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IRWD, Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Cyclical

We are a biotechnology company developing and commercializing life-changing therapies for people living with gastrointestinal, or GI, and rare diseases.

We are focused on the development and commercialization of innovative product opportunities in areas of significant unmet need, leveraging our demonstrated expertise and capabilities in GI and rare diseases.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

IRWD · Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$296M

−15.7% YoY · −5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $362M 5-yr avg $383M

Operating margin 55.4% 5-yr avg −7.3%

Owner-earnings margin 31% 5-yr avg 49%

Free cash flow margin 31% 5-yr avg 49%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 94% and operating margin about 27% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −214% to 61% — on a steadier 94% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −144 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 44%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$274M	$298M	$347M	$428M	$390M	$414M	$411M	$443M	$351M	$296M	$362M	RevenueRevenue
99%	94%	91%	94%	99%	—	—	—	—	—	99%	Gross marginGross mgn
63%	78%	63%	40%	36%	27%	28%	36%	41%	28%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
51%	30%	29%	27%	23%	17%	11%	26%	32%	32%	25%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($52M)	($15M)	($151M)	$120M	$143M	$232M	$250M	($945M)	$93M	$99M	$200M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−18.9%	−5.2%	−43.5%	28.0%	36.7%	56.1%	61.0%	−213.5%	26.5%	33.3%	55.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($82M)	($117M)	($282M)	$22M	$106M	$528M	$175M	($1.0B)	$880K	$24M	$102M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	0%	2%	—	31%	—	—	—	40%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($26M)	($101M)	($71M)	$11M	$169M	$262M	$274M	$183M	$104M	$127M	$112M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$10M	$6M	$4M	$6M	$2M	$2M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$1M	DepreciationDeprec.
$16M	($21M)	$167M	($48M)	$29M	($290M)	$70M	$1.2B	$72M	$85M	($7M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M	$3M	$351K	$7M	$2M	$265K	$136K	$273K	$142K	$34K	$34K	CapexCapex
1.5%	0.9%	0.1%	1.7%	0.5%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($30M)	($104M)	($71M)	$5M	$167M	$262M	$274M	$183M	$103M	$127M	$112M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−11.0%	−34.7%	−20.5%	1.2%	42.9%	63.2%	66.6%	41.4%	29.4%	42.9%	31.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($30M)	($104M)	($71M)	$4M	$167M	$262M	$274M	$183M	$103M	$127M	$112M	Free cash flowFCF
−11.0%	−34.7%	−20.5%	0.8%	42.9%	63.2%	66.6%	41.4%	29.4%	42.9%	31.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-28%	-9%	—	—	107%	53%	44%	—	—	—	—	ROICROIC
-122%	-1187%	—	—	170%	87%	27%	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
−122%	n/m	—	—	170%	87%	27%	—	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$305M	$221M	$173M	$177M	$363M	$620M	$656M	$92M	$89M	$215M	$316M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$933K	$3M	$21M	$11M	$122M	$114M	$115M	$129M	$82M	$47M	$106M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1M	$735K	—	$648K	—	—	—	—	—	—	$648K	InventoryInvent.
$18M	$16M	$15M	$4M	$661K	$935K	$483K	$8M	$2M	$3M	$3M	Accounts payablePayables
($16M)	($12M)	$6M	$8M	$122M	$113M	$115M	$121M	$80M	$44M	$103M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$380M	$312M	$266M	$307M	$496M	$745M	$781M	$233M	$182M	$274M	$332M	Current assetsCur. assets
$91M	$66M	$120M	$41M	$32M	$162M	$26M	$276M	$39M	$242M	$236M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.2×	4.7×	2.2×	7.5×	15.4×	4.6×	30.6×	0.8×	4.7×	1.1×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$785K	$785K	$785K	$785K	—	—	—	—	—	—	$785K	GoodwillGoodwill
$710M	$606M	$332M	$403M	$559M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$471M	$351M	$397M	$435M	Total assetsAssets
$132M	$249M	$266M	$408M	$430M	$454M	$396M	$300M	$385M	$385M	$385M	Total debtDebt
($173M)	$28M	$92M	$231M	$68M	($166M)	($260M)	$208M	$296M	$170M	$69M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.3×	-0.4×	-4.0×	3.3×	4.8×	7.5×	32.9×	-43.7×	2.8×	3.0×	5.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$67M	$10M	($196M)	($93M)	$63M	$606M	$652M	($346M)	($301M)	($262M)	($217M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
10.7%	10.4%	11.7%	7.3%	8.0%	5.4%	6.6%	7.2%	8.5%	5.8%	4.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
145M	149M	153M	156M	161M	164M	186M	155M	160M	163M	167M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.89	$2.00	$2.27	$2.75	$2.42	$2.52	$2.20	$2.85	$2.20	$1.82	$2.17	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.56	$-0.78	$-1.85	$0.14	$0.66	$3.21	$0.94	$-6.45	$0.01	$0.15	$0.61	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.21	$-0.70	$-0.47	$0.03	$1.04	$1.59	$1.47	$1.18	$0.65	$0.78	$0.67	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.21	$-0.70	$-0.47	$0.02	$1.04	$1.59	$1.47	$1.18	$0.65	$0.78	$0.67	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$0.02	$0.00	$0.05	$0.01	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.46	$0.07	$-1.29	$-0.60	$0.39	$3.69	$3.50	$-2.23	$-1.88	$-1.61	$-1.30	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.4%/yr	−5.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	−5.6%/yr
EPS	—	−25.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	−42.2%/yr	−55.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

163Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

44%low FY2016

Gross margin

99%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$127Mowner earningsvs.$24Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $24M of profit into $127M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$24M

Owner earnings$127M · 43% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$24M	$880K	($1.0B)	$175M	$528M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1M	+$1M	+$1M	+$1M	+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$17M	+$30M	+$32M	+$27M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$85M	+$72M	+$1.2B	+$70M	−$290M
Cash from operations	$127M	$104M	$183M	$274M	$262M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$34K	−$142K	−$273K	−$136K	−$265K
Owner earnings	$127M	$103M	$183M	$274M	$262M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	43%	29%	41%	67%	63%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $110M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.0×

Adequate

Operating income $99M ÷ interest expense $33M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $85M · 0.9× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $215M + ST investments $96M − debt $396M

What this means
Netting $311M of cash and short-term investments against $396M of debt leaves $85M owed, about 0.9× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -204d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 58 + DIO 75 − DPO 337 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($81M) = debt $396M + equity ($262M) − cash

Industry peers: median -44%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 29%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -35%–67%; latest $127M = operating cash $127M − maintenance capex $34K

Industry peers: median -34%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 43% of revenue this year, a 29% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $110M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 5.29×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $127M ÷ net income $24M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 100%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $126M ÷ Owner Earnings $127M

What this means
Of $127M Owner Earnings, $126M (100%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $126M buybacks. Net of $17M stock comp, the real buyback was about $109M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.03×

Harvesting

Capex $34K ÷ depreciation $1M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $296M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.13×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $396M vs $32M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.98/share (latest year $0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −23% → −51% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
The recent-years average (−51%) sits below the early years (−23%), but the latest year (33%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 27% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2023 · −213.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$332M

Cash & short-term investments$316M
Receivables$106M
Inventory$648K

Current liabilities$236M

Debt due within a year$121M
Accounts payable$3M
Other current liabilities$112M

Current ratio1.41×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.40×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$96Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$121M due · $316M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+158.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.9× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($220M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$333M$13M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $932M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$17M · 2%
Buybacks$151M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$764M · 82%

Returned to owners$151M
16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $151M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $253M and cash and short-term investments rose $11M.
Average price paid for buybacks$11.40
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 13M shares were bought for $151M, about $11.40 each.
Net change in share count15.0%
The diluted count rose from 145M to 167M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$100Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $17M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Mr. McCourt	$7.6M	$4.6M	$183M
2024	Mr. McCourt	$6.1M	−$4.5M	$103M
2025	Mr. McCourt	$1.9M	$1.3M	$127M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership9.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?15.0%
Diluted shares grew 15.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $151M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?1% → 29% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $2M to $106M while revenue grew 32%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (1% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CRMDCorMedix Inc.	$312M	8%	-8961.5%	-202%	-7330%
EOLSEvolus Inc.	$297M	68%	-44.0%	-142%	-34%
IRWDIronwood Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$296M	94%	27.3%	44%	35%
RIGLRigel Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$294M	99%	-36.4%	-117%	-71%
XERSXeris Biopharma Holdings Inc.	$292M	—	-50.6%	-44%	9%
HROWHarrow Inc.	$272M	70%	0.8%	-11%	-1%
LGNDLigand Pharmaceuticals	$268M	96%	31.6%	2%	45%
ARVNArvinas Inc.	$263M	—	-306.3%	-37%	-118%
Group median	—	82%	-40.2%	-41%	-17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. has delivered.

Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. earns about $105M on its 35.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 42.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($105M) Net of stock comp (−$16M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−19%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+82%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $112M on 165M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $69M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh IRWD against another business →

The owners of IRWD: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. (IRWD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IRWD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IRTC its page in the Manual ISRG →

Industry order: ← IRD the Pharmaceuticals chapter IVA →