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JOUT, Johnson Outdoors Inc.
Johnson Outdoors is a leading global manufacturer and marketer of branded seasonal, outdoor recreation products used primarily for fishing from a boat, diving, paddling, hiking and camping.
The Company's portfolio of well-known consumer brands has attained leading market positions due to innovation, marketing excellence, product performance and quality.
The Company's Fishing segment key brands are: Minn Kota electric motors for quiet trolling or primary propulsion, marine battery chargers and shallow water anchors; Humminbird sonar and GPS equipment for fish finding, navigation and marine cartography; and Cannon downriggers for controlled-depth fishing.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Fishing (77%), Diving (13%) and Camping & Watercraft (10%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 41% and operating margin about 8.9% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.3% to 15% — on a steadier 41% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Fishing is 77% of revenue, with Diving the other meaningful segment at 13%.
- Fishing77%$458M
- Diving13%$75M
- Camping & Watercraft10%$58M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $434M | $491M | $544M | $562M | $594M | $752M | $743M | $664M | $593M | $592M | $652M | RevenueRevenue |
| 41% | 43% | 44% | 44% | 45% | 44% | 37% | 37% | 34% | 35% | 37% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 9% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 6% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 9% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $23M | $46M | $63M | $64M | $71M | $111M | $66M | $12M | ($44M) | ($16M) | $7M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.3% | 9.3% | 11.6% | 11.3% | 12.0% | 14.8% | 8.9% | 1.8% | −7.3% | −2.7% | 1.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $14M | $35M | $41M | $51M | $55M | $83M | $44M | $20M | ($27M) | ($34M) | ($15M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | 27% | 40% | 23% | 25% | 26% | 24% | 24% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $43M | $46M | $63M | $46M | $61M | $58M | ($62M) | $42M | $41M | $56M | $44M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $12M | $13M | $13M | $14M | $15M | $13M | $14M | $16M | $20M | $21M | $21M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $16M | ($4M) | $7M | ($22M) | ($11M) | ($43M) | ($125M) | $3M | $47M | $68M | $37M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $12M | $12M | $19M | $17M | $16M | $21M | $32M | $23M | $22M | $16M | $19M | CapexCapex |
| 2.7% | 2.4% | 3.5% | 3.0% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 4.3% | 3.4% | 3.7% | 2.7% | 2.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $32M | $35M | $50M | $29M | $46M | $45M | ($76M) | $25M | $19M | $40M | $25M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.3% | 7.1% | 9.2% | 5.2% | 7.7% | 6.0% | −10.3% | 3.8% | 3.2% | 6.8% | 3.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $32M | $35M | $44M | $29M | $46M | $37M | ($94M) | $19M | $19M | $40M | $25M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.3% | 7.1% | 8.1% | 5.2% | 7.7% | 4.9% | −12.6% | 2.9% | 3.2% | 6.8% | 3.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $9M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $12M | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $3M | $4M | $4M | $6M | $7M | $8M | $12M | $13M | $13M | $14M | $14M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $2M | $663K | $675K | $708K | $460K | $495K | $509K | $444K | $436K | $121K | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 19% | 24% | 32% | 32% | 38% | 14% | 2% | -11% | -5% | 1% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 14% | 15% | 16% | 15% | 18% | 9% | 4% | -6% | -8% | -4% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 13% | 13% | 14% | 13% | 16% | 7% | 1% | −9% | −11% | −7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $87M | $110M | $151M | $172M | $212M | $240M | $130M | $139M | $162M | $176M | $108M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $42M | $47M | $41M | $45M | $67M | $71M | $92M | $43M | $41M | $50M | $127M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $68M | $79M | $89M | $94M | $97M | $167M | $249M | $261M | $210M | $171M | $187M | InventoryInvent. |
| $25M | $32M | $34M | $30M | $37M | $57M | $54M | $43M | $36M | $40M | $52M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $85M | $94M | $96M | $108M | $127M | $181M | $287M | $262M | $214M | $181M | $261M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $202M | $241M | $286M | $323M | $389M | $491M | $480M | $459M | $429M | $409M | $428M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $68M | $84M | $93M | $88M | $106M | $138M | $115M | $104M | $90M | $105M | $123M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.0× | 2.9× | 3.1× | 3.7× | 3.7× | 3.6× | 4.2× | 4.4× | 4.7× | 3.9× | 3.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $11M | $11M | $11M | $11M | $11M | $11M | $11M | $11M | $0 | $10M | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $310M | $354M | $396M | $436M | $546M | $674M | $680M | $682M | $635M | $604M | $618M | Total assetsAssets |
| $7M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| ($80M) | ($110M) | ($151M) | ($172M) | ($212M) | ($240M) | ($130M) | ($139M) | ($162M) | ($176M) | ($108M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 31.5× | 60.2× | 310.4× | 370.8× | 497.0× | 767.5× | 433.4× | 77.2× | -286.3× | -72.3× | 30.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $207M | $243M | $279M | $325M | $378M | $459M | $488M | $500M | $463M | $418M | $419M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 9.9M | 9.9M | 10.0M | 10.0M | 10.1M | 10.1M | 10.2M | 10.2M | 10.2M | 10.3M | 10.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $44.01 | $49.45 | $54.45 | $56.12 | $59.04 | $74.27 | $73.23 | $65.11 | $58.00 | $57.72 | $62.86 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.37 | $3.54 | $4.07 | $5.13 | $5.49 | $8.24 | $4.38 | $1.92 | $-2.60 | $-3.34 | $-1.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.22 | $3.50 | $5.03 | $2.90 | $4.56 | $4.44 | $-7.52 | $2.49 | $1.86 | $3.92 | $2.41 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.22 | $3.50 | $4.42 | $2.90 | $4.56 | $3.65 | $-9.24 | $1.87 | $1.86 | $3.92 | $2.41 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.32 | $0.36 | $0.44 | $0.55 | $0.67 | $0.83 | $1.19 | $1.23 | $1.31 | $1.32 | $1.31 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.19 | $1.17 | $1.92 | $1.68 | $1.55 | $2.12 | $3.12 | $2.22 | $2.15 | $1.56 | $1.84 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $21.05 | $24.50 | $27.93 | $32.39 | $37.57 | $45.31 | $48.08 | $49.02 | $45.34 | $40.77 | $40.