Owner Scorecard


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LFUS, Littelfuse Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Littelfuse is a diversified, industrial technology manufacturing company empowering a sustainable, connected, and safer world.

Our market leadership and extensive brand equity are underpinned by a broad, multi-technology portfolio that addresses the critical needs of our global customer base.

As our end markets transition toward higher power and energy density, customers face escalating challenges related to system safety and energy efficiency.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LFUS · Littelfuse Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.4B
+8.9% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Gross margin 38% 5-yr avg 37%
Operating margin 2.8% 5-yr avg 11.0%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Electronics (56%), Transportation (28%) and Industrial (15%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.6% to 20% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Electronics at 56%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Electronics56%$1.3B
  • Transportation28%$676M
  • Industrial15%$364M
By geographyOther countries41%United States35%China24%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2013–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2013’132016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$758M$1.1B$1.2B$1.7B$1.5B$1.4B$2.5B$2.4B$2.2B$2.4B$2.5BRevenueRevenue
39%39%41%38%36%35%40%38%36%38%38%Gross marginGross mgn
18%20%17%16%15%14%14%15%16%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%4%4%5%5%4%4%4%5%4%4%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$130M$131M$219M$225M$193M$162M$501M$361M$159M$38M$69MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.1%12.4%17.9%13.1%12.8%11.2%19.9%15.3%7.2%1.6%2.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$89M$81M$120M$165M$139M$130M$373M$259M$100M($72M)($40M)Net incomeNet inc.
29%19%41%20%16%19%16%21%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$117M$180M$269M$332M$245M$258M$420M$457M$368M$434M$448MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$34M$53M$63M$103M$93M$96M$99M$137M$68M$75M$75MDepreciationDeprec.
($15M)$34M$70M$37M($5M)$14M($76M)$37M$173M$403M$385MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$35M$46M$66M$75M$62M$56M$104M$86M$76M$68M$59MCapexCapex
4.6%4.4%5.4%4.3%4.1%3.9%4.2%3.6%3.5%2.8%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$82M$134M$203M$257M$183M$202M$315M$371M$292M$366M$390MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.9%12.7%16.6%15.0%12.2%14.0%12.5%15.7%13.3%15.3%15.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$82M$134M$203M$257M$183M$202M$315M$371M$292M$366M$390MFree cash flowFCF
10.9%12.7%16.6%15.0%12.2%14.0%12.5%15.7%13.3%15.3%15.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$144M$471M$39M$318M$775K$0$533M$199M$0$408M$353MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$19M$28M$32M$40M$45M$47M$56M$62M$67M$72M$73MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$64M$99M$23M$0$0$41M$28MBuybacksBuybacks
15%11%13%11%10%8%16%10%4%1%1%ROICROIC
13%10%13%11%9%8%17%10%4%-3%-2%Return on equityROE
10%7%9%8%6%5%14%8%1%−6%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$312M$332M$430M$490M$531M$688M$563M$556M$726M$564M$482MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$128M$176M$183M$233M$202M$233M$307M$287M$294M$363M$381MReceivablesReceiv.
$93M$114M$141M$258M$238M$258M$548M$475M$416M$416M$419MInventoryInvent.
$34M$91M$102M$126M$117M$146M$209M$174M$188M$211M$223MAccounts payablePayables
$187M$199M$222M$365M$322M$345M$646M$588M$522M$569M$577MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$566M$612M$792M$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$1.5B$1.4B$1.6B$1.4B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$209M$188M$225M$295M$226M$276M$572M$375M$434M$533M$527MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×3.3×3.5×3.5×4.5×4.4×2.6×3.8×3.6×2.7×2.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$186M$404M$453M$827M$821M$817M$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$1.5B$1.7B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7B$3.9B$4.0B$3.9B$4.0B$3.9BTotal assetsAssets
$220M$454M$496M$695M$679M$687M$1.0B$872M$856M$803M$632MTotal debtDebt
($92M)$122M$66M$205M$148M($545K)$439M$316M$130M$239M$150MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
44.5×15.1×16.3×10.0×8.7×7.7×27.0×9.1×4.1×1.1×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$687M$815M$927M$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$2.2B$2.5B$2.4B$2.4B$2.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.1%1.1%1.3%1.6%1.3%1.3%0.9%1.0%1.2%1.1%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$9M$34M$45M$301M$301MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
22.5M22.7M22.9M25.2M24.8M24.6M25.0M25.1M25.0M24.8M25.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$33.63$46.47$53.27$68.10$60.60$58.79$100.61$94.12$87.49$96.16$97.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.94$3.56$5.21$6.52$5.60$5.29$14.94$10.34$4.00$-2.89$-1.58EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.66$5.89$8.86$10.19$7.39$8.21$12.62$14.79$11.65$14.75$15.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.66$5.89$8.86$10.19$7.39$8.21$12.62$14.79$11.65$14.75$15.33Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.83$1.23$1.39$1.58$1.80$1.90$2.24$2.48$2.68$2.90$2.89Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.55$2.03$2.87$2.96$2.49$2.28$4.18$3.43$3.03$2.73$2.31Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.47$35.85$40.44$58.58$60.27$65.41$88.50$98.80$96.38$97.76$98.90Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
12-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.2%/yr+10.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.3%/yr+12.4%/yr
Dividends / share+11.0%/yr+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.8%/yr+3.6%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr+8.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income-76.4%
    “Operating Income Operating income in 2025 was $37.5 million, a decrease of $121.3 million or 76.4% compared to $158.8 million for 2024. The decrease in operating income was primarily due to the non-cash goodwill impairment charge of $301.2 million recognized in 2025 compared to the non-cash charge of $92.6 million from the impairment of intangible assets and goodwill in 2024 as noted above, partially offset by higher operating income of $50.2 million, $26.2 million and $16.7 million across the Electronics, Transportation and Industrial…”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2013–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
25Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
1%low FY2025
Gross margin
38%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.7×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$366Mowner earningsvs.($72M)net incomelow FY2013

