Owner Scorecard


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JAZZ, Jazz Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Cyclical

Jazz Pharmaceuticals plc is a global biopharmaceutical company whose purpose is to innovate to transform the lives of patients and their families.

Our lead marketed products, listed below, are approved in countries around the world to improve patient care.

Ziihera (zanidatamab-hrii) , a product approved by FDA in November 2024 under FDA's accelerated approval pathway and launched in the U.S. in December 2024 for the treatment of adults with previously treated, unresectable or metastatic HER2-positive (IHC3+) BTC, as detected by an FDA-approved test.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
JAZZ · Jazz Pharmaceuticals
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
+4.9% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.4B 5-yr avg $3.8B
Operating margin −0.9% 5-yr avg 5.3%
ROIC −0% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 29% 5-yr avg 30%
Free cash flow margin 29% 5-yr avg 30%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 16% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −10% to 40% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 6.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.5B$1.6B$1.9B$2.2B$2.4B$3.1B$3.7B$3.8B$4.1B$4.3B$4.4BRevenueRevenue
34%34%36%34%36%47%39%35%34%42%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%12%12%14%14%16%16%22%22%18%18%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$592M$529M$615M$532M$378M$170M($66M)$579M$717M($430M)($38M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
39.8%32.7%32.5%24.6%16.0%5.5%−1.8%15.1%17.6%−10.1%−0.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$397M$488M$447M$523M$239M($330M)($224M)$415M$560M($356M)$29MNet incomeNet inc.
25%15%12%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$592M$693M$799M$776M$900M$779M$1.3B$1.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$12M$13M$15M$15M$19M$27M$30M$30M$33M$42M$40MDepreciationDeprec.
$85M$85M$234M$127M$521M$892M$1.2B$420M$555M$1.4B$966MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$10M$29M$20M$40M$15M$28M$29M$24M$38M$59M$65MCapexCapex
0.7%1.8%1.1%1.9%0.6%0.9%0.8%0.6%0.9%1.4%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$583M$680M$784M$761M$885M$751M$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
39.2%42.0%41.4%35.2%37.4%24.3%34.0%27.9%33.4%30.8%29.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$583M$664M$779M$736M$885M$751M$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3BFree cash flowFCF
39.2%41.0%41.2%34.1%37.4%24.3%34.0%27.9%33.4%30.4%28.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.5B$0$0$0$0$6.2B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$278M$99M$524M$301M$147M$0$54K$270M$311M$125MBuybacksBuybacks
12%14%13%13%7%1%-1%7%9%-4%-0%ROICROIC
21%18%16%17%7%-8%-7%11%14%-8%1%Return on equityROE
21%18%16%17%7%−8%−7%11%14%−8%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$426M$386M$310M$637M$1.1B$591M$881M$1.5B$2.4B$1.4B$2.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$234M$224M$264M$356M$396M$563M$651M$706M$717M$831M$836MReceivablesReceiv.
$34M$43M$53M$79M$95M$1.1B$714M$597M$480M$417M$438MInventoryInvent.
$22M$24M$41M$46M$27M$100M$91M$103M$78M$122M$100MAccounts payablePayables
$246M$243M$276M$389M$465M$1.5B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$748M$968M$1.2B$1.6B$2.8B$2.6B$2.6B$3.4B$4.6B$4.2B$4.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$257M$294M$345M$364M$654M$809M$933M$1.5B$1.0B$2.2B$2.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×3.3×3.6×4.5×4.3×3.2×2.8×2.2×4.5×1.9×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$894M$948M$928M$920M$958M$1.8B$1.7B$1.8B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.8B$5.1B$5.2B$5.5B$6.5B$12.3B$10.8B$11.4B$12.0B$11.7B$11.9BTotal assetsAssets
$2.0B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$2.1B$6.0B$5.7B$5.7B$6.1B$5.4B$5.4BTotal debtDebt
$1.6B$1.2B$1.3B$970M$1.0B$5.5B$4.8B$4.2B$3.7B$4.0B$3.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.9B$2.7B$2.8B$3.1B$3.7B$4.0B$3.1B$3.7B$4.1B$4.3B$4.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
6.6%6.6%5.4%5.1%5.1%6.1%6.1%5.9%6.1%6.8%6.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
61.9M61.3M61.2M57.5M56.5M59.7M62.5M72.1M66.0M61.0M66.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$24.05$26.40$30.89$37.56$41.82$51.83$58.51$53.20$61.64$69.98$67.15Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.41$7.96$7.30$9.09$4.22$-5.52$-3.58$5.76$8.49$-5.84$0.45EPS (diluted)EPS
$9.42$11.09$12.80$13.23$15.65$12.58$19.87$14.82$20.57$21.55$19.57Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$9.42$10.83$12.72$12.79$15.65$12.58$19.87$14.82$20.57$21.27$19.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.47$0.33$0.70$0.27$0.46$0.46$0.33$0.58$0.96$0.98Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.34$44.25$45.04$54.06$64.75$66.43$49.34$51.86$62.02$70.82$68.57Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.6%/yr+10.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.6%/yr+6.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+22.4%/yr+29.4%/yr
Book value / share+9.9%/yr+1.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
61Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−4%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.0×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.3Bowner earningsvs.($356M)net incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $42M it takes just to hold its position. It put $17M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.3B.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($356M)$560M$415M($224M)($330M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$42M+$33M+$30M+$30M+$27M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$291M+$248M+$227M+$222M+$189M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.4B+$555M+$420M+$1.2B+$892M
Cash from operations$1.4B$1.4B$1.1B$1.3B$779M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$42M−$38M−$24M−$29M−$28M
Owner earnings$1.3B$1.4B$1.1B$1.2B$751M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$17M
Free cash flow$1.3B$1.4B$1.1B$1.2B$751M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue31%33%28%34%24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $42M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $17M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $291M), owner earnings is nearer $1.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($430M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.4B + ST investments $60M − debt $5.4B
    What this means

