Owner Scorecard


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FNKO, Funko Inc.

Leisure Products consumer brand Cyclical

Funko is a leading pop culture consumer products company .

We create whimsical, fun and unique products that enable fans to express who they are, which allows them to find their community and generate a sense of belonging and joy.

We achieve this through products people display, wear or carry of their favorite "something"—whether it is a movie, TV show, video game, musician or sports team.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FNKO · Funko Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$908M
−13.5% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $918M 5-yr avg $1.1B
Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 33%
Operating margin −3.5% 5-yr avg −1.0%
ROIC −7% 5-yr avg −3%
Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 0%
Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Core Collectible (80%), Loungefly (17%) and Other (3%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 36% and operating margin about 3.6% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −9.5% to 10% — on a steadier 36% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Core Collectible is 80% of revenue, with Loungefly the other meaningful line at 17%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Core Collectible80%$723M
  • Loungefly17%$155M
  • Other3%$30M
By geographyUnited States60%Europe32%International8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$427M$516M$686M$795M$653M$1.0B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$908M$918MRevenueRevenue
34%39%37%36%38%37%33%30%32%Gross marginGross mgn
18%23%23%24%28%24%30%34%34%37%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$44M$42M$61M$47M$24M$95M($12M)($104M)$13M($46M)($32M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.3%8.2%8.9%5.9%3.6%9.3%−0.9%−9.5%1.2%−5.0%−3.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$27M$4M$7M$12M$4M$44M($8M)($154M)($15M)($67M)($58M)Net incomeNet inc.
24%42%28%34%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$49M$24M$50M$91M$109M$87M($40M)$31M$124M($5M)$27MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$24M$32M$39M$42M$44M$40M$48M$57M$63M$59M$59MDepreciationDeprec.
($3M)($18M)($6M)$24M$50M($10M)($97M)$117M$62M($8M)$16MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$21M$34M$27M$42M$18M$28M$59M$35M$33M$33M$35MCapexCapex
5.0%6.5%3.9%5.3%2.8%2.7%4.5%3.2%3.1%3.6%3.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$28M($10M)$23M$49M$90M$60M($99M)($4M)$91M($38M)($7M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.6%−1.9%3.4%6.1%13.8%5.8%−7.5%−0.4%8.6%−4.2%−0.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$28M($10M)$23M$49M$90M$60M($99M)($4M)$91M($38M)($7M)Free cash flowFCF
6.6%−1.9%3.4%6.1%13.8%5.8%−7.5%−0.4%8.6%−4.2%−0.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$903K$32M$635K$6M$0$0$19M$5M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
8%9%10%8%4%17%-2%-24%3%-10%-7%ROICROIC
12%3%5%5%2%14%-2%-66%-6%-36%-34%Return on equityROE
12%3%5%5%2%14%−2%−66%−6%−36%−34%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$6M$8M$13M$25M$52M$84M$19M$36M$35M$42M$34MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$84M$115M$149M$152M$132M$188M$168M$131M$120M$117M$91MReceivablesReceiv.
$44M$79M$87M$62M$60M$166M$246M$119M$93M$83M$77MInventoryInvent.
$24M$53M$36M$43M$29M$57M$68M$53M$63M$65M$52MAccounts payablePayables
$104M$141M$199M$171M$162M$297M$347M$197M$149M$135M$115MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$152M$224M$261M$259M$259M$453M$473M$337M$287M$290M$241MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$98M$130M$143M$158M$139M$285M$361M$353M$306M$244M$210MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.7×1.8×1.6×1.9×1.6×1.3×1.0×0.9×1.2×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$97M$114M$116M$125M$125M$127M$131M$134M$134M$134M$134MGoodwillGoodwill
$522M$630M$666M$796M$764M$968M$1.1B$799M$707M$685M$626MTotal assetsAssets
$211M$223M$227M$217M$191M$173M$176M$153M$183M$225M$216MTotal debtDebt
$205M$215M$214M$191M$139M$90M$157M$117M$148M$183M$182MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$217M$131M$155M$225M$242M$322M$368M$232M$233M$186M$169MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%1.1%1.3%1.6%1.6%1.3%1.3%1.0%1.3%1.3%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
25.3M25.6M32.9M35.8M40.6M44.6M48.3M52.0M54.4M55.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.38$26.84$24.15$18.24$25.35$29.69$22.68$20.17$16.70$16.57Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.16$0.29$0.36$0.11$1.08$-0.18$-3.19$-0.28$-1.24$-1.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.38$0.90$1.47$2.52$1.47$-2.23$-0.09$1.74$-0.70$-0.13Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.38$0.90$1.47$2.52$1.47$-2.23$-0.09$1.74$-0.70$-0.13Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.33$1.05$1.28$0.52$0.68$1.33$0.73$0.63$0.61$0.62Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.18$6.05$6.85$6.77$7.92$8.26$4.80$4.48$3.42$3.05Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−2.5%/yr (8-yr)−1.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.3%/yr (8-yr)+3.2%/yr
Book value / share−5.1%/yr (8-yr)−12.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
54Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−10%low FY2023
Gross margin
30%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($38M)owner earningsvs.($67M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $67M loss into ($38M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($67M)($15M)($154M)($8M)$44M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$59M+$63M+$57M+$48M+$40M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$12M+$14M+$11M+$17M+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$8M+$62M+$117M−$97M−$10M
Cash from operations($5M)$124M$31M($40M)$87M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$33M−$33M−$35M−$59M−$28M
Owner earnings($38M)$91M($4M)($99M)$60M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-4%9%0%-8%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer ($50M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $42M − debt $225M
    What this means

    Netting $42M of cash and short-term investments against $225M of debt leaves $183M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 47 + DIO 40 − DPO 31 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -24%–17%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($36M) ÷ invested capital $369M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -8%–14%; latest ($38M) = operating cash ($5M) − maintenance capex $33M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -4% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves ($50M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($67M) · cash from operations ($5M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.56×
    Harvesting
    Capex $33M ÷ depreciation $59M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $908M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.19×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $225M vs $46M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −717%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.42/share (latest year $-1.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to −4% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −9.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.8%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$241M
  • Cash & short-term investments$34M
  • Receivables$91M
  • Inventory$77M
  • Other current assets$39M
Current liabilities$210M
  • Debt due within a year$20M
  • Accounts payable$52M
  • Other current liabilities$139M
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.78×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$31Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$20M due · $34M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($97M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$279M$63M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$15Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $519M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$330M · 64%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$189M · 36%
  • Net change in share count118.9%

    The diluted count rose from 25M to 55M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$270M39% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity72%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$65Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $330M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership3.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio128:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$12M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Funko Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.4% vs 2.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.7% early in the record and 1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?118.9%

    Diluted shares grew 118.9% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Leisure Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HASHasbro Inc.$4.7B67%10.5%12%12%
GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp.$2.6B51%11.4%12%7%
PTONPeloton Interactive Inc.$2.5B43%-15.3%-10%-5%
CALYCallaway Golf Company$2.1B44%6.9%7%8%
YETIYETI Holdings$1.9B54%11.4%30%12%
BRCBrady Corporation$1.5B50%14.6%17%12%
FNKOFunko Inc.$908M36%4.7%6%5%
JOUTJohnson Outdoors Inc.$592M42%9.1%16%6%
Group median47%9.8%12%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Funko Inc. has delivered.

Funko Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Funko Inc. earns about $42M on its 4.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −4.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($7M) on 55M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $182M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Funko Inc. (FNKO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FNKO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FNF its page in the Manual FNLC →

Industry order: ← DOO the Leisure Products chapter GOLF →