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HTZ, Hertz Global Holdings Inc

Auto Dealers & Services diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are one of the largest worldwide vehicle rental companies and our Hertz brand name is among the most recognized globally.

We are engaged principally in the business of renting vehicles primarily through our Hertz, Dollar and Thrifty brands.

We have an extensive network of airport and off airport rental locations in the U.S. and major European markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HTZ · Hertz Global Holdings Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$8.5B

−6.0% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $8.7B 5-yr avg $8.6B

Operating margin −7.0% 5-yr avg −1.0%

ROIC −3% 5-yr avg −0%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 23%

Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 23%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 28% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −5.5%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

24% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States76%$6.4B
International24%$2.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$8.8B	$8.8B	$9.5B	$9.8B	$5.3B	$7.3B	$8.7B	$9.4B	$9.0B	$8.5B	$8.7B	RevenueRevenue
10%	10%	11%	10%	12%	9%	11%	10%	9%	11%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($487M)	($575M)	($255M)	$5M	($2.1B)	$683M	$2.4B	$286M	($3.2B)	($830M)	($609M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.5%	−6.5%	−2.7%	0.1%	−39.0%	9.3%	28.2%	3.1%	−35.8%	−9.8%	−7.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($491M)	$327M	($225M)	($58M)	($1.7B)	$366M	$2.1B	$616M	($2.9B)	($747M)	($637M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$953M	$1.8B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.2B	$1.6B	$1.4B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$167M	$143M	$129M	$203M	$225M	$196M	$142M	$149M	$139M	$117M	$113M	DepreciationDeprec.
$2.8B	$1.9B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$2.4B	$1.2B	$337M	$1.7B	$4.9B	$2.3B	$1.9B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$134M	$173M	$177M	$224M	$98M	$71M	$150M	$188M	$105M	$97M	$104M	CapexCapex
1.5%	2.0%	1.9%	2.3%	1.9%	1.0%	1.7%	2.0%	1.2%	1.1%	1.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$855M	$1.7B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$1.5B	$1.3B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
27.2%	25.2%	25.0%	27.4%	16.3%	23.7%	27.5%	24.4%	23.4%	18.0%	14.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$855M	$1.7B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$1.5B	$1.3B	Free cash flowFCF
27.2%	25.2%	25.0%	27.4%	16.3%	23.7%	27.5%	24.4%	23.4%	18.0%	14.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M	$15M	$2M	$1M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$100M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$654M	$2.5B	$315M	$0	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-3%	-3%	-1%	0%	-31%	3%	13%	2%	-16%	-4%	-3%	ROICROIC
-46%	22%	-21%	-3%	-3061%	12%	78%	20%	-1871%	—	—	Return on equityROE
−46%	22%	−21%	−3%	n/m	12%	78%	20%	n/m	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$816M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$865M	$1.1B	$2.3B	$943M	$764M	$592M	$565M	$583M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$777M	$758M	$974M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$777M	$758M	$974M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
$19.2B	$20.1B	$21.4B	$24.6B	$16.9B	$19.8B	$22.5B	$24.6B	$21.8B	$22.3B	$23.3B	Total assetsAssets
$13.5B	$14.9B	$16.3B	$17.1B	$6.3B	$10.9B	$13.9B	$15.7B	$16.3B	$17.1B	$18.2B	Total debtDebt
$12.7B	$13.8B	$15.2B	$16.2B	$5.2B	$8.6B	$12.9B	$14.9B	$15.7B	$16.5B	$17.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.8B	$56M	$3.0B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$153M	($459M)	($786M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	−0.0%	0.1%	—	—	—	—	0.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$172M	$86M	—	—	$213M	—	—	—	—	—	$213M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
168M	190M	192M	234M	300M	315M	403M	326M	306M	322M	314M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$52.40	$46.33	$49.50	$41.79	$17.53	$23.29	$21.55	$28.75	$29.57	$26.41	$27.69	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.92	$1.72	$-1.17	$-0.25	$-5.71	$1.16	$5.11	$1.89	$-9.35	$-2.32	$-2.03	EPS (diluted)EPS
$14.26	$11.69	$12.39	$11.44	$2.85	$5.51	$5.93	$7.01	$6.92	$4.75	$4.11	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$14.26	$11.69	$12.39	$11.44	$2.85	$5.51	$5.93	$7.01	$6.92	$4.75	$4.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.80	$0.91	$0.92	$0.96	$0.33	$0.23	$0.37	$0.58	$0.34	$0.30	$0.33	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.40	$8.00	$5.53	$7.56	$0.19	$9.45	$6.56	$9.48	$0.50	$-1.43	$-2.50	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−7.3%/yr	+8.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−11.5%/yr	+10.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	−10.3%/yr	−1.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

322Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

−4%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

10.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.5Bowner earningsvs.($747M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $747M loss into $1.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($747M)	($2.9B)	$616M	$2.1B	$366M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$117M	+$139M	+$149M	+$142M	+$196M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	—	—	—	—	+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$2.3B	+$4.9B	+$1.7B	+$337M	+$1.2B
Cash from operations	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$1.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$97M	−$105M	−$188M	−$150M	−$71M
Owner earnings	$1.5B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$1.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	18%	23%	24%	27%	24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $16.5B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $565M − debt $17.1B

What this means
Netting $565M of cash and short-term investments against $17.1B of debt leaves $16.5B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -3%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -31%–13%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($656M) ÷ invested capital $16.0B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 24%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 16%–27%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $97M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.6B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($747M) · cash from operations $1.6B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B

What this means
Of $1.5B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.83×

Maintaining

Capex $97M ÷ depreciation $117M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.16/share (latest year $-2.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −5% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −5% early to −14% lately, median −6% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −39.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We may use AI in our business, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm and legal liability, and could have adverse effects on our results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and cash flows .”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$610M

'27$515M

'28$434M

'29$364M

'30$249M

later$2.4B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$610Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$4.6Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$2.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$17.1B

Lease obligations (present value)$2.3B

Total fixed claims on the business$19.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $19.3B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $22.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$1.4B · 6%
Buybacks$3.5B · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$17.1B · 78%

Returned to owners$3.5B
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.5B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $4.7B and cash and short-term investments fell $233M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count86.9%
The diluted count rose from 168M to 314M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.9B17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$20Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.4B of capital spent building

$471M written down across 3 years (2016, 2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. West	$14.2M	$13.6M	$1.7B
2021	Mr. West	$12.7M	$11.9M	$1.7B
2022	Mr. West	$182.1M	$132.1M	$2.4B
2022	Mr. West	$887k	−$809k	$2.4B
2023	Mr. West	$2.9M	−$41.8M	$2.3B
2024	Mr. West	$35.2M	$14.4M	$2.1B
2024	Mr. West	$547k	−$45.6M	$2.1B
2025	Mr. West	$4.5M	$14.2M	$1.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio122:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hertz Global Holdings Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?21.9% vs 25.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 25.8% early in the record and 21.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?86.9%
Diluted shares grew 86.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $3.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$13.5B → $18.2B
Debt rose from $13.5B to $18.2B while owner earnings went from about $2.3B to $2.0B — about 5.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CARAvis Budget Group Inc.	$11.7B	—	3.0%	5%	—
IPGInterpublic	$9.2B	14%	11.1%	24%	7%
DOLEDole plc	$9.2B	8%	3.3%	9%	2%
ABMABM Industries Incorporated	$8.7B	12%	3.2%	7%	2%
HTZHertz Global Holdings Inc	$8.5B	—	-4.1%	-2%	25%
NWSNews Corporation	$8.5B	—	3.3%	2%	7%
APGAPi Group Corporation	$7.9B	25%	3.9%	4%	7%
SGISomnigroup International Inc.	$7.5B	42%	12.6%	16%	8%
Group median	—	—	3.3%	6%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hertz Global Holdings Inc has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Hertz Global Holdings Inc earns about $2.1B on its 24.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($2.1B) Net of stock comp (−$10M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.3B on 316M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $17.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HTZ against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hertz Global Holdings Inc (HTZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HTZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HTO its page in the Manual HTZWW →

Industry order: ← GPI the Auto Dealers & Services chapter HTZWW →