Share count
121Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← KRO Manual KRT → ← KOS Oil & Gas Producers LB →
KRP, Kimbell Royalty Partners
Revenue is led by Oil revenue (59%) and Natural gas revenue (23%), with 2 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$334M
+7.9% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $315M 5-yr avg $274M
Revenue $66M −22.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 24.1% yr-ago 39.9%
Net income $7M yr-ago $26M
Net margin 10.6% yr-ago 30.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 67% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −277% and 49% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 32% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Oil revenue at 59%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Oil revenue59%$195M
- Natural gas revenue23%$78M
- NGL revenue13%$44M
- Lease bonus and other income1%$4M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $70M | $108M | $90M | $175M | $282M | $268M | $309M | $334M | $315M | RevenueRevenue |
| 24% | 21% | 29% | 15% | 10% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($48M) | ($152M) | ($251M) | $49M | $137M | $110M | $37M | $133M | $115M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −68.6% | −140.1% | −277.1% | 28.2% | 48.6% | 41.1% | 12.0% | 39.8% | 36.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($57M) | ($158M) | ($256M) | $42M | $131M | $83M | $11M | $100M | $81M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 0% | 2% | 4% | -7% | -1% | -2% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $33M | $81M | $62M | $91M | $167M | $174M | $251M | $246M | $242M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $25M | $52M | $48M | $37M | $50M | $96M | $135M | $125M | $123M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $62M | $179M | $261M | $2M | ($25M) | ($18M) | $88M | $6M | $22M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $404K | $12M | $88M | $55M | $141M | $491M | $22K | $223M | $223M | CapexCapex |
| 0.6% | 10.8% | 96.8% | 31.6% | 50.1% | 183.4% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 70.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $33M | $69M | $14M | $55M | $117M | $78M | $251M | $122M | $119M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 46.7% | 63.8% | 15.8% | 31.2% | 41.3% | 29.1% | 81.1% | 36.5% | 37.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $33M | $69M | ($25M) | $36M | $25M | ($316M) | $251M | $24M | $19M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 46.7% | 63.8% | −28.0% | 20.6% | 9.0% | −118.2% | 81.1% | 7.1% | 6.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $16M | $14M | $10M | $7M | $25M | $31M | $34M | $44M | $37M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1M | $1M | $889K | $811K | $1M | $7M | $7M | $3M | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $38M | $34M | $28M | $45M | $75M | $103M | $85M | $88M | $85M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4M | $5M | $9M | $28M | $19M | $13M | $13M | $10M | $17M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 9.9× | 6.3× | 3.2× | 1.6× | 4.0× | 7.9× | 6.7× | 8.6× | 5.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $237M | $906M | $565M | $601M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $87M | $100M | $172M | $217M | $233M | $294M | $239M | $442M | $441M | Total debtDebt |
| $72M | $86M | $162M | $210M | $208M | $263M | $205M | $398M | $404M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -11.8× | -26.1× | -39.0× | 5.4× | 9.9× | 4.2× | 1.4× | 3.9× | 3.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| 4.5% | 6.9% | 10.2% | 6.1% | 3.9% | 4.9% | 5.3% | 4.9% | 5.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 27.7M | 31.8M | 51.8M | 91.4M | 98.8M | 93.1M | 116M | 121M | 119M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.54 | $3.40 | $1.75 | $1.91 | $2.86 | $2.88 | $2.67 | $2.75 | $2.65 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.05 | $-4.98 | $-4.94 | $0.46 | $1.32 | $0.89 | $0.10 | $0.82 | $0.68 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.19 | $2.17 | $0.28 | $0.60 | $1.18 | $0.84 | $2.16 | $1.00 | $1.00 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.19 | $2.17 | $-0.49 | $0.40 | $0.26 | $-3.40 | $2.16 | $0.20 | $0.16 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.37 | $1.69 | $0.60 | $1.43 | $5.27 | $0.00 | $1.84 | $1.87 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
The diluted share count moved ×1.63 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.77 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.2%/yr | +9.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −2.3%/yr | +29.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +99.5%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.3×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$122Mowner earningsvs.$100Mnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $122M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $125M it takes just to hold its position. It put $98M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $24M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $100M | $11M | $83M | $131M | $42M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$125M | +$135M | +$96M | +$50M | +$37M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$16M | +$16M | +$13M | +$11M | +$11M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$6M | +$88M | −$18M | −$25M | +$2M |
| Cash from operations | $246M | $251M | $174M | $167M | $91M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$125M | −$22K | −$96M | −$50M | −$37M |
| Owner earnings | $122M | $251M | $78M | $117M | $55M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$98M | — | −$394M | −$91M | −$19M |
| Free cash flow | $24M | $251M | ($316M) | $25M | $36M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 37% | 81% | 29% | 41% | 31% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $125M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $98M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $106M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $133M ÷ interest expense $34M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $398M · 3.0× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $44M − debt $442M
What this means
Netting $44M of cash and short-term investments against $442M of debt leaves $398M owed, about 3.0× a year's operating profit (3.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 16%–81%; latest $122M = operating cash $246M − maintenance capex $125MIndustry peers: median 36%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 37% of revenue this year, a 37% median across 8 years. It chose to put $98M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $24M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $106M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $246M ÷ net income $100M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.79×ExpandingCapex $223M ÷ depreciation $125M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $334M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 8.64×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $442M vs $78M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.54/share (latest year $0.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −162% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −162% early to 31% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +20%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 20% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −277.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$85M
- Cash & short-term investments$37M
- Other current assets$48M
Current liabilities$17M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$14M
Current ratio5.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio2.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$68Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−22.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.7× → 5.1×
Deeper floors
Net current asset value($380M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$176M$4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$509Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.0B · 91%
- Retained (debt / cash)$96M · 9%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $354M and cash and short-term investments rose $21M.
- Net change in share count330.5%
The diluted count rose from 28M to 119M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership5.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2022 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kimbell Royalty Partners is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?330.5%
Diluted shares grew 330.5% over 2018–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$87M → $441M
Debt rose from $87M to $441M while owner earnings went from about $39M to $150M — about 2.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GTEGran Tierra Energy Inc. | $597M | 68% | 17.8% | 3% | 10% |
| GRNTGranite Ridge Resources Inc. | $450M | — | 19.3% | 9% | 56% |
| BSMBlack Stone Minerals L.P. Common | $422M | — | 50.6% | — | 65% |
| TXOTXO Partners L.P. Common | $363M | — | -5.7% | — | 25% |
| EGYVAALCO Energy Inc. | $359M | — | 27.2% | 18% | 23% |
| INRInfinity Natural Resources Inc. | $350M | — | 33.0% | 3% | 69% |
| KRPKimbell Royalty Partners | $334M | — | 20.1% | — | 39% |
| SDSandRidge Energy Inc. | $156M | 84% | 18.8% | 7% | 36% |
| Group median | — | — | 19.7% | — | 37% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kimbell Royalty Partners has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Kimbell Royalty Partners earns about $130M on its 38.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 36.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $19M on 119M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $404M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($223M) runs well above depreciation ($123M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $117M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kimbell Royalty Partners (KRP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KRP, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← KRO its page in the Manual KRT →
Industry order: ← KOS the Oil & Gas Producers chapter LB →