← All companies ← HLT Manual HMN → ← HAL Oilfield Services & Equipment HP →

HLX, Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are an international offshore energy services company that provides specialty services to the offshore energy industry, with a focus on well intervention, robotics and decommissioning operations.

Our services are key in supporting a global energy transition by maximizing production of existing oil and gas reserves, decommissioning end-of-life oil and gas fields and supporting renewable energy developments.

We provide a range of services to the oil and gas and renewable energy markets primarily in the Gulf of America (deepwater and shelf), Brazil, North Sea, West Africa and Asia Pacific regions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HLX · Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.3B

−4.9% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Gross margin 11% 5-yr avg 10%

Operating margin 3.4% 5-yr avg 1.4%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 1%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%

Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Well Intervention (56%) and Robotics (22%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 11% and operating margin about 1.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −13% and 9.4% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Well Intervention at 56%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Well Intervention56%$729M
Robotics22%$290M
Shallow Water Abandonment15%$200M
Production Facilities6%$73M

By geographyUnited States38%Brazil27%North Sea21%Africa7%Asia Pacific5%Other0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$488M	$581M	$740M	$752M	$734M	$675M	$873M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	RevenueRevenue
10%	11%	16%	18%	11%	2%	6%	16%	16%	12%	11%	Gross marginGross mgn
14%	11%	10%	9%	8%	9%	9%	7%	7%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($63M)	($1M)	$52M	$68M	$13M	($49M)	($45M)	$64M	$127M	$65M	$44M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−13.0%	−0.2%	7.0%	9.0%	1.8%	−7.2%	−5.1%	4.9%	9.4%	5.0%	3.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($81M)	$30M	$29M	$58M	$22M	($62M)	($88M)	($11M)	$56M	$31M	$14M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	8%	12%	—	—	—	—	32%	27%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$39M	$52M	$197M	$170M	$99M	$140M	$51M	$152M	$186M	$137M	$182M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$114M	$109M	$111M	$113M	$134M	$142M	$143M	$164M	$173M	$187M	$189M	DepreciationDeprec.
$110K	($98M)	$48M	($12M)	($66M)	$52M	($11M)	($7M)	($50M)	($88M)	($27M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$186M	$231M	$137M	$141M	$20M	$8M	$34M	$20M	$23M	$16M	$15M	CapexCapex
38.2%	39.8%	18.5%	18.7%	2.8%	1.2%	3.8%	1.5%	1.7%	1.3%	1.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($75M)	($57M)	$60M	$29M	$79M	$132M	$18M	$133M	$163M	$120M	$167M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−15.5%	−9.8%	8.1%	3.8%	10.7%	19.5%	2.0%	10.3%	12.0%	9.3%	12.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($148M)	($179M)	$60M	$29M	$79M	$132M	$18M	$133M	$163M	$120M	$167M	Free cash flowFCF
−30.3%	−30.9%	8.1%	3.8%	10.7%	19.5%	2.0%	10.3%	12.0%	9.3%	12.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$0	$4M	$0	—	$113M	—	—	—	$113M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$341K	—	—	—	—	—	—	$12M	$30M	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-3%	-0%	3%	3%	1%	-2%	-2%	—	6%	3%	2%	ROICROIC
-6%	2%	2%	3%	1%	-4%	-6%	-1%	4%	2%	1%	Return on equityROE
−6%	2%	2%	3%	1%	−4%	−6%	−1%	4%	2%	1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$357M	$267M	$279M	$208M	$291M	$254M	$187M	$332M	$368M	$445M	$501M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$102M	$113M	$68M	$125M	$132M	$144M	$213M	$280M	$259M	$304M	$230M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$60M	$81M	$55M	$69M	$50M	$88M	$135M	$135M	$145M	$134M	$138M	Accounts payablePayables
$42M	$32M	$13M	$56M	$82M	$56M	$78M	$146M	$114M	$170M	$92M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$523M	$452M	$451M	$438M	$526M	$530M	$461M	$698M	$710M	$825M	$819M	Current assetsCur. assets
$186M	$266M	$191M	$285M	$279M	$278M	$298M	$449M	$304M	$300M	$281M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×	1.7×	2.4×	1.5×	1.9×	1.9×	1.5×	1.6×	2.3×	2.8×	2.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0	—	$0	$7M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
$626M	$496M	$440M	$406M	$350M	$305M	$264M	$362M	$315M	$308M	$593M	Total debtDebt
$269M	$229M	$161M	$197M	$58M	$51M	$77M	$30M	($53M)	($137M)	$91M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.4×	-0.0×	1.6×	2.2×	0.4×	-2.1×	-2.2×	3.0×	3.8×	2.0×	1.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.9%	1.3%	1.5%	1.2%	1.1%	0.9%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$45M	—	—	—	$7M	—	—	—	—	—	$7M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
112M	145M	147M	150M	150M	150M	151M	151M	155M	148M	147M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.37	$4.00	$5.04	$5.03	$4.89	$4.50	$5.77	$8.55	$8.78	$8.70	$8.84	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.73	$0.21	$0.19	$0.39	$0.15	$-0.41	$-0.58	$-0.07	$0.36	$0.21	$0.10	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.68	$-0.39	$0.41	$0.19	$0.52	$0.88	$0.12	$0.88	$1.05	$0.81	$1.14	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.32	$-1.24	$0.41	$0.19	$0.52	$0.88	$0.12	$0.88	$1.05	$0.81	$1.14	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.67	$1.59	$0.93	$0.94	$0.14	$0.06	$0.22	$0.13	$0.15	$0.11	$0.10	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.48	$10.79	$11.02	$11.36	$11.61	$10.98	$10.03	$9.95	$9.82	$10.64	$10.58	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.0%/yr	+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+9.1%/yr
EPS	—	+7.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−26.1%/yr	−4.0%/yr
Book value / share	−0.8%/yr	−1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

148Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

3%low FY2016

Gross margin

12%low FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-1.1×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$120Mowner earningsvs.$31Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $31M of profit into $120M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$31M

Owner earnings$120M · 9% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$31M	$56M	($11M)	($88M)	($62M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$187M	+$173M	+$164M	+$143M	+$142M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$7M	+$7M	+$7M	+$7M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$88M	−$50M	−$7M	−$11M	+$52M
Cash from operations	$137M	$186M	$152M	$51M	$140M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$16M	−$23M	−$20M	−$34M	−$8M
Owner earnings	$120M	$163M	$133M	$18M	$132M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	12%	10%	2%	20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $114M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.0×

Thin

Operating income $65M ÷ interest expense $33M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $147M · 2.3× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $445M − debt $593M

What this means
Netting $445M of cash and short-term investments against $593M of debt leaves $147M owed, about 2.3× a year's operating profit (9.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 1%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -3%–6%; 3% latest = NOPAT $47M ÷ invested capital $1.7B

Industry peers: median 0%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -15%–20%; latest $120M = operating cash $137M − maintenance capex $16M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $114M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.44×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $137M ÷ net income $31M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 25%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $30M ÷ Owner Earnings $120M

What this means
Of $120M Owner Earnings, $30M (25%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $30M buybacks. Net of $7M stock comp, the real buyback was about $23M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.09×

Harvesting

Capex $16M ÷ depreciation $187M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.75×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $593M vs $525M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.17/share (latest year $0.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −2% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 6% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2016 · −13.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors may adopt AI into their service offerings, business processes or operations more quickly or more successfully than us, which could affect our ability to compete effectively.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$819M

Cash & short-term investments$501M
Receivables$230M
Other current assets$88M

Current liabilities$281M

Debt due within a year$9M
Accounts payable$138M
Other current liabilities$133M

Current ratio2.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio

Cash ratio1.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$538Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $501M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($192M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$626M$322M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $914M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$16Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$81M

'27$81M

'28$69M

'29$57M

'30$64M

later$39M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$81Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$391Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$322Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$593M

Lease obligations (present value)$322M

Total fixed claims on the business$914M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $914M, of which the leases are 35%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$817M · 67%
Buybacks$42M · 3%
Retained (debt / cash)$363M · 30%

Returned to owners$42M
7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $42M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $42M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count31.9%
The diluted count rose from 112M to 147M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$2.9M	$830k	$132M
2022	$6.4M	$16.5M	$18M
2023	$7.0M	$15.0M	$133M
2024	$5.7M	$4.6M	$163M
2025	$5.1M	−$2.0M	$120M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership6.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio57:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?31.9%
Diluted shares grew 31.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $42M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OIIOceaneering International	$2.6B	12%	2.6%	5%	4%
ACDCProFrac Holding Corp.	$1.9B	—	-2.5%	-3%	3%
RESRPC	$1.6B	26%	4.8%	7%	5%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.	$1.6B	95%	-12.2%	-8%	-1%
WTTRSelect Water Solutions	$1.4B	12%	1.9%	-0%	6%
NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp	$1.3B	13%	7.4%	8%	9%
HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc.	$1.3B	12%	3.3%	1%	9%
PUMPProPetro Holding Corp.	$1.3B	—	0.1%	0%	7%
Group median	—	12%	2.3%	0%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc. earns about $112M on its 8.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($112M) Net of stock comp (−$6M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $167M on 147M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $91M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HLX against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc. (HLX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HLX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HLT its page in the Manual HMN →

Industry order: ← HAL the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter HP →