What it is: A hotel and lodging business, earning on rooms filled and the brand that fills them.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −6.4% to 42% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −281 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 147%, above 15% in 4 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest System Fund And Reimbursable Revenues at 52%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

System Fund And Reimbursable Revenues52%$2.7B
System Fund Revenue33%$1.7B
Reimbursable Revenues19%$1.0B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
											Income statement
$1.7B	$1.8B	$4.3B	$4.6B	$2.4B	$2.9B	$3.9B	$4.6B	$4.9B	$5.2B	$5.2B	RevenueRevenue
68%	69%	85%	83%	85%	83%	83%	84%	85%	85%	85%	Gross marginGross mgn
$712M	$744M	$582M	$630M	($153M)	$494M	$628M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
41.5%	41.7%	13.4%	13.6%	−6.4%	17.0%	16.1%	23.1%	21.1%	23.1%	23.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$456M	$534M	$349M	$385M	($260M)	$266M	$375M	$750M	$628M	$758M	$758M	Net incomeNet inc.
28%	18%	27%	29%	—	27%	30%	26%	30%	29%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$710M	$616M	$709M	$653M	$137M	$636M	$646M	$893M	$724M	$898M	$898M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$75M	$112M	$115M	$116M	$110M	$98M	$68M	$67M	$65M	$67M	$67M	DepreciationDeprec.
$179M	($30M)	$245M	$152M	$287M	$272M	$203M	$76M	$31M	$73M	$73M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$32M	$44M	$46M	$75M	$26M	$17M	$54M	$28M	$29M	$28M	$28M	CapexCapex
1.9%	2.5%	1.1%	1.6%	1.1%	0.6%	1.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$678M	$572M	$663M	$578M	$111M	$619M	$592M	$865M	$695M	$870M	$870M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
39.5%	32.1%	15.3%	12.5%	4.6%	21.3%	15.2%	18.7%	14.1%	16.8%	16.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$678M	$572M	$663M	$578M	$111M	$619M	$592M	$865M	$695M	$870M	$870M	Free cash flowFCF
39.5%	32.1%	15.3%	12.5%	4.6%	21.3%	15.2%	18.7%	14.1%	16.8%	16.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.7B	$593M	$199M	$721M	—	—	$233M	$245M	$259M	$270M	$270M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$10M	$3M	$3M	$5M	—	—	$482M	$790M	$804M	$897M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
147%	235%	—	90%	-51%	—	—	—	—	256%	256%	ROICROIC
											Balance sheet
$226M	$184M	$705M	$199M	$1.7B	$1.5B	$976M	$1.3B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$469M	$549M	$610M	$666M	$514M	$574M	$646M	$740M	$785M	$833M	$833M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$3M	$3M	$5M	$6M	$5M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$4M	$5M	$5M	InventoryInvent.
$526M	$595M	$616M	$568M	$466M	$579M	$697M	$711M	$650M	$676M	$676M	Accounts payablePayables
($54M)	($43M)	($1M)	$104M	$53M	($1M)	($47M)	$34M	$139M	$162M	$162M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$796M	$861M	$1.4B	$916M	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	0.7×	1.0×	0.7×	1.2×	1.3×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$232M	$237M	$313M	$339M	—	$341M	$335M	$336M	$331M	$335M	$335M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.8B	$3.3B	$4.3B	$4.2B	$5.0B	$4.7B	$4.2B	$4.8B	$4.7B	$5.3B	$5.3B	Total assetsAssets
$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$3.8B	$2.8B	$2.4B	$3.2B	$3.3B	$4.2B	$4.2B	Total debtDebt
$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.3B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.3B	$3.1B	$3.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
8.3×	7.8×	5.8×	5.2×	-1.1×	3.4×	5.3×	8.5×	5.8×	5.9×	5.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.2B)	($1.4B)	($1.1B)	($1.5B)	($1.9B)	($1.5B)	($1.6B)	($1.9B)	($2.3B)	($2.7B)	($2.7B)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
212M	193M	190M	183M	182M	183M	181M	169M	161M	154M	154M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.09	$9.24	$22.83	$25.28	$13.15	$15.89	$21.50	$27.36	$30.54	$33.61	$33.61	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.15	$2.77	$1.84	$2.10	$-1.43	$1.45	$2.07	$4.44	$3.90	$4.91	$4.91	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.20	$2.96	$3.49	$3.16	$0.61	$3.38	$3.27	$5.12	$4.31	$5.63	$5.63	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.20	$2.96	$3.49	$3.16	$0.61	$3.38	$3.27	$5.12	$4.31	$5.63	$5.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$7.99	$3.07	$1.05	$3.94	—	—	$1.29	$1.45	$1.61	$1.75	$1.75	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.15	$0.23	$0.24	$0.41	$0.14	$0.09	$0.30	$0.17	$0.18	$0.18	$0.18	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-5.44	$-7.05	$-5.99	$-8.05	$-10.20	$-8.09	$-8.92	$-11.54	$-14.34	$-17.75	$-17.75	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+17.1%/yr	+20.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+6.5%/yr	+56.0%/yr
EPS	+9.6%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−15.5%/yr	+10.8%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	+2.1%/yr	+4.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

154Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

256%low FY2020

Gross margin

85%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.5×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$870Mowner earningsvs.$758Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $758M of profit into $870M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$758M

Owner earnings$870M · 17% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$758M	$628M	$750M	$375M	$266M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$67M	+$65M	+$67M	+$68M	+$98M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$73M	+$31M	+$76M	+$203M	+$272M
Cash from operations	$898M	$724M	$893M	$646M	$636M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$28M	−$29M	−$28M	−$54M	−$17M
Owner earnings	$870M	$695M	$865M	$592M	$619M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	17%	14%	19%	15%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.2B ÷ interest expense $202M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.1B · 2.6× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $1.1B + ST investments $3M − debt $4.2B

What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $4.2B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -262d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 59 + DIO 2 − DPO 323 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 147%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

5-yr median, range -51%–256%; 256% latest = NOPAT $846M ÷ invested capital $331M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 256% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 5%–40%; latest $870M = operating cash $898M − maintenance capex $28M

Industry peers: median 22%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.18×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $898M ÷ net income $758M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 134%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $1.2B ÷ Owner Earnings $870M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $870M of Owner Earnings, $1.2B (134%) went back to shareholders, $270M dividends, $897M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.42×

Harvesting

Capex $28M ÷ depreciation $67M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $4.2B vs ($51M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +60%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.32/share (latest year $4.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-16.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 32% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 32% early to 22% lately, median 17% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Owner earnings growth +3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −6.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −3.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We are harnessing every dimension automation, machine learning, generative AI and agentic while tracking emerging trends to deliver competitive advantage in how we elevate guest experiences, unlock revenue opportunities and drive returns for owners.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B

Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
Receivables$833M
Inventory$5M
Other current assets$79M

Current liabilities$2.1B

Debt due within a year$478M
Accounts payable$676M
Other current liabilities$946M

Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.97×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.54×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($51M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$478M due · $1.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($3.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($6.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$4.6B$406M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$829Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$379M · 6%
Dividends$4.2B · 64%
Buybacks$3.0B · 45%

Returned to owners$7.2B
115% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.2B as dividends and $3.0B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$964M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $964M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.7B to $4.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−27.2%
The diluted count fell from 212M to 154M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.75/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 20% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Intercontinental Hotels Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?16.5% vs 29.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.0% early in the record and 16.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.7B → $4.2B
Debt rose from $1.7B to $4.2B while owner earnings went from about $638M to $810M — about 2.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TTEKTetra Tech	$5.4B	83%	7.7%	14%	7%
TEAMAtlassian	$5.2B	83%	-2.5%	—	27%
IHGIntercontinental Hotels Group	$5.2B	84%	19.1%	147%	16%
OTEXOpen Text Corporation	$5.2B	69%	17.6%	6%	23%
INCYIncyte	$5.1B	95%	15.0%	24%	22%
TWLOTwilio Inc.	$5.1B	52%	-19.4%	-7%	-1%
GENGen Digital	$5.0B	82%	32.2%	11%	31%
GDDYGoDaddy Inc.	$5.0B	—	9.1%	15%	21%
Group median	—	83%	12.0%	14%	22%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “Each ADS represents one ordinary”; Intercontinental Hotels Group reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Intercontinental Hotels Group has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Intercontinental Hotels Group earns about $832M on its 16.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($832M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $870M on 165M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $3.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh IHG against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Intercontinental Hotels Group (IHG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IHG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IGIC its page in the Manual IHS →

Industry order: ← HTHT the Hotels & Resorts chapter LIND →