ($225M) | $607M | $534M | $401M | $399M | $399M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 4% | 6% | -4% | — | 3% | 5% | 22% | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $613M | $539M | $361M | $415M | $618M | $547M | $501M | $606M | $606M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $162M | $158M | $157M | $147M | $135M | $122M | $138M | $148M | $148M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $89M | $30M | ($56M) | $493M | ($125M) | ($109M) | ($38M) | $60M | $60M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $92M | $108M | $129M | $51M | $127M | $203M | $145M | $106M | $106M | CapexCapex |
| 3.3% | 3.7% | 4.6% | 2.6% | 4.4% | 6.4% | 4.4% | 2.9% | 2.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $521M | $431M | $232M | $364M | $490M | $425M | $356M | $500M | $500M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.0% | 14.8% | 8.2% | 18.4% | 16.8% | 13.3% | 10.9% | 13.8% | 13.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $521M | $431M | $232M | $364M | $490M | $343M | $356M | $500M | $500M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.0% | 14.8% | 8.2% | 18.4% | 16.8% | 10.7% | 10.9% | 13.8% | 13.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $85M | $95M | $110M | $31M | $90M | $132M | $133M | $135M | $135M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 15% | 15% | 11% | -7% | 27% | 24% | 19% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 18% | 18% | 14% | -14% | 32% | 27% | 28% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 14% | 13% | 8% | −16% | 27% | 21% | 18% | 7% | 7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $53M | $47M | $64M | $505M | $179M | $150M | $99M | $284M | $284M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $243M | $317M | $321M | $196M | $330M | $412M | $542M | $956M | $956M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $946M | $940M | $1.1B | $728M | $774M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.4B | $2.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| $258M | $347M | $407M | $344M | $440M | $408M | $490M | $1.3B | $1.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $931M | $910M | $966M | $581M | $664M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $4.7B | $4.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $258M | $347M | $422M | $360M | $464M | $724M | $837M | $2.2B | $2.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 5.1× | 4.0× | 3.6× | 4.3× | 3.1× | 2.3× | 2.2× | 2.1× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $227M | $227M | $228M | $207M | $284M | $272M | $272M | $869M | $869M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $10.5B | $10.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $630M | $669M | $845M | $1.0B | $600M | $685M | $1.2B | $3.9B | $3.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $577M | $622M | $781M | $495M | $421M | $535M | $1.1B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 224M | 211M | 204M | 198M | 197M | 176M | 163M | 153M | 185M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $12.27 | $13.76 | $13.83 | $9.99 | $14.83 | $18.16 | $20.07 | $23.65 | $19.55 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.62 | $1.66 | $1.27 | $-1.14 | $3.08 | $3.03 | $2.46 | $2.61 | $2.15 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.33 | $2.04 | $1.14 | $1.84 | $2.49 | $2.42 | $2.19 | $3.27 | $2.70 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.33 | $2.04 | $1.14 | $1.84 | $2.49 | $1.95 | $2.19 | $3.27 | $2.70 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.38 | $0.45 | $0.54 | $0.15 | $0.46 | $0.75 | $0.82 | $0.88 | $0.73 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.41 | $0.51 | $0.63 | $0.26 | $0.65 | $1.16 | $0.89 | $0.70 | $0.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.15 | $9.16 | $8.99 | $7.86 | $9.74 | $11.13 | $8.94 | $23.28 | $19.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.6%/yr | +24.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +4.3%/yr | +15.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +6.2%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +11.2%/yr | +54.8%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +6.8%/yr | +28.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +12.4%/yr | +31.2%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $399M of profit into $500M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $399M | $401M | $534M | $607M | ($225M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$148M | +$138M | +$122M | +$135M | +$147M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$60M | −$38M | −$109M | −$125M | +$493M |
| Cash from operations | $606M | $501M | $547M | $618M | $415M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$106M | −$145M | −$122M | −$127M | −$51M |
| Owner earnings | $500M | $356M | $425M | $490M | $364M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$82M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $500M | $356M | $343M | $490M | $364M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 11% | 13% | 17% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.6B · 5.8× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $284M − debt $3.9B
What this means
Netting $284M of cash and short-term investments against $3.9B of debt leaves $3.6B owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (6.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 96 + DIO 348 − DPO 185 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -7%–27%; 7% latest = NOPAT $519M ÷ invested capital $7.1BIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 8%–19%; latest $500M = operating cash $606M − maintenance capex $106MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 8 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $606M ÷ net income $399M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $135M ÷ Owner Earnings $500M
What this means
Of $500M Owner Earnings, $135M (27%) went back to shareholders, $135M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.72×HarvestingCapex $106M ÷ depreciation $148M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.11×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.9B vs $2.5B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (8-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (8)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +37%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.40/share (latest year $2.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 13% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 13% early to 19% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −9.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −4.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“We are also actively investing in digital tools, predictive analytics, and artificial intelligence to accelerate decision-making across the organization, streamline processes, and optimize supply chain planning.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 28, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$284M
- Receivables$956M
- Inventory$2.4B
- Other current assets$1.1B
- Accounts payable$1.3B
- Other current liabilities$971M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$961M · 23%
- Dividends$811M · 19%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.4B · 58%
- Returned to owners$811M
24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $811M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $232M.
- Net change in share count−17.4%
The diluted count fell from 224M to 185M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.88/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained2%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $32M, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Gildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$630M → $3.9B
Debt rose from $630M to $3.9B while owner earnings went from about $395M to $427M — about 1.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?43% → 92% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.2B to $3.3B while revenue grew 32%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (43% of revenue then, 92% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Textiles & Apparel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LULUlululemon athletica inc. | $11.1B | 56% | 20.6% | 58% | 14% |
| LEVILevi Strauss & Co | $6.3B | 58% | 9.8% | 23% | 5% |
| UAUnder Armour Inc. | $5.0B | 46% | 2.3% | 4% | 2% |
| GILGildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot. | $3.6B | 28% | 15.9% | 15% | 14% |
| COLMColumbia Sportswear | $3.4B | 50% | 10.7% | 18% | 10% |
| KTBKontoor Brands Inc. Common Stock | $3.2B | 42% | 12.1% | 16% | 12% |
| GIIIG-III Apparel | $3.0B | 36% | 6.3% | 9% | 4% |
| CRICarter's | $2.9B | 43% | 11.0% | 24% | 9% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 10.9% | 17% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Gildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Gildan Activewear Inc. Class A Sub. Vot. earns about $518M on its 14.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $500M on 185M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-12-28; net debt $3.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GIBO its page in the Manual GILT →
Industry order: ← GIII the Textiles & Apparel chapter GOOS →