Owner Scorecard


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APG, APi Group Corporation

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified CyclicalSerial acquirer

We are a global, market-leading business services provider of fire and life safety, security, elevator and escalator, and specialty services with a substantial recurring revenue base and over 500 locations worldwide.

We provide statutorily mandated and other contracted services to a strong base of long-standing customers across industries.

We have a winning leadership culture driven by entrepreneurial business leaders that deliver innovative solutions to our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
APG · APi Group Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.9B
+12.7% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.2B 5-yr avg $6.5B
Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 7.0% 5-yr avg 5.0%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Life Safety (69%) and Specialty Contracting (14%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 53% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 8 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −16% to 7.0% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Life Safety is 69% of revenue, with Specialty Contracting the other meaningful line at 14%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Life Safety69%$5.5B
  • Specialty Contracting14%$1.1B
  • Infrastructure and Utility13%$1.0B
  • Fabrication and Distribution4%$342M
By geographyAmericas65%Other26%France9%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.7B$985M$3.6B$3.9B$6.6B$6.9B$7.0B$7.9B$8.2BRevenueRevenue
21%20%21%24%26%28%31%31%31%Gross marginGross mgn
17%36%20%20%24%23%24%24%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$162M($161M)($166M)$136M$162M$359M$484M$554M$573MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%−16.3%−4.6%3.5%2.5%5.2%6.9%7.0%7.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$136M($153M)($153M)$47M$73M$153M$250M$302M$324MNet incomeNet inc.
7%41%22%34%24%27%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$112M$150M$496M$182M$270M$514M$620M$759M$782MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$60M$18M$81M$75M$77M$79M$80M$85M$86MDepreciationDeprec.
($87M)$129M$563M$48M$102M$253M$258M$328M$327MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$74M$11M$38M$55M$79M$86M$84M$96M$102MCapexCapex
2.0%1.1%1.1%1.4%1.2%1.2%1.2%1.2%1.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$38M$139M$458M$127M$191M$428M$536M$663M$680MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.0%14.1%12.8%3.2%2.9%6.2%7.6%8.4%8.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$38M$139M$458M$127M$191M$428M$536M$663M$680MFree cash flowFCF
1.0%14.1%12.8%3.2%2.9%6.2%7.6%8.4%8.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$234M$2.6B$319M$86M$2.8B$83M$778M$186M$469MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$30M$0$44M$41M$0$75MBuybacksBuybacks
26%-5%-5%3%3%6%7%8%8%ROICROIC
21%-9%-10%2%3%7%8%9%9%Return on equityROE
21%−9%−10%2%3%7%8%9%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$54M$138M$515M$1.2B$605M$479M$499M$912M$645MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$765M$730M$639M$767M$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$58M$64M$69M$163M$150M$143M$145M$156MInventoryInvent.
$156M$150M$236M$490M$472M$497M$526M$506MAccounts payablePayables
$765M$632M$553M$600M$986M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.4B$2.6B$2.7B$2.6B$2.7B$3.2B$3.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$823M$841M$867M$1.9B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.7×3.0×1.4×1.4×1.4×1.5×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$320M$980M$1.1B$1.1B$2.4B$2.5B$2.9B$3.2B$3.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.0B$4.1B$5.2B$8.1B$7.6B$8.2B$8.9B$9.0BTotal assetsAssets
$1.2B$1.4B$1.8B$2.8B$2.3B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8BTotal debtDebt
$1.1B$900M$579M$2.2B$1.8B$2.3B$1.8B$2.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.4×-10.7×-3.2×2.3×1.3×2.5×4.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$633M$1.8B$1.6B$2.3B$2.1B$2.1B$3.0B$3.4B$3.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%15.8%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$197M$4M$4MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
133M169M206M266M353M402M416M435MShares out (diluted)Shares
$7.41$21.22$19.13$24.65$19.64$17.48$19.03$18.79Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.15$-0.91$0.23$0.27$0.43$0.62$0.73$0.74EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.05$2.71$0.62$0.72$1.21$1.33$1.59$1.56Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.05$2.71$0.62$0.72$1.21$1.33$1.59$1.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08$0.22$0.27$0.30$0.24$0.21$0.23$0.23Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.21$9.22$11.28$7.99$5.87$7.35$8.20$8.01Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+17.0%/yr (6-yr)−2.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.3%/yr (6-yr)−10.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+18.7%/yr (6-yr)+0.5%/yr
Book value / share−7.6%/yr (6-yr)−2.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
416Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
8%low FY2020
Gross margin
31%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.8×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$663Mowner earningsvs.$302Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $302M of profit into $663M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$302M
Owner earnings$663M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$302M$250M$153M$73M$47M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$85M+$80M+$79M+$77M+$75M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$44M+$32M+$29M+$18M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$328M+$258M+$253M+$102M+$48M
Cash from operations$759M$620M$514M$270M$182M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$96M−$84M−$86M−$79M−$55M
Owner earnings$663M$536M$428M$191M$127M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%8%6%3%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $44M), owner earnings is nearer $619M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $554M ÷ interest expense $145M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 3.4× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $912M − debt $2.8B
    What this means

