Owner Scorecard


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PRGO, Perrigo Company plc

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableCyclicalSerial acquirer

Perrigo is a leading pure-play self-care company with more than a century of providing high-quality health and wellness solutions to meet the evolving needs of consumers.

As one of the originators of the over-the-counter ("OTC") self-care market, Perrigo is led by its vision "To Provide The Best Self-Care For Everyone" and its purpose to "Make Lives Better Through Trusted Health and Wellness Solutions, Accessible To All".

Perrigo delivers value by helping consumers proactively manage their well-being through affordable and effective self-care solutions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PRGO · Perrigo Company plc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
−2.8% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.2B 5-yr avg $4.4B
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 35%
Operating margin −36.9% 5-yr avg −1.8%
ROIC −21% 5-yr avg −2%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is CSCA (61%) and CSCI (39%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 80% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 36% and operating margin about 3.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −38% to 12% — on a steadier 36% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

CSCA is 61% of revenue, with CSCI the other meaningful segment at 39%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • CSCA61%$2.6B
  • CSCI39%$1.7B
By geographyUnited States60%Europe38%All Other Countries2%Ireland1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.3B$4.9B$4.7B$3.9B$4.1B$4.1B$4.5B$4.7B$4.4B$4.3B$4.2BRevenueRevenue
39%40%39%37%37%34%33%36%35%35%34%Gross marginGross mgn
9%9%9%12%12%12%12%11%11%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%5%3%3%3%3%3%3%2%2%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($2.0B)$598M$237M$175M$265M$410M$79M$152M$113M($1.1B)($1.5B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−37.9%12.1%5.0%4.5%6.5%9.9%1.8%3.3%2.6%−26.4%−36.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($4.0B)$120M$131M$146M($163M)($69M)($141M)($13M)($172M)($1.4B)($1.8B)Net incomeNet inc.
57%55%-8%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$655M$699M$593M$388M$636M$156M$307M$406M$363M$239M$189MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$457M$445M$424M$397M$385M$312M$339M$360M$326M$338M$341MDepreciationDeprec.
$4.2B$91M$700K($207M)$356M($147M)$54M($10M)$144M$1.3B$1.6BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$106M$89M$103M$138M$170M$152M$96M$102M$118M$93M$82MCapexCapex
2.0%1.8%2.2%3.6%4.2%3.7%2.2%2.2%2.7%2.2%2.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$549M$610M$490M$250M$466M$4M$211M$304M$245M$145M$108MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.4%12.3%10.4%6.5%11.4%0.1%4.7%6.5%5.6%3.4%2.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$549M$610M$490M$250M$466M$4M$211M$304M$245M$145M$108MFree cash flowFCF
10.4%12.3%10.4%6.5%11.4%0.1%4.7%6.5%5.6%3.4%2.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$427M$400K$0$748M$169M$0$2.0B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$83M$91M$105M$112M$124M$130M$142M$150M$153M$159M$159MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$192M$400M$0$164M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-14%3%1%2%2%3%1%1%1%-15%-21%ROICROIC
-67%2%2%3%-3%-1%-3%-0%-4%-49%-73%Return on equityROE
−69%0%0%1%−5%−4%−6%−3%−8%−54%−79%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$622M$679M$551M$354M$632M$1.9B$601M$751M$559M$532M$392MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$594M$653M$697M$740M$642M$613M$697MReceivablesReceiv.
$795M$807M$878M$967M$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BInventoryInvent.
$472M$450M$475M$520M$452M$411M$537M$478M$495M$475M$435MAccounts payablePayables
$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.7B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$2.7B$3.1B$3.9B$2.7B$2.8B$2.5B$2.8B$2.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.8B$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.1B$1.6B$1.0B$1.0B$998MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×2.0×1.9×2.0×2.3×2.4×2.4×1.8×2.4×2.8×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.0B$4.2B$4.0B$3.1B$3.1B$3.0B$3.5B$3.5B$3.3B$2.1B$1.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$13.9B$11.6B$11.0B$11.3B$11.5B$10.4B$11.0B$10.8B$9.6B$8.5B$8.0BTotal assetsAssets
$5.8B$3.3B$3.2B$3.4B$3.6B$3.5B$4.1B$4.1B$3.6B$3.6B$3.6BTotal debtDebt
$5.2B$2.7B$2.7B$3.0B$2.9B$1.7B$3.5B$3.3B$3.1B$3.1B$3.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$6.0B$6.2B$5.7B$5.8B$5.7B$5.2B$4.8B$4.8B$4.3B$2.9B$2.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.9%0.8%1.3%1.4%1.5%1.2%1.5%1.5%1.3%1.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$1.1B$137M$109M$347M$16M$90M$28M$1.3B$1.7BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
143M143M138M137M137M134M135M135M137M139M139MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.85$34.69$34.21$28.35$29.80$30.98$33.10$34.41$31.83$30.71$30.13Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-28.00$0.84$0.95$1.07$-1.19$-0.52$-1.05$-0.09$-1.25$-10.29$-13.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.83$4.28$3.55$1.83$3.40$0.03$1.57$2.25$1.78$1.05$0.78Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.83$4.28$3.55$1.83$3.40$0.03$1.57$2.25$1.78$1.05$0.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.58$0.64$0.76$0.82$0.90$0.97$1.06$1.11$1.11$1.15$1.14Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.74$0.62$0.74$1.01$1.24$1.14$0.72$0.75$0.86$0.67$0.59Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$41.58$43.27$40.98$42.52$41.22$38.56$36.00$35.24$31.44$21.19$18.02Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−2.0%/yr+0.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−13.4%/yr−21.0%/yr
Dividends / share+7.9%/yr+5.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.0%/yr−11.5%/yr
Book value / share−7.2%/yr−12.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income-1094.0%
    “Operating income decreased $1,235.1 million, or 1,094.0%, due to: •$48.2 million decrease in gross profit due primarily to lower global OTC sales volumes, the impact of divested businesses and exited products of $41.6 million, and net impact of pricing actions.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
139Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−15%low FY2025
Gross margin
35%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
21.4×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$145Mowner earningsvs.($1.4B)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.4B loss into $145M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($1.4B)($172M)($13M)($141M)($69M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$338M+$326M+$360M+$339M+$312M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$55M+$64M+$69M+$55M+$60M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.3B+$144M−$10M+$54M−$147M
Cash from operations$239M$363M$406M$307M$156M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$93M−$118M−$102M−$96M−$152M
Owner earnings$145M$245M$304M$211M$4M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%6%7%5%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $55M), owner earnings is nearer $91M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $532M + ST investments $13M − debt $3.6B
    What this means