    Netting $1.5B of cash and short-term investments against $5.4B of debt leaves $3.9B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -4%–14%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($340M) ÷ invested capital $8.3B
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 24%–42%; latest $1.3B = operating cash $1.4B − maintenance capex $42M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 31% of revenue this year, a 34% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $291M of SBC) leaves $1.0B.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($356M) · cash from operations $1.4B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $125M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.3B
    What this means

    Of $1.3B Owner Earnings, $125M (10%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $125M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($291M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.41×
    Expanding
    Capex $59M ÷ depreciation $42M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.4B vs $1.9B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −54%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.29/share (latest year $-5.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $68.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 35% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 35% early to 8% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −10.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.0B
  • Receivables$836M
  • Inventory$438M
  • Other current assets$1.3B
Current liabilities$2.2B
  • Debt due within a year$1.0B
  • Accounts payable$100M
  • Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio2.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.85×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.91×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.0B due · $2.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$5.4B$62M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$292M · 3%
  • Buybacks$2.1B · 21%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$7.3B · 76%
  • Returned to owners$2.1B

    22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.6B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count6.8%

    The diluted count rose from 62M to 66M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$6.3B54% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity42%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$7.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $292M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Bruce C. Cozadd$15.7M$4.9M$751M
2022Bruce C. Cozadd$17.3M$26.3M$1.2B
2023Bruce C. Cozadd$15.3M−$2.5M$1.1B
2024Bruce C. Cozadd$15.5M$17.3M$1.4B
2025Bruce C. Cozadd$18.8M$24.1M$1.3B
2025Renee D. Gala$19.2M$29.8M$1.3B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio69:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$291M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Jazz Pharmaceuticals is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?30.7% vs 40.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 40.9% early in the record and 30.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6.8%

    Diluted shares grew 6.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2.1B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.0B → $5.4B

    Debt rose from $2.0B to $5.4B while owner earnings went from about $682M to $1.2B — about 3.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?18% → 29% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $268M to $1.3B while revenue grew 198%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (18% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OGNOrganon$6.2B62%25.0%17%12%
ONCBeOne Medicines Ltd.$5.3B86%-124.4%-46%-112%
ELANElanco Animal Health Incorporated$4.7B54%-3.2%-1%4%
JAZZJazz Pharmaceuticals$4.3B16.8%8%35%
PRGOPerrigo Company plc$4.3B36%3.9%1%6%
ALNYAlnylam$3.7B86%-126.0%-83%-107%
BMRNBioMarin$3.2B78%-1.7%-1%1%
AMRXAmneal Pharmaceuticals Inc.$3.0B37%7.9%3%9%
Group median1.1%0%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Jazz Pharmaceuticals has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Jazz Pharmaceuticals earns about $1.5B on its 34.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 30.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.3B on 63M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $3.3B. The if-converted diluted count is 66M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($65M) runs well above depreciation ($40M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Jazz Pharmaceuticals (JAZZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JAZZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← JANX its page in the Manual JBGS →

Industry order: ← JANX the Pharmaceuticals chapter JNJ →