Owner Scorecard


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KOS, Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE)

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Unprofitable

Kosmos Energy is a leading deepwater exploration and production company focused on meeting the world's growing demand for energy.

We have diversified oil and gas production from assets offshore Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, and the Gulf of America.

Strategy has evolved to focus on enhancing production through infill drilling and well work, infrastructure-led exploration, as well as value-accretive acquisitions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KOS · Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.3B
−23.1% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Operating margin −57.3% 5-yr avg 0.9%
ROIC −19% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 25%
Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 23% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −7.5%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 29% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$310M$578M$887M$1.5B$804M$1.3B$2.3B$1.7B$1.7B$1.3B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
28%12%11%7%9%7%4%6%6%6%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($370M)($237M)($67M)$15M($509M)($38M)$297M$389M$350M($638M)($785M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−119.1%−40.9%−7.5%1.0%−63.3%−2.8%13.2%22.6%20.9%−49.5%−57.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($284M)($223M)($94M)($56M)($412M)($78M)$227M$214M$190M($700M)($815M)Net incomeNet inc.
33%43%46%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$52M$237M$260M$628M$196M$374M$1.1B$765M$678M$134M$241MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$151M$265M$339M$573M$495M$478M$509M$455M$465M$565M$565MDepreciationDeprec.
$145M$154M($20M)$78M$80M($57M)$361M$54M($15M)$241M$466MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$645M$57M$385M$441M$274M$924M$612M$0$0$0CapexCapex
207.7%9.9%43.5%29.4%34.1%69.0%27.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($99M)$179M($125M)$187M($78M)($103M)$519M$765M$678M$241MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−31.7%31.0%−14.1%12.5%−9.7%−7.7%23.0%44.5%40.5%17.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($592M)$179M($125M)$187M($78M)($550M)$519M$765M$678M$241MFree cash flowFCF
−190.9%31.0%−14.1%12.5%−9.7%−41.0%23.0%44.5%40.5%17.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$73M$19M$512K$655K$166K$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$2M$2M$206MBuybacksBuybacks
-13%-10%-2%0%-17%-1%7%7%5%-14%-19%ROICROIC
-26%-25%-10%-7%-94%-15%29%21%16%-132%-158%Return on equityROE
−25%−10%−15%−98%−15%29%21%16%−132%−158%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$194M$233M$174M$225M$149M$132M$183M$95M$85M$92M$130MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$54M$0$48M$64M$44M$134M$67M$121M$165M$103M$111MReceivablesReceiv.
$74M$72M$85M$114M$129M$165M$134M$152M$171M$173M$183MInventoryInvent.
$221M$142M$177M$149M$221M$184M$212M$249M$350M$203M$195MAccounts payablePayables
($92M)($70M)($44M)$29M($48M)$115M($11M)$24M($14M)$74M$98MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$475M$534M$510M$567M$400M$542M$469M$423M$446M$428M$453MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$370M$429M$384M$539M$460M$531M$574M$555M$595M$572M$757MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.2×1.3×1.1×0.9×1.0×0.8×0.8×0.7×0.7×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.3B$3.2B$4.1B$4.3B$3.9B$4.9B$4.6B$4.9B$5.3B$4.7B$4.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.3B$1.3B$2.1B$2.0B$2.1B$2.6B$2.2B$2.4B$2.7B$3.1B$2.9BTotal debtDebt
$1.1B$1.0B$1.9B$1.8B$2.0B$2.5B$2.0B$2.3B$2.7B$3.0B$2.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.1B$897M$941M$842M$440M$529M$788M$1.0B$1.2B$529M$515MShareholders’ equityEquity
12.9%6.9%4.0%2.2%4.1%2.4%1.5%2.5%2.3%2.2%1.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
385M388M405M401M405M417M475M481M477M478M506MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.81$1.49$2.19$3.74$1.98$3.21$4.76$3.57$3.51$2.70$2.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.74$-0.57$-0.23$-0.14$-1.02$-0.19$0.48$0.44$0.40$-1.47$-1.61EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.26$0.46$-0.31$0.47$-0.19$-0.25$1.09$1.59$1.42$0.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.54$0.46$-0.31$0.47$-0.19$-1.32$1.09$1.59$1.42$0.48Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.18$0.05$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.67$0.15$0.95$1.10$0.68$2.22$1.29$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.81$2.31$2.33$2.10$1.09$1.27$1.66$2.15$2.52$1.11$1.02Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+14.4%/yr+6.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+25.0%/yr
Book value / share−9.8%/yr+0.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
478Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−14%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.9×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$678Mowner earningsvs.$190Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned $190M of profit into $678M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$190M
Owner earnings$678M · 40% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$190M$214M$227M($78M)($412M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$465M+$455M+$509M+$478M+$495M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$38M+$43M+$35M+$32M+$33M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$15M+$54M+$361M−$57M+$80M
Cash from operations$678M$765M$1.1B$374M$196M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$612M−$478M−$274M
Owner earnings$678M$765M$519M($103M)($78M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$446M
Free cash flow$678M$765M$519M($550M)($78M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue40%45%23%-8%-10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer $640M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($638M) ÷ interest expense $37M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $92M − debt $3.1B
    What this means

