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IHS, IHS Holding Limited
Revenue is Nigeria (68%) and SSA (32%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A telecom carrier, renting access to a network that must be constantly rebuilt.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 25% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −13% to 52% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −75 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Nigeria is 68% of revenue, with SSA the other meaningful segment at 32%.
- Nigeria68%$1.1B
- SSA32%$513M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 34% | 40% | 43% | 41% | 46% | 52% | 55% | 55% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($157M) | $332M | $388M | $312M | $524M | $604M | $821M | $821M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −12.8% | 23.7% | 24.6% | 15.9% | 27.2% | 39.5% | 51.9% | 51.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($423M) | ($322M) | ($26M) | ($459M) | ($2.0B) | ($1.6B) | $144M | $144M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $642M | $635M | $750M | $907M | $854M | $729M | $936M | $936M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $385M | $409M | $383M | $469M | $436M | $363M | $316M | $380M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $681M | $549M | $393M | $897M | $2.4B | $2.0B | $477M | $413M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | $95M | $238M | $379M | $465M | $235M | $218M | $218M | CapexCapex |
| — | 6.8% | 15.1% | 19.3% | 24.1% | 15.4% | 13.7% | 13.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | $540M | $512M | $529M | $389M | $494M | $719M | $719M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 38.5% | 32.4% | 27.0% | 20.2% | 32.4% | 45.4% | 45.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | $540M | $512M | $529M | $389M | $494M | $719M | $719M | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | 38.5% | 32.4% | 27.0% | 20.2% | 32.4% | 45.4% | 45.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -30% | -27% | -2% | -41% | -1799% | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| −30% | −27% | −2% | −41% | n/m | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $899M | $585M | $916M | $514M | $294M | $578M | $826M | $826M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $327M | $472M | $663M | $608M | $313M | $181M | $181M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $49M | $42M | $74M | $41M | $31M | $42M | $42M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $409M | $499M | $669M | $498M | $377M | $278M | $278M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($33M) | $14M | $69M | $150M | ($33M) | ($55M) | ($55M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $989M | $1.4B | $1.3B | $973M | $924M | $2.5B | $2.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $684M | $831M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $648M | $1.2B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.0× | 0.8× | 1.4× | 2.1× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $518M | $656M | $780M | $763M | $619M | $403M | $263M | $263M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $4.4B | $5.5B | $6.3B | $5.3B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $3.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.5× | 0.5× | 0.9× | 0.4× | 0.2× | 0.3× | 2.3× | 2.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $110M | ($473M) | ($251M) | ($251M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 294M | 294M | 301M | 331M | 333M | 333M | 335M | 336M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.19 | $4.77 | $5.25 | $5.93 | $5.78 | $4.59 | $4.72 | $4.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.44 | $-1.09 | $-0.09 | $-1.39 | $-5.93 | $-4.90 | $0.43 | $0.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $1.84 | $1.70 | $1.60 | $1.17 | $1.48 | $2.15 | $2.14 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $1.84 | $1.70 | $1.60 | $1.17 | $1.48 | $2.15 | $2.14 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $0.32 | $0.79 | $1.14 | $1.40 | $0.71 | $0.65 | $0.65 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $4.87 | $4.11 | $5.05 | $3.42 | $0.33 | $-1.42 | $-0.75 | $-0.75 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.0%/yr | −0.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.1%/yr (5-yr) | +3.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +15.0%/yr (5-yr) | +15.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $144M of profit into $719M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $144M | ($1.6B) | ($2.0B) | ($459M) | ($26M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$316M | +$363M | +$436M | +$469M | +$383M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$477M | +$2.0B | +$2.4B | +$897M | +$393M |
| Cash from operations | $936M | $729M | $854M | $907M | $750M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$218M | −$235M | −$465M | −$379M | −$238M |
| Owner earnings | $719M | $494M | $389M | $529M | $512M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 45% | 32% | 20% | 27% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We previously identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $821M ÷ interest expense $350M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B · 2.7× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $826M − debt $3.0B
What this means
Netting $826M of cash and short-term investments against $3.0B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, about 2.7× a year's operating profit (3.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 42 + DIO 22 − DPO 144 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle6-yr median margin, range 20%–45%; latest $719M = operating cash $936M − maintenance capex $218MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 45% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 6 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $936M ÷ net income $144M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.57×HarvestingCapex $218M ÷ depreciation $380M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.08×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.0B vs $1.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.44/share (latest year $0.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 40% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 40% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · −12.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“The implementation of new software and hardware, including new technology such as artificial intelligence (" AI "), involves risks and uncertainties that could cause disruptions, delays or deficiencies in the design, implementation or application of these systems.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$826M
- Receivables$181M
- Inventory$42M
- Other current assets$1.5B
- Debt due within a year$208M
- Accounts payable$278M
- Other current liabilities$718M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.6B · 34%
- Buybacks$10M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.2B · 66%
- Returned to owners$10M
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $846M and cash and short-term investments rose $240M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $10M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count14.1%
The diluted count rose from 294M to 336M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Peers, Telecom Operators
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITUniti Group Inc. | $2.2B | — | 32.9% | 3% | 1% |
| IHSIHS Holding Limited | $1.6B | 43% | 24.6% | — | 32% |
| CABOCable One | $1.5B | — | 27.3% | 10% | 19% |
| ZDZiff Davis | $1.5B | 85% | 12.3% | 5% | 24% |
| IDTIDT Corporation | $1.2B | 24% | 2.8% | 75% | 2% |
| TDSTelephone and Data Systems | $1.1B | — | 2.2% | 1% | 3% |
| CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc. | $976M | 57% | 16.1% | 17% | 14% |
| ATNIATN International Inc. | $667M | — | 2.5% | 1% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 50% | 14.2% | — | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. IHS Holding Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what IHS Holding Limited has delivered.
IHS Holding Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, IHS Holding Limited earns about $512M on its 32.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 45.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $719M on 336M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $2.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← IHG its page in the Manual IMMP →
Industry order: ← IDT the Telecom Operators chapter IRDM →