Share count
48Mpeak FY2022
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BALY, Bally's Corporation
We are a global gaming, hospitality, entertainment and technology company with an expanding international footprint across casino, interactive and lottery markets.
We provide our customers and partners with physical and interactive entertainment and gaming experiences worldwide.
Our offerings include traditional casino gaming, iGaming, online bingo, sportsbook, free-to- p lay games and technology driven lottery and gaming solutions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
$2.5B
+0.1% YoY · 36% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Revenue $756M
Operating margin 12.1%
Net income ($161M)
Net margin −21.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Casinos & Resorts (56%), Intralot B2C (37%) and North America Interactive (7%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 4.2% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −13% to 29% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 8.2% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Casinos & Resorts at 56%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2024
- Casinos & Resorts56%$1.4B
- Intralot B2C37%$903M
- North America Interactive7%$170M
- Corporate & Other0%$8M
- Intralot B2B0%$7M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $421M | $438M | $524M | $373M | $1.3B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 36% | 33% | 34% | 55% | 45% | 37% | 45% | 43% | 43% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $124M | $121M | $115M | ($18M) | $93M | ($293M) | $104M | ($258M) | ($258M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 29.4% | 27.6% | 21.9% | −4.9% | 7.1% | −13.0% | 4.2% | −10.5% | −10.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $62M | $71M | $55M | ($5M) | ($115M) | ($426M) | ($188M) | ($568M) | ($568M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | 27% | 27% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $108M | $109M | $94M | $20M | $83M | $271M | $189M | $114M | $114M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $22M | $22M | $32M | $38M | $145M | $301M | $350M | $380M | $380M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $22M | $14M | $3M | ($31M) | $33M | $368M | $2M | $287M | $287M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $48M | $129M | $28M | $15M | $98M | $212M | $311M | $200M | $161M | CapexCapex |
| 11.4% | 29.5% | 5.4% | 4.1% | 7.4% | 9.4% | 12.7% | 8.2% | 6.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $86M | $87M | $66M | $4M | ($15M) | $59M | ($123M) | ($86M) | ($47M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 20.3% | 19.9% | 12.6% | 1.1% | −1.1% | 2.6% | −5.0% | −3.5% | −1.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $60M | ($20M) | $66M | $4M | ($15M) | $59M | ($123M) | ($86M) | ($47M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.2% | −4.5% | 12.6% | 1.1% | −1.1% | 2.6% | −5.0% | −3.5% | −1.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $10M | $425M | $2.3B | $146M | $94M | $788K | $788K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $8M | $3M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $2M | $8M | $223M | $33M | $87M | $153M | $99M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 84% | 14% | 12% | -1% | — | -6% | — | -6% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 35% | 24% | 26% | -2% | -7% | -53% | -30% | -1837% | -72% | Return on equityROE |
| 35% | 24% | 23% | −3% | −7% | −53% | — | — | −72% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $86M | $78M | $183M | $123M | $206M | $213M | $163M | $171M | $559M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $23M | $23M | $15M | $48M | $72M | $70M | $55M | $205M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $6M | $8M | $9M | $11M | $14M | $15M | $19M | $61M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $14M | $15M | $16M | $88M | $70M | $69M | $86M | $147M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $15M | $16M | $8M | ($28M) | $16M | $16M | ($11M) | $120M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $122M | $245M | $289M | $567M | $523M | $572M | $448M | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $76M | $90M | $143M | $570M | $756M | $875M | $678M | $1.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 2.7× | 2.0× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $132M | $133M | $187M | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $3.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $782M | $1.0B | $1.9B | $6.6B | $6.3B | $6.9B | $5.9B | $10.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $394M | $684M | $1.1B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $4.4B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $317M | $501M | $976M | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.1B | $3.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 5.4× | 5.2× | 2.9× | -0.3× | 0.8× | -1.4× | 0.4× | -0.8× | -0.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $177M | $299M | $211M | $327M | $1.6B | $806M | $635M | $31M | $791M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 4.7% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | $5M | $5M | $232M | $150M | $72M | $72M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 38.4M | 38.6M | 37.8M | 31.3M | 49.6M | 58.1M | 53.4M | 48.5M | 60.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.95 | $11.35 | $13.84 | $11.90 | $26.64 | $38.82 | $45.91 | $50.56 | $40.67 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.62 | $1.85 | $1.46 | $-0.18 | $-2.31 | $-7.32 | $-3.51 | $-11.71 | $-9.42 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.23 | $2.25 | $1.74 | $0.13 | $-0.30 | $1.01 | $-2.30 | $-1.77 | $-0.78 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.56 | $-0.51 | $1.74 | $0.13 | $-0.30 | $1.01 | $-2.30 | $-1.77 | $-0.78 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.20 | $0.10 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.24 | $3.34 | $0.75 | $0.49 | $1.96 | $3.65 | $5.84 | $4.12 | $2.67 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $4.60 | $7.75 | $5.59 | $10.43 | $32.47 | $13.87 | $11.91 | $0.64 | $13.13 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +24.4%/yr | +29.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +18.7%/yr | +40.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | −24.6%/yr | −35.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−6%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
