Share count
1.1Bpeak FY2017
← All companies ← IVA Manual JBS → ← INV Financial Conglomerates
IX, ORIX Corporation
Financial Conglomerates financial
ORIX is a Japanese diversified financial group. It began in equipment leasing and spread into lending, insurance, banking, real estate, and investment and asset management, financing, owning, and operating assets and then collecting the interest, lease payments, fees, and profits they throw off. In plain terms, it puts capital to work across many businesses, mostly in Japan but also abroad, and lives on the spread between what that capital earns and what it costs.
During this time, our marketing strategy shifted from a focus on using the established networks of the trading companies and other initial shareholders to one that concentrated on independent marketing as the number of our branches expanded.
Since April 2022, we have transitioned from the First Section to the Prime Market under the restructure of the Tokyo Stock Exchange's market segments.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
¥1.50T
+11.2% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue ¥1.50T 5-yr avg ¥1.34T
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Products (21%) and Asset Management and Servicing (20%), with 7 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- For a borrow-and-deploy business like this, the whole game is the spread: capital is the raw material, so the test is whether ORIX funds itself cheaply and reliably and earns a return above that cost across a full cycle, and whether a sprawling collection of arms is a real advantage or just a holding company that hides which parts pay their way. Underwriting and credit discipline matter more than growth; the bad case is a leveraged book where losses, a funding squeeze, or mispriced risk swamp the spread, since the balance sheet carries net debt and any one weak segment can drag the whole. Watch return on the capital employed against its cost, not the headline income. The figures are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 10%, above 12% in 0 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Products at 21%.
Revenue by product line, FY2026
- Products21%¥320.7B
- Asset Management And Servicing20%¥297.6B
- Environmental And Energy11%¥169.0B
- Real Estate Contract Work11%¥164.3B
- Other8%¥127.5B
- Real Estate8%¥121.9B
- Other20%¥303.0B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| ¥2.68T | ¥2.86T | ¥2.43T | ¥1.17T | ¥1.09T | ¥1.25T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.50T | RevenueRevenue |
| ¥22.7B | ¥17.3B | ¥22.5B | ¥24.4B | ¥0 | ¥0 | ¥4.5B | ¥440M | ¥5.3B | ¥7.2B | ¥7.2B | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| ¥280.9B | ¥321.6B | ¥327.0B | ¥306.7B | ¥196.8B | ¥322.9B | ¥296.9B | ¥338.6B | ¥351.6B | ¥458.3B | ¥458.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | 26% | 17% | 26% | 32% | 37% | 24% | 28% | 27% | 34% | 34% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 2.5% | 2.8% | 2.7% | 2.3% | 1.5% | 2.3% | 1.9% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.5% | 2.5% | Return on assetsROA |
| 11% | 12% | 11% | 10% | 6% | 10% | 8% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 9% | 8% | 7% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 16% | 17% | 16% | 14% | 9% | 14% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 15% | 15% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| ¥11.23T | ¥11.43T | ¥12.17T | ¥13.07T | ¥13.56T | ¥14.28T | ¥15.29T | ¥16.32T | ¥16.87T | ¥18.00T | ¥18.00T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥1.61T | ¥1.76T | ¥1.93T | ¥2.23T | ¥2.32T | ¥2.28T | ¥2.25T | ¥2.25T | ¥2.45T | ¥2.63T | ¥2.63T | DepositsDeposits |
| ¥341.2B | ¥368.6B | ¥430.7B | ¥443.8B | ¥495.3B | ¥488.9B | ¥627.7B | ¥631.8B | ¥621.9B | ¥773.6B | ¥773.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.51T | ¥2.68T | ¥2.90T | ¥2.99T | ¥3.03T | ¥3.26T | ¥3.54T | ¥3.94T | ¥4.09T | ¥4.48T | ¥4.48T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.31B | 1.28B | 1.28B | 1.28B | 1.24B | 1.20B | 1.18B | 1.16B | 1.14B | 1.12B | 1.12B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥214.55 | ¥250.74 | ¥255.27 | ¥240.32 | ¥158.97 | ¥267.96 | ¥251.22 | ¥291.56 | ¥307.16 | ¥409.28 | ¥409.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥46.82 | ¥56.73 | ¥69.03 | ¥81.35 | ¥76.86 | ¥82.50 | ¥89.93 | ¥86.02 | ¥118.44 | ¥152.52 | ¥152.52 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥1915.18 | ¥2091.47 | ¥2261.35 | ¥2345.50 | ¥2446.06 | ¥2706.90 | ¥2998.11 | ¥3393.98 | ¥3572.55 | ¥4002.76 | ¥4002.76 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| ¥1352.14 | ¥1461.69 | ¥1591.80 | ¥1680.85 | ¥1702.32 | ¥1966.17 | ¥2028.67 | ¥2391.05 | ¥2570.38 | ¥2797.55 | ¥2797.55 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −4.6%/yr | +8.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.4%/yr | +6.2%/yr |
| EPS | +7.4%/yr | +20.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +14.0%/yr | +14.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −0.9%/yr | +13.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.5%/yr | +10.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
¥1.50Tlow FY2021
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%AdequateNet income ¥458.3B ÷ equity ¥4.48TIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- SolidNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill ¥773.6B − intangibles ¥576.1B)Industry peers: median 25%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 24.9%Well capitalizedEquity ¥4.48T ÷ assets ¥18.00T
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 15%Leans on wholesale fundingDeposits ¥2.63T ÷ assets ¥18.00T
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) -11%Net reserve releaseProvision for credit losses ¥7.2B ÷ net interest income (¥63.2B)
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Financial Conglomerates
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IXORIX Corporation | ¥1.50T | 10% | 14% | — | -0.4% |
| AXPAmerican Express Company | $72.2B | 30% | 35% | 73% | 4.3% |
| DFSDiscover Financial Services | $17.9B | 25% | 26% | 39% | 8.6% |
| BKKTBakkt Inc. | $2.3B | -146% | -252% | — | 0.5% |
| GDOTGreen DOT Corp | $2.0B | 5% | 13% | — | -0.1% |
| SOFISoFi Technologies | $3.6B | -6% | -9% | 85% | 3.6% |
| SYFSynchrony Financial | $19.0B | 21% | 25% | 27% | 15.5% |
| OMFOneMain Holdings Inc. | $4.9B | 23% | 48% | 39% | 15.3% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 20% | — | 3.9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. ORIX Corporation's US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at JPY 1 = $0.0062 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in JPY.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what ORIX Corporation’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered10%/yr’21→’26
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity14%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’24–’26)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $19.3B on 1124M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ORIX Corporation (IX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← IVA its page in the Manual JBS →
Industry order: ← INV the Financial Conglomerates chapter