Owner Scorecard


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VTRS, Viatris

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Viatris' executive management team is focused on ensuring that the Company is optimally structured and efficiently resourced to deliver sustainable value to patients, shareholders, customers and other key stakeholders.

Viatris' portfolio consists of generics (including complex products), globally recognized iconic brands, and an expanding portfolio of innovative medicines.

Retained the rights for Viagra , Dymista (which, in certain limited markets, are sold as OTC products) and select OTC products in certain markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VTRS · Viatris
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$14.3B
−3.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $14.5B 5-yr avg $15.7B
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 37%
Operating margin 1.0% 5-yr avg −0.8%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 15%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 0.1% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −19% to 10% — on a steadier 34% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$11.3B$11.4B$11.8B$17.8B$16.2B$15.4B$14.7B$14.3B$14.5BRevenueRevenue
34%33%31%31%40%42%38%35%34%Gross marginGross mgn
22%23%28%25%26%26%28%27%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
6%6%5%4%4%5%6%7%7%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$906M$716M($211M)($34M)$1.6B$766M$10M($2.7B)$139MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.0%6.3%−1.8%−0.2%10.0%5.0%0.1%−18.7%1.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$353M$17M($670M)($1.3B)$2.1B$55M($634M)($3.5B)($297M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$2.3B$1.8B$1.2B$3.0B$3.0B$2.9B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.1B$2.0B$2.2B$4.5B$3.0B$2.7B$2.9B$2.8B$2.8BDepreciationDeprec.
($117M)($289M)($394M)($332M)($2.2B)($76M)($102M)$2.9B($515M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$252M$213M$243M$457M$406M$377M$326M$379M$376MCapexCapex
2.2%1.9%2.1%2.6%2.5%2.4%2.2%2.7%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.1B$1.6B$989M$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
18.5%14.0%8.4%14.4%16.0%16.4%13.5%13.6%12.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.1B$1.6B$989M$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8BFree cash flowFCF
18.5%14.0%8.4%14.4%16.0%16.4%13.5%13.6%12.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$66M$149M$0$0$0$668M$350M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$432M$0$0$0$0$250M$250M$501MBuybacksBuybacks
3%-0%-0%3%1%-8%ROICROIC
3%-3%-6%10%0%-3%-24%-2%Return on equityROE
3%−3%−6%10%0%−3%−24%−2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$388M$502M$884M$701M$1.3B$992M$735M$1.3B$1.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.1B$4.8B$4.3B$3.8B$3.7B$3.2B$3.0B$3.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.7B$5.5B$4.0B$3.5B$3.5B$3.9B$4.0B$3.9BInventoryInvent.
$1.5B$1.9B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7BAccounts payablePayables
$4.2B$8.4B$6.6B$5.6B$5.2B$5.2B$5.3B$5.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$6.8B$12.9B$10.9B$10.6B$13.0B$9.5B$9.8B$10.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$5.6B$10.6B$9.9B$6.7B$7.8B$5.8B$7.1B$6.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.2×1.1×1.6×1.7×1.6×1.4×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9.7B$9.6B$12.3B$12.1B$10.4B$9.9B$9.1B$6.8B$6.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$31.3B$61.6B$54.8B$50.0B$47.7B$41.5B$37.2B$36.8BTotal assetsAssets
$12.7B$24.7B$21.6B$19.3B$18.1B$14.0B$14.4B$14.3BTotal debtDebt
$12.2B$23.9B$20.9B$18.0B$17.1B$13.3B$13.1B$12.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.7×1.4×-0.4×-0.1×2.7×1.3×0.0×-5.7×0.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$12.2B$0$23.0B$20.5B$21.1B$20.5B$18.6B$14.7B$14.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
−0.0%0.5%0.7%0.6%0.7%1.2%1.0%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$117M$580M$321M$2.9BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.03B1.03B1.20B1.21B1.22B1.21B1.18BShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.91$11.01$9.83$14.74$13.32$12.75$12.35Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.34$0.02$-0.56$-1.05$1.71$0.05$-0.25EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.02$1.54$0.82$2.12$2.13$2.09$1.53Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.02$1.54$0.82$2.12$2.13$2.09$1.53Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24$0.21$0.20$0.38$0.33$0.31$0.32Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.78$0.00$19.09$16.95$17.31$16.96$12.47Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr (5-yr)+3.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.7%/yr (5-yr)+0.7%/yr
EPS−33.2%/yr (5-yr)−33.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.1%/yr (5-yr)+5.1%/yr
Book value / share+7.6%/yr (5-yr)+7.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
1.2Bpeak FY2022
ROIC
−8%low FY2025
Gross margin
35%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.8×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.9Bowner earningsvs.($3.5B)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $3.5B loss into $1.9B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($3.5B)($634M)$55M$2.1B($1.3B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.8B+$2.9B+$2.7B+$3.0B+$4.5B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$178M+$146M+$181M+$116M+$111M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2.9B−$102M−$76M−$2.2B−$332M
Cash from operations$2.3B$2.3B$2.9B$3.0B$3.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$379M−$326M−$377M−$406M−$457M
Owner earnings$1.9B$2.0B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%13%16%16%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $178M), owner earnings is nearer $1.8B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($2.7B) ÷ interest expense $471M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.3B + ST investments $39M − debt $14.4B
    What this means