55.8×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($86M)owner earningsvs.($568M)net incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2017FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $568M loss into ($86M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($568M) | ($188M) | ($426M) | ($115M) | ($5M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$380M | +$350M | +$301M | +$145M | +$38M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$15M | +$24M | +$28M | +$20M | +$18M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$287M | +$2M | +$368M | +$33M | −$31M |
| Cash from operations | $114M | $189M | $271M | $83M | $20M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$200M | −$311M | −$212M | −$98M | −$15M |
| Owner earnings | ($86M) | ($123M) | $59M | ($15M) | $4M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -4% | -5% | 3% | -1% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer ($101M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 10-K/A · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“As disclosed in this report, we evaluated the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting and identified a material weakness as of December 31, 2025 relating to the ineffective operation of management review controls over accounting for…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($258M) ÷ interest expense $310M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $174M − debt $4.5B
What this means
Netting $174M of cash and short-term investments against $4.5B of debt leaves $4.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -6%–84%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($204M) ÷ invested capital $5.3BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -5%–20%; latest ($47M) = operating cash $114M − maintenance capex $161MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves ($62M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($568M) · cash from operations $114M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.42×HarvestingCapex $161M ÷ depreciation $380M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.5B vs ($340M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −725%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.11/share (latest year $-11.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 26% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 26% early to −6% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2022 · −13.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.4%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We may use AI in our business, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm and legal liability, and could have adverse effects on our business, operating results, and financial condition.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.1B
- Cash & short-term investments$559M
- Receivables$205M
- Inventory$61M
- Other current assets$314M
Current liabilities$1.0B
- Debt due within a year$17M
- Accounts payable$147M
- Other current liabilities$861M
Current ratio1.11×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$115Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$17M due · $559M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($5.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.8B$2.4B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $6.4B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$96Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$237Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$3.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.9Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$4.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.9B
Total fixed claims on the business$6.4B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.4B, of which the leases are 30%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2024 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2024
Over the record, the business generated $987M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.0B · 106%
- Dividends$11M · 1%
- Buybacks$606M · 61%
- Returned to owners$617M
792% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $11M as dividends and $606M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$671M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $671M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$18.93
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 32M shares were bought for $606M, about $18.93 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $5.08 (2020) to $34.01 (2019), and 2019, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($223M).
- Net change in share count56.7%
The diluted count rose from 38M to 60M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$3.1B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.9Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $1.0B of capital spent building
$463M written down across 5 years (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 16% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership69.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Bally's Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2024.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.0% vs 17.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 17.6% early in the record and −2.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?56.7%
Diluted shares grew 56.7% over 2017–2024, even as the company spent $606M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 8 years, $958M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Casinos & Gaming
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MARMarriott International | $26.2B | — | 12.4% | 17% | 10% |
| HLTHilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. | $12.0B | — | 17.5% | 20% | 15% |
| HHyatt Hotels Corporation | $7.1B | — | 8.6% | 7% | 6% |
| HGVHilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock | $4.5B | — | 12.8% | 5% | 7% |
| BALYBally's Corporation | $2.5B | — | 5.7% | 5% | 2% |
| CHHChoice Hotels International | $1.6B | — | 28.9% | 30% | 20% |
| WHWyndham Hotels & Resorts | $1.4B | — | 25.7% | 12% | 18% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.8% | 12% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Bally's Corporation has delivered.
Bally's Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Bally's Corporation earns about $46M on its 1.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings ($47M) on 49M shares outstanding, per the 10-K/A cover, as of 2026-02-28; net debt $3.8B. The if-converted diluted count is 60M, 24% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bally's Corporation (BALY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BALY, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BALL its page in the Manual BAM →
Industry order: ← ACEL the Casinos & Gaming chapter BRAG →