    Netting $544M of cash and short-term investments against $3.6B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 53 + DIO 152 − DPO 63 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -15%–3%; -15% latest = NOPAT ($887M) ÷ invested capital $6.0B
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–12%; latest $145M = operating cash $239M − maintenance capex $93M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $55M of SBC) leaves $91M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($1.4B) · cash from operations $239M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $159M ÷ Owner Earnings $145M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $145M of Owner Earnings, $159M (110%) went back to shareholders, $159M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.28×
    Harvesting
    Capex $93M ÷ depreciation $338M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.76×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.6B vs $1.8B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.88/share (latest year $-10.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.22/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −7% → −7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −7% early, −7% lately, median 3%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −37.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our ability to identify, adopt, and effectively integrate emerging technologies, including generative artificial intelligence ("AI"), into our product development, services, and operations is an important factor in maintaining our competitiveness.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$374M
  • Receivables$697M
  • Inventory$1.1B
  • Other current assets$520M
Current liabilities$998M
  • Debt due within a year$11M
  • Accounts payable$435M
  • Other current liabilities$551M
Current ratio2.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.59×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $374M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−7.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($3.8B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.8B$173M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$37M
'27$409M
'28$12M
'29$945M
'30$752M
later$1.5B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$37Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$446Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$945Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 28, 2026$374M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$145M
Together, against $37M due next year14.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $519M against the $37M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 14 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 26%
  • Dividends$1.2B · 28%
  • Buybacks$756M · 17%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 29%
  • Returned to owners$2.0B

    61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $756M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $2.2B and cash and short-term investments fell $249M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $756M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.2%

    The diluted count fell from 143M to 139M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.15/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$6.8B80% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity70%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$3.1B written down across 8 years (2016, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 94% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021M. Kessler$10.5M$5.2M$4M
2022M. Kessler$12.8M$11.2M$211M
2023M. Kessler$10.9M$8.8M$304M
2023P. Lockwood-Taylor$6.1M$5.9M$304M
2024P. Lockwood-Taylor$7.1M$4.9M$245M
2025P. Lockwood-Taylor$9.0M$2.9M$145M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio91:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$55M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Perrigo Company plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.2% vs 11.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.0% early in the record and 5.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $7.8B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OGNOrganon$6.2B62%25.0%17%12%
ONCBeOne Medicines Ltd.$5.3B86%-124.4%-46%-112%
ELANElanco Animal Health Incorporated$4.7B54%-3.2%-1%4%
JAZZJazz Pharmaceuticals$4.3B16.8%8%35%
PRGOPerrigo Company plc$4.3B36%3.9%1%6%
ALNYAlnylam$3.7B86%-126.0%-83%-107%
BMRNBioMarin$3.2B78%-1.7%-1%1%
AMRXAmneal Pharmaceuticals Inc.$3.0B37%7.9%3%9%
Group median62%1.1%0%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Perrigo Company plc has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Perrigo Company plc earns about $276M on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $108M on 138M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $3.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Perrigo Company plc (PRGO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRGO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRG its page in the Manual PRGS →

Industry order: ← PRE the Pharmaceuticals chapter PRLD →