Owner Scorecard


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IPG, Interpublic

A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K
IPG · Interpublic
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$9.2B
−2.3% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.7B 5-yr avg $9.0B
Operating margin 11.3% 5-yr avg 13.3%
ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 24%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 14% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −117 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 24%, above 15% in 9 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMSep 2025
Income statement
$7.6B$9.1B$9.0B$9.7B$10.2B$8.1B$9.1B$9.4B$9.4B$9.2B$8.7BRevenueRevenue
14%13%14%15%Gross marginGross mgn
25%2%1%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$875M$936M$938M$1.0B$1.1B$588M$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.2B$989MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.5%10.3%10.4%10.4%10.6%7.3%15.8%14.6%15.8%13.1%11.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$455M$605M$554M$619M$656M$351M$953M$938M$1.1B$690M$546MNet incomeNet inc.
38%25%33%24%24%2%21%25%21%33%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$689M$513M$882M$565M$1.5B$1.8B$2.1B$642M$555M$1.1B$915MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$131M$160M$157M$203M$279M$291M$284M$274M$264M$259M$248MDepreciationDeprec.
$33M($338M)$88M($339M)$515M$1.1B$769M($620M)($855M)$42M$64MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$161M$201M$156M$177M$199M$168M$195M$178M$179M$142M$108MCapexCapex
2.1%2.2%1.7%1.8%1.9%2.1%2.1%1.9%1.9%1.5%1.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$527M$312M$726M$388M$1.3B$1.7B$1.9B$464M$375M$913M$807MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.9%3.4%8.0%4.0%13.0%20.8%20.6%4.9%4.0%9.9%9.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$527M$312M$726M$388M$1.3B$1.7B$1.9B$464M$375M$913M$807MFree cash flowFCF
6.9%3.4%8.0%4.0%13.0%20.8%20.6%4.9%4.0%9.9%9.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$29M$52M$31M$2.3B$600K$5M$0$232M$3M$9M$57MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$196M$238M$280M$322M$363M$398M$428M$457M$479M$497M$489MDividends paidDiv. paid
$285M$303M$300M$117M$0$0$0$320M$350M$230MBuybacksBuybacks
26%28%23%13%17%15%36%26%25%18%14%ROICROIC
23%30%25%26%24%12%27%26%28%18%15%Return on equityROE
13%18%12%12%11%−2%15%13%16%5%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.5B$1.1B$791M$13M$1.2B$2.5B$3.3B$2.5B$2.4B$2.2B$1.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4.4B$4.4B$4.6B$113M$5.2B$4.6B$5.2B$5.3B$5.8B$5.6B$4.9BReceivablesReceiv.
$6.7B$6.3B$6.4B$6.7B$7.2B$7.3B$9.0B$8.2B$8.4B$8.3B$7.1BAccounts payablePayables
($2.3B)($1.9B)($1.8B)($6.6B)($2.0B)($2.6B)($3.8B)($2.9B)($2.6B)($2.6B)($2.2B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$7.7B$7.4B$7.5B$8.2B$8.8B$9.4B$11.2B$10.3B$11.0B$10.6B$9.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.6B$7.7B$7.7B$8.1B$9.4B$9.6B$10.9B$10.0B$10.3B$9.8B$8.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.0×1.0×1.0×0.9×1.0×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.6B$3.7B$3.8B$1.1B$4.9B$4.9B$4.9B$5.1B$5.1B$5.1B$4.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$12.6B$12.5B$12.7B$15.6B$17.8B$18.0B$19.9B$18.8B$19.3B$18.3B$17.0BTotal assetsAssets
$1.6B$1.6B$1.3B$3.7B$3.3B$3.4B$2.9B$2.9B$3.2B$2.9B$2.9BTotal debtDebt
$103M$504M$497M$3.6B$2.1B$909M($361M)$326M$782M$734M$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.2×10.3×10.3×8.2×5.4×3.1×8.4×8.2×6.6×5.2×4.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B$2.0B$2.2B$2.4B$2.8B$2.9B$3.5B$3.6B$3.9B$3.8B$3.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.9%0.9%0.8%0.8%0.8%0.8%0.5%0.5%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
416M408M397M389M391M393M398M395M386M378M371MShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.32$22.20$22.77$24.97$26.13$20.51$22.86$23.92$24.36$24.33$23.56Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.09$1.48$1.40$1.59$1.68$0.89$2.39$2.37$2.85$1.83$1.47EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.27$0.76$1.83$1.00$3.40$4.27$4.72$1.17$0.97$2.42$2.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.27$0.76$1.83$1.00$3.40$4.27$4.72$1.17$0.97$2.42$2.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.47$0.58$0.71$0.83$0.93$1.01$1.07$1.16$1.24$1.31$1.32Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.39$0.49$0.39$0.46$0.51$0.43$0.49$0.45$0.46$0.38$0.29Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.73$4.94$5.57$6.15$7.10$7.36$8.85$9.15$10.22$10.05$9.86Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr−1.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.4%/yr−6.6%/yr
EPS+5.9%/yr+1.7%/yr
Dividends / share+12.1%/yr+7.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−0.4%/yr−5.8%/yr
Book value / share+8.7%/yr+7.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
378Mpeak FY2015
ROIC
18%low FY2018
Gross margin
15%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.8×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$913Mowner earningsvs.$690Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2015FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned $690M of profit into $913M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$690M
Owner earnings$913M · 10% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$690M$1.1B$938M$953M$351M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$259M+$264M+$274M+$284M+$291M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$65M+$47M+$50M+$70M+$67M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$42M−$855M−$620M+$769M+$1.1B
Cash from operations$1.1B$555M$642M$2.1B$1.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$142M−$179M−$178M−$195M−$168M
Owner earnings$913M$375M$464M$1.9B$1.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%4%5%21%21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $65M), owner earnings is nearer $849M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.2B ÷ interest expense $230M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $731M · 0.6× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $2.2B + ST investments $3M − debt $2.9B
    What this means

