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LFMDP, Lifemd, Inc.

Health Care Providers & Services asset-light Distress / turnaround

LifeMD is a patient-centric, direct-to-patient healthcare company providing a high-quality, cost-effective, and convenient way for patients to access virtual medical care and pharmacy services.

Through our vertically integrated care model, we combine proprietary technology, affiliated clinical services, pharmacy infrastructure, and artificial intelligence ("AI")-enabled operational systems to deliver longitudinal care at scale.

We provide virtual clinical services as well as prescription and over-the-counter ("OTC") treatments, when medically appropriate.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LFMDP · Lifemd, Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$194M

+25.3% YoY · 39% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $193M 5-yr avg $143M

Gross margin 87% 5-yr avg 85%

Operating margin −8.0% 5-yr avg −24.3%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg −7%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Telehealth Subscription Revenue (58%) and Telehealth (42%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −25% through the cycle on a 80% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −132 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Telehealth Subscription Revenue at 58%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Telehealth Subscription Revenue58%$113M
Telehealth42%$81M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$5M	$4M	$8M	$12M	$37M	$93M	$119M	$153M	$155M	$194M	$193M	RevenueRevenue
63%	72%	76%	80%	76%	81%	84%	88%	86%	86%	87%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	20%	27%	19%	121%	43%	39%	34%	37%	30%	30%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($1M)	($1M)	($2M)	($3M)	($58M)	($54M)	($43M)	($14M)	($20M)	($8M)	($15M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−22.4%	−33.4%	−24.7%	−23.2%	−155.0%	−58.5%	−36.5%	−9.5%	−13.2%	−4.0%	−8.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1M)	($1M)	($1M)	($3M)	($59M)	($61M)	($46M)	($21M)	($21M)	$14M	$6M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($408K)	($817K)	($906K)	$251K	($12M)	($33M)	($23M)	$9M	$18M	$8M	$6M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
—	—	—	—	—	$14K	$162K	$204K	$466K	$866K	$1000K	DepreciationDeprec.
$112K	$226K	$62K	$3M	$28M	$16M	$9M	$17M	$26M	($17M)	($10M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
—	—	—	—	—	$247K	$367K	$204K	$1M	$2M	$2M	CapexCapex
—	—	—	—	—	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
—	—	—	—	—	($33M)	($23M)	$9M	$17M	$7M	$5M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
—	—	—	—	—	−35.6%	−19.4%	5.6%	11.0%	3.8%	2.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
—	—	—	—	—	($33M)	($23M)	$9M	$16M	$6M	$4M	Free cash flowFCF
—	—	—	—	—	−35.9%	−19.6%	5.6%	10.4%	3.3%	2.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$149K	—	—	—	$1M	—	—	—	$1M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	$871K	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	-137%	-138%	—	—	-268%	—	-588%	—	62%	38%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	−272%	—	−676%	—	49%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$183K	$141K	$180K	$1M	$9M	$41M	$4M	$33M	$35M	$37M	$34M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$445K	$128K	$99K	$97K	$998K	$980K	$3M	$5M	$10M	$9M	$10M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$160K	$681K	$1M	$950K	$1M	$2M	$4M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
$753K	$422K	$869K	$3M	$10M	$9M	$10M	$11M	$11M	$14M	$22M	Accounts payablePayables
($148K)	$387K	$253K	($2M)	($8M)	($6M)	($4M)	($3M)	$2M	($2M)	($9M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$790K	$1M	$2M	$3M	$12M	$45M	$11M	$43M	$52M	$52M	$52M	Current assetsCur. assets
$1M	$641K	$1M	$4M	$14M	$23M	$31M	$35M	$67M	$42M	$50M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	2.0×	1.3×	0.7×	0.9×	2.0×	0.4×	1.2×	0.8×	1.2×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$8M	—	—	—	$8M	GoodwillGoodwill
$790K	$1M	$3M	$3M	$13M	$50M	$26M	$58M	$76M	$70M	$70M	Total assetsAssets
$50K	$210K	$247K	—	—	$376K	$0	$18M	$10M	—	$16M	Total debtDebt
($133K)	$69K	$67K	—	—	($41M)	($4M)	($15M)	($25M)	—	($19M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-24.2×	-12.2×	-5.8×	-3.8×	-34.7×	-18.0×	-34.1×	-5.6×	-9.4×	-5.6×	-18.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($355K)	$882K	$898K	($988K)	($2M)	$23M	($11M)	$4M	($9M)	$23M	$15M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
11.2%	4.4%	3.3%	5.9%	50.0%	13.0%	11.5%	8.2%	7.9%	5.4%	4.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
33.5M	41.7M	44.2M	9.9M	14.3M	27.0M	31.0M	33.9M	41.2M	45.1M	47.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.16	$0.09	$0.19	$1.26	$2.61	$3.44	$3.84	$4.50	$3.76	$4.30	$4.08	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.03	$-0.03	$-0.03	$-0.32	$-4.11	$-2.25	$-1.47	$-0.61	$-0.52	$0.32	$0.12	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	—	—	—	$-1.23	$-0.75	$0.25	$0.41	$0.16	$0.10	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$-1.23	$-0.75	$0.25	$0.39	$0.14	$0.08	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$0.03	$0.10	$0.09	$0.08	$0.07	$0.07	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	$0.04	$0.04	$0.04	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.01	$0.02	$0.02	$-0.10	$-0.16	$0.84	$-0.37	$0.10	$-0.22	$0.51	$0.32	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/4.46 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.89 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+44.5%/yr	+10.5%/yr
Dividends / share	+20.9%/yr (4-yr)	+20.9%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	+45.9%/yr (4-yr)	+45.9%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

45Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

86%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$7Mowner earningsvs.$14Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $7M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $866K it takes just to hold its position. It put $1M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $6M.

Reported net income$14M

Owner earnings$7M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$14M	($21M)	($21M)	($46M)	($61M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$866K	+$466K	+$204K	+$162K	+$14K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$10M	+$12M	+$12M	+$14M	+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$17M	+$26M	+$17M	+$9M	+$16M
Cash from operations	$8M	$18M	$9M	($23M)	($33M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$866K	−$466K	−$204K	−$162K	−$14K
Owner earnings	$7M	$17M	$9M	($23M)	($33M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$1M	−$998K	—	−$205K	−$234K
Free cash flow	$6M	$16M	$9M	($23M)	($33M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	11%	6%	-19%	-36%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $866K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($3M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -5.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($8M) ÷ interest expense $1M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$27M

Net cash

Cash $37M − debt $10M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $27M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -132d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 18 + DIO 37 − DPO 186 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($4M) = debt $10M + equity $23M − cash

Industry peers: median -11%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $7M = operating cash $8M − maintenance capex $866K; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (5-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median -20%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($3M).
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.58×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops $8M ÷ net income $14M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 46%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $7M

What this means
Of $7M Owner Earnings, $3M (46%) went back to shareholders, $3M dividends, $270K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($10M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.16×

Expanding

Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $866K

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $194M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.25×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $10M vs $10M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.19/share (latest year $0.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −27% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −27% early to −9% lately, median −25% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −155.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“New developments, such as cloud computing, AI, and machine learning, have made it easier for competition to enter our markets due to lower up-front technology costs.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$52M

Cash & short-term investments$34M
Receivables$10M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$4M

Current liabilities$50M

Accounts payable$22M
Other current liabilities$28M

Current ratio1.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$7Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$22M$6M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$12Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$8M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4M of capital spent building

$8M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Mr. Schreiber	$889k	$948k	$9M
2024	Mr. Schreiber	$1.1M	$1.1M	$17M
2025	Mr. Schreiber	$777k	$777k	$7M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership17.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Lifemd, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SGRYSurgery Partners Inc.	$3.3B	26%	12.4%	6%	6%
TDOCTeladoc Health Inc.	$2.5B	69%	-24.6%	-8%	6%
NTRANatera Inc.	$2.3B	37%	-46.0%	-62%	-33%
VCYTVeracyte Inc.	$517M	62%	-24.0%	-11%	-8%
WGSGeneDx Holdings Corp.	$428M	42%	-89.2%	-44%	-58%
OMDAOmada Health Inc.	$260M	61%	-25.7%	-124%	-20%
TALKTalkspace Inc.	$229M	52%	-28.9%	4%	-51%
LFMDPLifemd, Inc.	$194M	80%	-23.9%	—	4%
Group median	—	56%	-25.2%	—	-14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lifemd, Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Lifemd, Inc. earns about $7M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($7M) Net of stock comp (−$9M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($5M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−14%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $4M on 48M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net cash $19M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2M) runs well above depreciation ($1000K), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LFMDP against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lifemd, Inc. (LFMDP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LFMDP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LEVI its page in the Manual LFST →

Industry order: ← INNV the Health Care Providers & Services chapter LFST →