Owner Scorecard


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KURA, Kura Oncology Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Unprofitable

A pharmaceutical business, where patents grant a temporary monopoly the pipeline must keep refilling.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KURA · Kura Oncology Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$67M
+25.2% YoY
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $206M
Cash burn · annual $78M
Runway 2.6 yrs

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
The pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. What decides it: whether new drugs replace those losing exclusivity, the odds in the clinical pipeline, and how durable pricing stays against payers and generics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on regulation & policy, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −77%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). By owner earnings: roughly 76% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2023–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$0$54M$67M$72MRevenueRevenue
143%178%180%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
315%372%363%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($166M)($193M)($304M)($318M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−358.5%−449.9%−443.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
($153M)($174M)($279M)($295M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($125M)$134M($64M)($78M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$849K$848K$1M$1MDepreciationDeprec.
($1M)$274M$176M$178MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$168K$472K$7M$6MCapexCapex
0.9%9.8%9.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($125M)$134M($65M)($79M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
248.4%−96.5%−110.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($125M)$134M($71M)($84M)Free cash flowFCF
248.4%−104.8%−117.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-35%-77%-690%-320%ROICROIC
-38%-42%-160%-273%Return on equityROE
−38%−42%−160%−273%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$37M$224M$149M$206MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2M$9M$9MReceivablesReceiv.
$0$413K$843KInventoryInvent.
$2M$1M$5M$7MAccounts payablePayables
$591K$4M$3MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$432M$745M$709M$624MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$35M$79M$117M$101MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
12.3×9.5×6.1×6.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$449M$760M$738M$653MTotal assetsAssets
$9M$10M$10M$10MTotal debtDebt
($28M)($215M)($139M)($196M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-107.0×-119.3×-200.8×-216.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$397M$414M$174M$108MShareholders’ equityEquity
62.9%55.0%52.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
73.2M86.2M87.7M88.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.00$0.63$0.77$0.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.08$-2.02$-3.18$-3.32EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.71$1.55$-0.74$-0.89Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.71$1.55$-0.81$-0.95Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.01$0.08$0.07Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.43$4.80$1.99$1.22Book value / shareBVPS

The record, charted

FY2023–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
88Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−690%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($65M)owner earningsvs.($279M)net incomelow FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($65M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1M it takes just to hold its position. It put $6M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($71M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023
Reported net income($279M)($174M)($153M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1M+$848K+$849K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$37M+$34M+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$176M+$274M−$1M
Cash from operations($64M)$134M($125M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1M−$472K−$168K
Owner earnings($65M)$134M($125M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$6M
Free cash flow($71M)$134M($125M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-96%248%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $6M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $37M), owner earnings is nearer ($102M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($304M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $149M + ST investments $82M − debt $10M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $221M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    3-yr median, range -690%–-35%; -690% latest = NOPAT ($240M) ÷ invested capital $35M
    Industry peers: median -70%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -690% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash
    Owner earnings ($65M) = operating cash ($64M) − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median -240%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -96% of revenue this year. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $37M of SBC) leaves ($102M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($279M) · cash from operations ($64M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 6.43×
    Expanding
    Capex $7M ÷ depreciation $1M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $67M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.06×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $10M vs $592M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.27/share (latest year $-3.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$624M
  • Cash & short-term investments$206M
  • Receivables$9M
  • Inventory$843K
  • Other current assets$408M
Current liabilities$101M
  • Accounts payable$7M
  • Other current liabilities$94M
Current ratio6.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio6.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$522Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway2.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+29.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters14.9× → 6.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$108Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$79MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$24M$15M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$464Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Troy E. Wilson, Ph.D., J.D$5.3M$5.9M($125M)
2024Troy E. Wilson, Ph.D., J.D$6.2M$4.2M$134M
2025Troy E. Wilson, Ph.D., J.D$4.7M$6.5M($65M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership7.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$37M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 55% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BCYCBicycle Therapeutics plc$73M-561.0%-1553%-236%
ASMBAssembly Biosciences Inc.$72M-602.7%-70%-130%
VRDNViridian Therapeutics Inc.$71M96%-1815.9%-1328%
KURAKura Oncology Inc.$67M-449.9%-77%-96%
ENTAEnanta Pharmaceuticals Inc.$65M-73.4%-17%-22%
FBIOPFortress Biotech, Inc.$63M68%-271.4%-372%-240%
NUVBNuvation Bio Inc.$63M89%-338.7%-70%-278%
TNGXTango Therapeutics Inc.$62M-329.3%-47%-269%
Group median-394.3%-70%-238%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Kura Oncology Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−118%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kura Oncology Inc. (KURA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KURA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KTOS its page in the Manual KVUE →

Industry order: ← KNSA the Pharmaceuticals chapter KZIA →