    Netting $2.2B of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $731M owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (2.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 224 + DIO 0 − DPO 341 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 13%–36%; 18% latest = NOPAT $811M ÷ invested capital $4.5B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–21%; latest $913M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $142M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $65M of SBC) leaves $849M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $690M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $727M ÷ Owner Earnings $913M
    What this means

    Of $913M Owner Earnings, $727M (80%) went back to shareholders, $497M dividends, $230M buybacks. Net of $65M stock comp, the real buyback was about $165M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.55×
    Harvesting
    Capex $142M ÷ depreciation $259M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $848M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +69%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.50/share (latest year $1.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 11% early to 14% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 7.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Sep 30, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$9.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.6B
  • Receivables$4.9B
  • Other current assets$2.8B
Current liabilities$8.7B
  • Debt due within a year$100K
  • Accounts payable$7.1B
  • Other current liabilities$1.6B
Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$667Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$100K due · $1.6B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Sep 30, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−5.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.8B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.1B$1.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$596Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'25$280M
'26$265M
'27$231M
'28$181M
'29$147M
later$363M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$280Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.9B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$4.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.2B, of which the leases are 31%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2024 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $10.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.8B · 17%
  • Dividends$3.7B · 35%
  • Buybacks$1.9B · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.0B · 29%
  • Returned to owners$5.6B

    65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.7B as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$25.86

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 74M shares were bought for $1.9B, about $25.86 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.97 (2015) to $33.67 (2023), and 2023, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($350M).

  • Net change in share count−10.8%

    The diluted count fell from 416M to 371M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.31/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $62M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.7B31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.8B of capital spent building

$232M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Michael Roth$16.9M$16.3M$1.7B
2021$17.4M$31.5M$1.9B
2022Mr. Krakowsky$13.2M$10.3M$464M
2023$14.4M$13.5M$375M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Stock-based compensation$65M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Interpublic is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.6B → $2.9B

    Debt rose from $1.6B to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about $522M to $584M — about 3.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Advertising & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OMCOmnicom$17.3B18%14.1%33%11%
FISFidelity National Info$10.7B36%14.3%4%23%
CNXCConcentrix Corporation$9.8B36%6.5%6%7%
IPGInterpublic$9.2B14%11.1%24%7%
ABMABM Industries Incorporated$8.7B12%3.2%7%2%
APGAPi Group Corporation$7.9B25%3.9%4%7%
BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc.$6.9B28%14.4%18%13%
STGWStagwell Inc.$2.9B35%5.1%4%5%
Group median27%8.8%6%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Interpublic has delivered.

Interpublic’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Interpublic earns about $687M on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24−22%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $807M on 363M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-10-31; net debt $1.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Interpublic (IPG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IPG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IPAR its page in the Manual IPGP →

Industry order: ← IBTA the Advertising & Marketing chapter MNTN →