Owner Scorecard


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HELE, Helen of Troy

Household Durables capital-intensive Serial acquirer

We are a leading global consumer products company offering creative products and solutions for our customers through a diversified portfolio of brands.

We go to market under a number of brands, some of which are licensed.

Our portfolio of brands includes OXO, Hydro Flask, Osprey, Vicks, Braun, Honeywell, PUR, Hot Tools, Drybar, Curlsmith, Revlon and Olive & June, among others.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
HELE · Helen of Troy
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.8B
−6.4% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 45%
Operating margin −17.3% 5-yr avg −0.2%
ROIC −16% 5-yr avg −1%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −44% to 13% — on a steadier 43% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

28% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • United States72%$1.3B
  • EMEA16%$293M
  • Asia Pacific6%$107M
  • Canada4%$74M
  • Latin America2%$34M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8BRevenueRevenue
41%41%41%43%44%43%43%47%48%46%45%Gross marginGross mgn
29%29%28%30%30%31%32%33%37%40%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%3%2%2%3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$170M$169M$199M$178M$281M$273M$212M$261M$143M($782M)($315M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.1%11.4%12.7%10.4%13.4%12.3%10.2%13.0%7.5%−43.8%−17.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$141M$44M$169M$152M$254M$224M$143M$169M$124M($899M)($413M)Net incomeNet inc.
7%37%8%8%6%14%16%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$229M$224M$195M$271M$314M$141M$208M$306M$113M$171M$112MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$36M$34M$30M$37M$38M$36M$45M$51M$55M$53M$53MDepreciationDeprec.
$38M$131M($25M)$59M($4M)($153M)($6M)$52M($87M)$1000M$449MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$16M$14M$26M$18M$99M$78M$175M$37M$30M$39M$32MCapexCapex
1.1%0.9%1.7%1.0%4.7%3.5%8.4%1.8%1.6%2.2%1.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$213M$211M$169M$254M$276M$105M$164M$269M$83M$132M$80MOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.2%14.2%10.8%14.8%13.2%4.7%7.9%13.4%4.4%7.4%4.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$213M$211M$169M$254M$215M$63M$33M$269M$83M$132M$80MFree cash flowFCF
15.2%14.2%10.8%14.8%10.3%2.8%1.6%13.4%4.4%7.4%4.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$209M$0$0$256M$0$411M$146M$0$229M$226MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$76M$73M$217M$10M$203M$188M$18M$55M$103M$2MBuybacksBuybacks
11%14%11%17%11%7%9%6%-40%-16%ROICROIC
14%4%17%13%20%17%10%10%7%-113%-49%Return on equityROE
14%4%17%13%20%17%10%10%7%−113%−49%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$24M$21M$12M$24M$45M$33M$29M$19M$19M$19M$22MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$229M$276M$280M$348M$382M$458M$378M$395M$428M$361M$324MReceivablesReceiv.
$281M$252M$302M$256M$482M$558M$455M$396M$453M$456M$467MInventoryInvent.
$106M$129M$144M$153M$335M$308M$191M$245M$269M$256M$246MAccounts payablePayables
$405M$398M$439M$452M$529M$707M$642M$545M$612M$561M$545MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$556M$558M$605M$683M$972M$1.1B$892M$844M$932M$866M$856MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$289M$299M$312M$339M$615M$603M$412M$451M$466M$505M$480MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×1.9×1.9×2.0×1.6×1.8×2.2×1.9×2.0×1.7×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$602M$602M$602M$740M$740M$949M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$472M$472MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B$1.6B$1.6B$1.9B$2.3B$2.8B$2.9B$2.8B$3.1B$2.1B$2.1BTotal assetsAssets
$486M$290M$321M$339M$344M$813M$934M$666M$917M$781M$716MTotal debtDebt
$462M$269M$309M$315M$299M$780M$905M$647M$898M$762M$694MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
11.8×12.1×17.0×14.0×22.3×21.2×5.2×4.9×2.7×-13.5×-5.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.0B$1.0B$997M$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$798M$844MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.0%1.4%1.3%1.3%1.6%1.3%1.7%1.1%0.9%1.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$3M$15M$26M$41M$8M$39M$707M$707MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
27.9M27.3M26.3M25.3M25.2M24.4M24.1M24.0M23.1M23.0M23.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$50.11$54.26$59.47$67.43$83.30$91.08$86.04$83.65$82.71$77.66$76.47Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.04$1.63$6.41$6.02$10.08$9.17$5.95$7.03$5.37$-39.08$-17.36EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.64$7.73$6.42$10.01$10.97$4.30$6.79$11.24$3.60$5.73$3.39Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.64$7.73$6.42$10.01$8.55$2.57$1.39$11.24$3.60$5.73$3.39Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.56$0.50$1.00$0.70$3.92$3.20$7.26$1.53$1.30$1.71$1.33Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$36.60$37.22$37.89$45.88$49.19$54.38$61.80$68.31$72.99$34.70$35.50Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.0%/yr−1.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.1%/yr−12.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.3%/yr−15.3%/yr
Book value / share−0.6%/yr−6.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
23Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
−40%low FY2026
Gross margin
46%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$132Mowner earningsvs.($899M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $899M loss into $132M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($899M)$124M$169M$143M$224M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$53M+$55M+$51M+$45M+$36M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$17M+$21M+$34M+$27M+$35M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1000M−$87M+$52M−$6M−$153M
Cash from operations$171M$113M$306M$208M$141M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$39M−$30M−$37M−$45M−$36M
Owner earnings$132M$83M$269M$164M$105M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$130M−$42M
Free cash flow$132M$83M$269M$33M$63M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%4%13%8%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $115M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($782M) ÷ interest expense $58M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $19M − debt $781M
    What this means