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.1%/yr | −0.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +2.2%/yr | −3.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +16.9%/yr | +14.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.1%/yr | +0.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.6%/yr | +1.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $34M loss into $40M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($34M) | ($27M) | $20M | $44M | $83M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$21M | +$20M | +$16M | +$14M | +$13M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$1M | +$1M | +$2M | +$4M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$68M | +$47M | +$3M | −$125M | −$43M |
| Cash from operations | $56M | $41M | $42M | ($62M) | $58M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$16M | −$22M | −$16M | −$14M | −$13M |
| Owner earnings | $40M | $19M | $25M | ($76M) | $45M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$6M | −$17M | −$8M |
| Free cash flow | $40M | $19M | $19M | ($94M) | $37M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 3% | 4% | -10% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1M), owner earnings is nearer $39M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -72.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($16M) ÷ interest expense $224K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $176M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $176M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 31 + DIO 162 − DPO 38 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -11%–38%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($13M) ÷ invested capital $242MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -10%–9%; latest $40M = operating cash $56M − maintenance capex $16MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1M of SBC) leaves $39M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($34M) · cash from operations $56M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $14M ÷ Owner Earnings $40M
What this means
Of $40M Owner Earnings, $14M (34%) went back to shareholders, $14M dividends, $121K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.77×HarvestingCapex $16M ÷ depreciation $21M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $592M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.91×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $304M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −146%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.33/share (latest year $-3.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $40.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to −3% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −25%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −7.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 3, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$108M
- Receivables$127M
- Inventory$187M
- Other current assets$6M
- Accounts payable$52M
- Other current liabilities$70M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $396M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$189M · 48%
- Dividends$83M · 21%
- Buybacks$6M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$118M · 30%
- Returned to owners$89M
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $83M as dividends and $6M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $6M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count5.2%
The diluted count rose from 10M to 10M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.32/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 17% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−6%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($193M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $11M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Helen P. Johnson-Leipold | $3.2M | $6.2M | $45M |
| 2022 | Helen P. Johnson-Leipold | $2.4M | −$849k | ($76M) |
| 2023 | Helen P. Johnson-Leipold | $2.1M | $1.3M | $25M |
| 2024 | Helen P. Johnson-Leipold | $2.1M | $514k | $19M |
| 2025 | Helen P. Johnson-Leipold | $2.8M | $2.0M | $40M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership19.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$1M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Johnson Outdoors Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.6% vs 7.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.9% early in the record and 4.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.2%
Diluted shares grew 5.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $6M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 48% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $110M to $314M while revenue grew 50%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 48% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Leisure Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HASHasbro Inc. | $4.7B | 67% | 10.5% | 12% | 12% |
| GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp. | $2.6B | 51% | 11.4% | 12% | 7% |
| PTONPeloton Interactive Inc. | $2.5B | 43% | -15.3% | -10% | -5% |
| CALYCallaway Golf Company | $2.1B | 44% | 6.9% | 7% | 8% |
| YETIYETI Holdings | $1.9B | 54% | 11.4% | 30% | 12% |
| BRCBrady Corporation | $1.5B | 50% | 14.6% | 17% | 12% |
| FNKOFunko Inc. | $908M | 36% | 4.7% | 6% | 5% |
| JOUTJohnson Outdoors Inc. | $592M | 42% | 9.1% | 16% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 47% | 9.8% | 12% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Johnson Outdoors Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Johnson Outdoors Inc. earns about $38M on its 6.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $25M on 10M shares outstanding (a weighted diluted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $108M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($19M) runs well above depreciation ($21M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $28M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← JOE its page in the Manual JPM →
Industry order: ← HAS the Leisure Products chapter KBSX →