    Netting $1.4B of cash and short-term investments against $14.4B of debt leaves $13.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 78 + DIO 157 − DPO 69 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -8%–3%; -8% latest = NOPAT ($2.1B) ÷ invested capital $27.8B
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 8%–19%; latest $1.9B = operating cash $2.3B − maintenance capex $379M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $178M of SBC) leaves $1.8B.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($3.5B) · cash from operations $2.3B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $501M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.9B
    What this means

    Of $1.9B Owner Earnings, $501M (26%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $501M buybacks. Net of $178M stock comp, the real buyback was about $323M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.14×
    Harvesting
    Capex $379M ÷ depreciation $2.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $14.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.38×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $14.4B vs $2.7B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.17/share (latest year $-3.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.63/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to −5% lately, median 0% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −18.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If the analyses that ML or AI-based software assist in producing are deficient or inaccurate, we could be subjected to competitive harm, potential legal liability and brand or reputational harm.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$10.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.8B
  • Receivables$3.1B
  • Inventory$3.9B
  • Other current assets$2.1B
Current liabilities$6.8B
  • Debt due within a year$1.9B
  • Accounts payable$1.7B
  • Other current liabilities$3.1B
Current ratio1.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.9B due · $1.8B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($6.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($11.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$14.6B$269M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.9B
'27$1.7B
'28$1.6B
'29$0
'30$1.4B
later$7.2B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.9Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$3.7Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.9Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$14.0Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$1.8B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$1.9B
Together, against $1.9B due next year2.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $3.8B against the $1.9B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.0 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $18.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.7B · 14%
  • Buybacks$1.4B · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$14.8B · 78%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.4B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$12.72

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 73M shares were bought for $933M, about $12.72 each.

  • Net change in share count13.8%

    The diluted count rose from 1033M to 1175M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$21.9B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity46%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $2.7B of capital spent building

$4.0B written down across 4 years (2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$14.8M$13.6M$2.6B
2022$14.8M$14.3M$2.6B
2023$9.8M−$4.9M$2.5B
2023$15.9M$17.8M$2.5B
2024$14.8M$17.8M$2.0B
2025$15.3M$24.7M$1.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$178M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Viatris is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?13.8%

    Diluted shares grew 13.8% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $1.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?4 of 8 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 4 of the last 8 years, $4.0B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TEVATeva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited$17.3B48%-2.2%-2%6%
REGNRegeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc.$14.3B34.6%21%31%
VTRSViatris$14.3B34%2.5%0%14%
VRTXVertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated$12.0B87%31.8%36%34%
BHCBausch Health Companies Inc.$10.3B76%5.5%2%13%
ZTSZoetis Inc.$9.5B69%34.2%26%22%
OGNOrganon$6.2B62%25.0%17%12%
ONCBeOne Medicines Ltd.$5.3B86%-124.4%-46%-112%
Group median69%15.2%10%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Viatris has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Viatris earns about $2.0B on its 14.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.8B on 1165M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $12.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Viatris (VTRS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VTRS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VTR its page in the Manual VTS →

Industry order: ← VSTM the Pharmaceuticals chapter WVE →