    Netting $19M of cash and short-term investments against $781M of debt leaves $762M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 74 + DIO 171 − DPO 96 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -40%–17%; -40% latest = NOPAT ($618M) ÷ invested capital $1.6B
    Industry peers: median -0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -40% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–15%; latest $132M = operating cash $171M − maintenance capex $39M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $115M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($899M) · cash from operations $171M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2M ÷ Owner Earnings $132M
    What this means

    Of $132M Owner Earnings, $2M (1%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($17M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.74×
    Harvesting
    Capex $39M ÷ depreciation $53M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.71×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $781M vs $361M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −272%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.68/share (latest year $-38.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → −8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to −8% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −30%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2026 · −43.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2026, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$856M
  • Cash & short-term investments$22M
  • Receivables$324M
  • Inventory$467M
  • Other current assets$43M
Current liabilities$480M
  • Debt due within a year$25M
  • Accounts payable$246M
  • Other current liabilities$209M
Current ratio1.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.81×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$376Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $22M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($380M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$778M$62M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $2.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$531M · 24%
  • Buybacks$946M · 44%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$696M · 32%
  • Returned to owners$946M

    50% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $946M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $946M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−14.8%

    The diluted count fell from 28M to 24M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$845M40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity59%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $531M of capital spent building

$838M written down across 7 years (2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 67% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$17M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Helen of Troy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.4% vs 13.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 13.4% early in the record and 8.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$486M → $716M

    Debt rose from $486M to $716M while owner earnings went from about $198M to $161M — about 2.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $1.8B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$363M · 20% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “Sales to our largest customer, Amazon.com Inc ., accounted for approximately 20%, 22% and 21% of our consolidated net sales revenue in fiscal 2026, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Household Durables

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AOSA.O. Smith Corporation$3.8B39%19.1%29%13%
FLNCFluence Energy Inc.$2.3B4%-5.0%-32%-6%
FELEFranklin Electric$2.1B34%11.6%14%9%
BEBloom Energy Corporation$2.0B5%-19.7%-40%-21%
VISNVistance Networks Inc.$1.9B37%0.9%-0%10%
HELEHelen of Troy$1.8B43%11.8%11%12%
LITELumentum Holdings Inc.$1.6B32%3.0%3%9%
SONOSonos Inc.$1.4B44%-1.4%-15%5%
Group median36%2.0%1%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Helen of Troy has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Helen of Troy earns about $214M on its 12.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $80M on 23M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-29; net debt $694M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Helen of Troy (HELE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HELE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HEI its page in the Manual HES →

Industry order: ← FLXS the Household Durables chapter LEG →