Owner Scorecard


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KVUE, Kenvue Inc.

Personal Care Products consumer brand

Our global scale and the breadth of our brand portfolio are complemented by our well-developed capabilities and accelerated through our digital strategy, allowing us to dynamically capitalize on and respond to current trends impacting our categories and geographic markets.

Our portfolio includes Self Care, Skin Health and Beauty, and Essential Health products, allowing us to connect with consumers across North America, Asia Pacific ("APAC"), Europe, Middle East, and Africa ("EMEA"), and Latin America ("LATAM") in their daily rituals and the moments that matter most.

Our products are marketed across more than 165 countries worldwide.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KVUE · Kenvue Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$15.1B
−2.1% YoY · 0% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $15.3B 4-yr avg $15.3B
Gross margin 58% 4-yr avg 57%
Operating margin 17.2% 4-yr avg 15.9%
ROIC 11% 4-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 4-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 12% 4-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Self Care (42%), Essential Health (31%) and Skin Health and Beauty (27%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 56% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Self Care at 42%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Self Care42%$6.4B
  • Essential Health31%$4.6B
  • Skin Health and Beauty27%$4.1B
By geographyNorth America48%EMEA25%Asia Pacific18%Latin America9%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$15.1B$15.4B$15.5B$15.1B$15.3BRevenueRevenue
56%56%58%58%58%Gross marginGross mgn
36%40%41%40%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%3%3%3%2%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$2.9B$2.5B$1.8B$2.4B$2.6BOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.4%16.3%11.9%16.0%17.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.1B$1.7B$1.0B$1.5B$1.6BNet incomeNet inc.
29%24%27%26%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$334M$3.2B$1.8B$2.2B$2.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$731M$627M$622M$557M$564MDepreciationDeprec.
($2.6B)$689M($137M)$34M($49M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$295M$469M$434M$475M$435MCapexCapex
2.0%3.0%2.8%3.1%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$39M$2.7B$1.3B$1.7B$1.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
0.3%17.5%8.6%11.4%11.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$39M$2.7B$1.3B$1.7B$1.8BFree cash flowFCF
0.3%17.5%8.6%11.4%11.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$766M$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
$7M$235M$197MBuybacksBuybacks
11%7%8%10%11%ROICROIC
10%8%11%14%15%Return on equityROE
10%4%−5%−1%0%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$740M$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$2.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.9B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BInventoryInvent.
$2.5B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5BAccounts payablePayables
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$6.1B$5.5B$5.7B$5.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$5.5B$5.7B$5.9B$5.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.0×1.0×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9.8B$9.3B$8.8B$9.5B$9.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$27.9B$25.6B$27.1B$26.9BTotal assetsAssets
$8.3B$8.6B$8.5B$8.7BTotal debtDebt
$7.1B$7.5B$7.5B$7.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$20.5B$20.0B$9.7B$10.8B$10.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%1.2%1.6%0.9%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
1.72B1.85B1.92B1.92B1.92BShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.77$8.35$8.04$7.86$7.96Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.21$0.90$0.54$0.76$0.84EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.02$1.46$0.69$0.90$0.95Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.02$1.46$0.69$0.90$0.95Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.41$0.81$0.82$0.83Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.17$0.25$0.23$0.25$0.23Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.94$10.79$5.03$5.60$5.52Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
3-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−3.6%/yr−3.6%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share+240.2%/yr+240.2%/yr (3-yr)
EPS−14.2%/yr−14.2%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share+12.8%/yr+12.8%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share−22.3%/yr−22.3%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.9Bpeak FY2025
ROIC
10%low FY2023
Gross margin
58%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.3×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.7Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.5B of profit into $1.7B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.5B
Owner earnings$1.7B · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$1.5B$1.0B$1.7B$2.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$557M+$622M+$627M+$731M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$136M+$254M+$188M+$141M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$34M−$137M+$689M−$2.6B
Cash from operations$2.2B$1.8B$3.2B$334M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$475M−$434M−$469M−$295M
Owner earnings$1.7B$1.3B$2.7B$39M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%9%17%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $136M), owner earnings is nearer $1.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.5B · 3.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $1.1B − debt $8.5B
    What this means

    Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $8.5B of debt leaves $7.5B owed, about 3.1× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 57 + DIO 96 − DPO 143 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    4-yr median, range 7%–11%; 10% latest = NOPAT $1.8B ÷ invested capital $18.2B
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range 0%–17%; latest $1.7B = operating cash $2.2B − maintenance capex $475M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $136M of SBC) leaves $1.6B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.2B ÷ net income $1.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.7B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $1.7B of Owner Earnings, $1.8B (103%) went back to shareholders, $1.6B dividends, $197M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $136M stock comp, the real buyback was about $61M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.85×
    Maintaining
    Capex $475M ÷ depreciation $557M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $15.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.96×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $8.5B vs ($248M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.72/share (latest year $0.77), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 4
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 14% (2-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 14% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 11.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, any latency, disruption, or failure in our artificial intelligence systems or infrastructure could result in delays or errors in our offerings.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
  • Receivables$2.5B
  • Inventory$1.7B
  • Other current assets$545M
Current liabilities$5.9B
  • Accounts payable$2.5B
  • Other current liabilities$3.4B
Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.70×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($101M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($7.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($10.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$7.8B$141M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.7B · 22%
  • Dividends$3.9B · 52%
  • Buybacks$439M · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.5B · 20%
  • Returned to owners$4.3B

    75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.9B as dividends and $439M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$21.56

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 20M shares were bought for $432M, about $21.56 each.

  • Net change in share count12.0%

    The diluted count rose from 1716M to 1922M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.82/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained29%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $561M, so each retained $1 added about 0.29 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$18.2B67% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity88%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 4 years buying other businesses, against $1.7B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Thibaut Mongon$19.7M$17.0M$2.7B
2024Thibaut Mongon$13.2M$16.1M$1.3B
2025Kirk Perry$7.5M$5.4M$1.7B
2025Thibaut Mongon$10.9M−$15.0M$1.7B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$136M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kenvue Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?12.0%

    Diluted shares grew 12.0% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $439M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Personal Care Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CLColgate-Palmolive Co.$20.4B60%21.9%41%17%
ECLEcolab Inc.$16.1B42%14.1%10%12%
KVUEKenvue Inc.$15.1B57%16.1%9%10%
REGNRegeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc.$14.3B34.6%21%31%
ELEstee Lauder Companies Inc. (The)$14.3B76%14.4%19%12%
VTRSViatris$14.3B34%2.5%0%14%
CLXClorox Co.$7.1B44%17.1%32%12%
COTYCoty Inc.$5.9B60%-1.0%-1%4%
Group median57%15.3%15%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kenvue Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kenvue Inc. earns about $1.5B on its 10.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.8B on 1920M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $7.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kenvue Inc. (KVUE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KVUE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KURA its page in the Manual KVYO →

Industry order: ← IPAR the Personal Care Products chapter ODD →