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INDI, indie Semiconductor Inc.
Our go-to-market strategy focuses on collaborating with key customers and partnering with Tier 1s through aligned product development, in pursuit of solutions addressing the automotive industry's highest growth applications.
We focus on developing innovative, high-performance and energy-efficient mixed-signal system-on-chips ("SoCs") and system solutions for advanced driver assistance systems ("ADAS") in addition to adjacent industrial applications.
Our sensors span all major modalities, including Radar, LiDAR, Ultrasound, and Computer Vision, while our embedded system control, power management, and interfacing solutions are accelerating the proliferation of automated vehicle safety features.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 58% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 6 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −85% through the cycle on a 41% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 30% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −26%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →85% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- China47%$103M
- Europe20%$43M
- United States15%$33M
- Rest of Asia Pacific9%$18M
- South Korea7%$15M
- Rest of North America1%$3M
- South America1%$2M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $23M | $48M | $111M | $223M | $217M | $217M | $219M | RevenueRevenue |
| 42% | 41% | 45% | 40% | 42% | 40% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 30% | 75% | 44% | 32% | 37% | 36% | 36% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 97% | 120% | 109% | 69% | 81% | 71% | 69% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($19M) | ($75M) | ($119M) | ($135M) | ($170M) | ($154M) | ($154M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −85.1% | −154.5% | −107.5% | −60.7% | −78.5% | −70.9% | −70.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($97M) | ($88M) | ($43M) | ($118M) | ($133M) | ($143M) | ($152M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($21M) | ($56M) | ($77M) | ($104M) | ($59M) | ($57M) | ($50M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $76M | $9M | ($75M) | ($30M) | $7M | $21M | $34M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $637K | $3M | $8M | $13M | $14M | $14M | $15M | CapexCapex |
| 2.8% | 5.5% | 6.8% | 5.7% | 6.6% | 6.6% | 6.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($22M) | ($59M) | ($84M) | ($117M) | ($73M) | ($71M) | ($65M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −96.7% | −120.8% | −76.1% | −52.5% | −33.7% | −32.9% | −29.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($22M) | ($59M) | ($84M) | ($117M) | ($73M) | ($71M) | ($65M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −96.7% | −120.8% | −76.1% | −52.5% | −33.7% | −32.9% | −29.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $80M | $9M | $95M | $3M | $18M | $18M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $0 | $7M | $0 | $0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | -58% | -58% | -23% | -26% | -22% | -22% | ROICROIC |
| — | -28% | -14% | -26% | -32% | -40% | -47% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −28% | −14% | −26% | −32% | −40% | −47% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $19M | $219M | $322M | $152M | $274M | $145M | $174M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $6M | $14M | $26M | $64M | $52M | $57M | $60M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $9M | $13M | $33M | $50M | $49M | $57M | InventoryInvent. |
| $5M | $5M | $14M | $18M | $28M | $22M | $24M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $4M | $17M | $26M | $78M | $74M | $84M | $93M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $30M | $248M | $374M | $272M | $409M | $286M | $327M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $122M | $34M | $64M | $139M | $85M | $77M | $80M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.2× | 7.4× | 5.8× | 2.0× | 4.8× | 3.7× | 4.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2M | $114M | $136M | $295M | $266M | $293M | $290M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $35M | $469M | $603M | $819M | $941M | $841M | $870M | Total assetsAssets |
| $21M | $8M | $171M | $161M | $381M | $353M | $415M | Total debtDebt |
| $2M | ($211M) | ($150M) | $9M | $107M | $208M | $241M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -8.8× | -60.4× | -70.4× | -15.7× | -18.4× | -8.7× | -8.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($110M) | $313M | $313M | $446M | $418M | $358M | $325M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 47.3% | 37.8% | 19.6% | 31.0% | 29.9% | 30.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 31.2M | 70.0M | 119M | 145M | 175M | 197M | 207M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.72 | $0.69 | $0.93 | $1.54 | $1.24 | $1.10 | $1.06 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-3.12 | $-1.26 | $-0.37 | $-0.81 | $-0.76 | $-0.73 | $-0.73 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.70 | $-0.84 | $-0.71 | $-0.81 | $-0.42 | $-0.36 | $-0.32 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.70 | $-0.84 | $-0.71 | $-0.81 | $-0.42 | $-0.36 | $-0.32 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.09 | $0.08 | $0.07 | $0.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-3.53 | $4.47 | $2.64 | $3.07 | $2.39 | $1.82 | $1.57 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.24 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.69 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.8%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +28.9%/yr | +28.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $143M loss into ($71M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($143M) | ($133M) | ($118M) | ($43M) | ($88M) |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$65M | +$67M | +$44M | +$42M | +$23M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$21M | +$7M | −$30M | −$75M | +$9M |
| Cash from operations | ($57M) | ($59M) | ($104M) | ($77M) | ($56M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$14M | −$14M | −$13M | −$8M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($71M) | ($73M) | ($117M) | ($84M) | ($59M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -33% | -34% | -52% | -76% | -121% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $65M), owner earnings is nearer ($137M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -8.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($154M) ÷ interest expense $18M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $145M − debt $353M
What this means
Netting $145M of cash and short-term investments against $353M of debt leaves $208M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 97 + DIO 136 − DPO 61 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -58%–-22%; -22% latest = NOPAT ($122M) ÷ invested capital $566MIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -121%–-33%; latest ($71M) = operating cash ($57M) − maintenance capex $14MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -33% of revenue this year, a -76% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $65M of SBC) leaves ($137M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($57M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($143M) · cash from operations ($57M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $217M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.73×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $353M vs $209M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.63/share (latest year $-0.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −116% → −70% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −116% early to −70% lately, median −85% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2021 · −154.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Our portfolio also supports perception and driver and occupant monitoring, enabled by advanced vision processors and our AI-based emotion3D software.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$174M
- Receivables$60M
- Inventory$57M
- Other current assets$35M
- Debt due within a year$12M
- Accounts payable$24M
- Other current liabilities$43M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | McClymont | $255k | $255k | ($59M) |
| 2022 | McClymont | $2.4M | $1.2M | ($84M) |
| 2023 | McClymont | $4.5M | $6.3M | ($117M) |
| 2024 | McClymont | $3.1M | −$993k | ($73M) |
| 2025 | McClymont | $3.7M | $2.3M | ($71M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$65M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 30% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why indie Semiconductor Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$21M → $415M
Debt rose from $21M to $415M while owner earnings went from about ($55M) to ($87M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?39% → 54% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $9M to $118M while revenue grew 868%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (39% of revenue then, 54% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SHLSShoals Technologies Group Inc. | $475M | 36% | 17.0% | 10% | 17% |
| MXLMaxLinear Inc. | $468M | 55% | -5.3% | -3% | 15% |
| POWIPower Integrations | $444M | 51% | 13.4% | 11% | 17% |
| SKYTSkyWater Technology Inc. | $442M | 16% | -6.2% | -14% | -12% |
| AMBAAmbarella | $391M | 61% | -21.4% | -15% | 11% |
| LASRnLIGHT Inc. | $261M | 28% | -9.8% | -16% | -2% |
| INDIindie Semiconductor Inc. | $217M | 41% | -81.8% | -26% | -64% |
| AXTIAXT Inc | $88M | 32% | 6.0% | 4% | -16% |
| Group median | — | 38% | -5.7% | -9% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFindie Semiconductor Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered60%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← INDB its page in the Manual INDV →
Industry order: ← IMOS the Semiconductors chapter INTC →