    Netting $912M of cash and short-term investments against $2.8B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 3.4× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 72 + DIO 10 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -5%–26%; 8% latest = NOPAT $405M ÷ invested capital $5.3B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 1%–14%; latest $663M = operating cash $759M − maintenance capex $96M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $44M of SBC) leaves $619M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $759M ÷ net income $302M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $75M ÷ Owner Earnings $663M
    What this means

    Of $663M Owner Earnings, $75M (11%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $75M buybacks. Net of $44M stock comp, the real buyback was about $31M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.13×
    Maintaining
    Capex $96M ÷ depreciation $85M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.50×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.8B vs $1.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.54/share (latest year $0.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −6% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 6% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 18%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +31%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 31% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −16.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Moreover, if we do not employ new technologies as quickly or efficiently as our competitors, or if our competitors develop or utilize more cost-effective or customer-preferred technologies, such as data analytics, artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, that give them a competitive advantage in…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$645M
  • Receivables$1.5B
  • Inventory$156M
  • Other current assets$678M
Current liabilities$2.1B
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$506M
  • Other current liabilities$1.6B
Current ratio1.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$917Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $645M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$304M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.1B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$826Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$107M
'27$83M
'28$60M
'29$35M
'30$20M
later$43M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$107Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$348Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$313Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$313M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.1B, of which the leases are 10%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$523M · 17%
  • Buybacks$190M · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.4B · 77%
  • Returned to owners$190M

    7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $190M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$22.14

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $160M, about $22.14 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $17.56 (2022) to $25.21 (2023); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $24.23 ($75M).

  • Net change in share count227.1%

    The diluted count rose from 133M to 435M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained71%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($465M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $331M, so each retained $1 added about 0.71 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.8B53% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity93%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$7.1Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $523M of capital spent building

$201M written down across 2 years (2020, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Becker$8.0M$11.5M$127M
2022Becker$8.7M$4.4M$191M
2023Becker$10.2M$21.1M$428M
2024Becker$8.8M$9.9M$536M
2025Becker$10.5M$21.2M$663M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership18.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio151:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$44M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why APi Group Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?227.1%

    Diluted shares grew 227.1% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $190M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FISFidelity National Info$10.7B36%14.3%4%23%
CNXCConcentrix Corporation$9.8B36%6.5%6%7%
IPGInterpublic$9.2B14%11.1%24%7%
ABMABM Industries Incorporated$8.7B12%3.2%7%2%
APGAPi Group Corporation$7.9B25%3.9%4%7%
BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc.$6.9B28%14.4%18%13%
NSPInsperity Inc.$6.8B3.8%4%
EFXEquifax Inc.$6.1B18.2%8%14%
Group median27%8.8%7%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what APi Group Corporation has delivered.

APi Group Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, APi Group Corporation earns about $546M on its 6.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+39%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+31%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $680M on 433M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "APi Group Corporation (APG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← APEI its page in the Manual APH →

Industry order: ← ANDG the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter ARLO →