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INV, Innventure Inc.
Innventure's team screens opportunities that are reflective of the four dimensions of the DownSelect Process: technology developed by an MNC or other technology innovator, significant market need, transformative solution and strategic execution.
We have launched four such companies since inception: PureCycle Technologies, Inc.
Through a shared services model, we provide direct operational support to the Innventure Companies, including accounting, finance, legal, human resources and IT support.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Product revenue (76%) and Management Fees (24%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Product revenue is 76% of revenue, with Management Fees the other meaningful line at 24%.
- Product revenue76%$2M
- Management Fees24%$499K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations (FFO) ($271M)about $-4.98 per shareNet income ($293M) + depreciation $23M
What this means
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not enough data
What this means
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Not cleanly capturedIndustry peers: median 50%
What this means
This REIT tags its borrowings in a way the pipeline could not fully total, so we decline to show a leverage figure rather than a misleadingly low one. The debt schedule in the 10-K is where to read its true leverage.
- Interest coverage (EBITDA) -43.2×Thin(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $10MIndustry peers: median 2.3×
What this means
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“If Innventure fails to keep pace with rapidly evolving technological developments in AI, its competitive position and business results may suffer.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$55M
- Receivables$840K
- Inventory$2M
- Other current assets$24M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$57M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 2-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$347M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 2-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership14.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1356% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Financial Conglomerates
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIVApartment Investment and Management Company | $138M | 38% | 3.6% | 86% | 49% |
| MSBMesabi Trust | $99M | — | — | — | — |
| OLPOne Liberty Properties Inc. | $97M | 45% | 4.8% | 89% | 54% |
| LANDGladstone Land Corporation | $88M | 43% | 2.3% | 50% | 54% |
| FVRFrontView REIT Inc. | $67M | 26% | 2.0% | 95% | 37% |
| TCITranscontinental Realty Investors Inc. | $49M | 40% | 2.2% | — | 25% |
| TPTATerra Property Trust, Inc. | $35M | -18% | -1.2% | — | 52% |
| INVInnventure Inc. | $2M | -13172% | -45.2% | — | — |
| Group median | — | 38% | 2.2% | — | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← INTU its page in the Manual INVA →
Industry order: ← CODI the Financial Conglomerates chapter IX →