    Netting $92M of cash and short-term investments against $3.1B of debt leaves $3.0B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -17%–7%; -14% latest = NOPAT ($504M) ÷ invested capital $3.5B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -32%–45%; latest $134M = operating cash $134M − maintenance capex $0
    Industry peers: median 28%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $106M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($700M) · cash from operations $134M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $206M ÷ Owner Earnings $134M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $134M of Owner Earnings, $206M (154%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $206M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $28M stock comp, the real buyback was about $178M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.00×
    Harvesting
    Capex $0 ÷ depreciation $565M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.75×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.1B vs ($144M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.17/share (latest year $-1.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −56% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −56% early to −2% lately, median −8% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +43%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 43% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −119.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$453M
  • Cash & short-term investments$130M
  • Receivables$111M
  • Inventory$183M
  • Other current assets$30M
Current liabilities$757M
  • Debt due within a year$30M
  • Accounts payable$195M
  • Other current liabilities$532M
Current ratio0.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($304M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$30M due · $130M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+27.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$515Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$2.9B$11M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$17Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $4.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$3.3B · 77%
  • Dividends$93M · 2%
  • Buybacks$210M · 5%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$680M · 16%
  • Returned to owners$303M

    16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $93M as dividends and $210M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.6B and cash and short-term investments fell $64M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $210M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count31.3%

    The diluted count rose from 385M to 506M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Inglis$6.2M$7.8M($103M)
2022Mr. Inglis$7.9M$17.0M$519M
2023Mr. Inglis$9.7M$11.4M$765M
2024Mr. Inglis$8.6M−$5.4M$678M
2025Mr. Inglis$5.0M−$2.1M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$28M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?31.3%

    Diluted shares grew 31.3% over 2016–2024, even as the company spent $210M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.3B → $2.9B

    Debt rose from $1.3B to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about ($15M) to $654M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DECDiversified Energy Company$1.8B29.2%14%15%
HESMHess Midstream LP$1.6B60.4%48%
GPORGulfport Energy$1.4B69%0.5%7%23%
VNOMViper Energy$1.3B66.4%18%
MGYMagnolia Oil & Gas$1.3B41.2%19%32%
KOSKosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE)$1.3B-5.2%-1%12%
MNRMach Natural Resources LP Common$1.2B39.6%41%
AESIAtlas Energy Solutions Inc.$1.1B27.3%9%15%
Group median34.4%11%23%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE) has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE) earns about $148M on its 11.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $241M on 593M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $2.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kosmos Energy Ltd. Common Shares (DE) (KOS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KOS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KOPN its page in the Manual KR →

Industry order: ← INR the Oil & Gas Producers chapter KRP →