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2013FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $72M loss into $366M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2020
Reported net income($72M)$100M$259M$373M$130M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$75M+$68M+$137M+$99M+$96M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$27M+$26M+$24M+$24M+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$403M+$173M+$37M−$76M+$14M
Cash from operations$434M$368M$457M$420M$258M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$68M−$76M−$86M−$104M−$56M
Owner earnings$366M$292M$371M$315M$202M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%13%16%13%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer $339M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $38M ÷ interest expense $34M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $239M · 6.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $563M + ST investments $287K − debt $803M
    What this means

    Netting $564M of cash and short-term investments against $803M of debt leaves $239M owed, about 6.4× a year's operating profit (21.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 56 + DIO 103 − DPO 52 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–16%; 1% latest = NOPAT $19M ÷ invested capital $2.7B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 11%–17%; latest $366M = operating cash $434M − maintenance capex $68M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves $339M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($72M) · cash from operations $434M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $100M ÷ Owner Earnings $366M
    What this means

    Of $366M Owner Earnings, $100M (27%) went back to shareholders, $72M dividends, $28M buybacks. Net of $27M stock comp, the real buyback was about $252K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.90×
    Maintaining
    Capex $68M ÷ depreciation $75M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.69×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $803M vs $903M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −0%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.80/share (latest year $-2.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $95.93/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2013–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 8% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 1.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.8%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$482M
  • Receivables$381M
  • Inventory$419M
  • Other current assets$94M
Current liabilities$527M
  • Debt due within a year$100M
  • Accounts payable$223M
  • Other current liabilities$204M
Current ratio2.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.82×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.91×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$849Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$100M due · $482M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.5× → 2.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$734Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$33MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$712M$80M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$740Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2013–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$674M · 22%
  • Dividends$467M · 15%
  • Buybacks$254M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.7B · 55%
  • Returned to owners$721M

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $467M as dividends and $254M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$175.74

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $254M, about $175.74 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $130.93 (2020) to $228.30 (2025); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $171.38 ($99M).

  • Net change in share count12.8%

    The diluted count rose from 23M to 25M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.90/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 15% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained31%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($663M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $203M, so each retained $1 added about 0.31 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.8B46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $674M of capital spent building

$389M written down across 4 years (2016, 2020, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 18% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$6.2M$10.6M
2022$6.9M$1.2M$315M
2023$6.6M$8.7M$371M
2024$6.3M$3.8M$292M
2025$19.6M$25.2M$366M
2025$831k−$342k$366M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio1,125:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$27M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 73% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Littelfuse Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2013–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?12.8%

    Diluted shares grew 12.8% over 2013–2025, even as the company spent $254M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $847M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ATKRAtkore$2.9B28%13.6%20%12%
SPBSpectrum Brands Holdings$2.8B34%3.8%3%6%
UIUbiquiti Inc.$2.6B45%33.0%152%26%
LFUSLittelfuse Inc.$2.4B38%13.0%10%14%
FLNCFluence Energy Inc.$2.3B4%-5.0%-32%-6%
FELEFranklin Electric$2.1B34%11.6%14%9%
BEBloom Energy Corporation$2.0B5%-19.7%-40%-21%
POWLPowell Industries Inc.$1.1B18%2.5%5%11%
Group median31%7.7%8%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Littelfuse Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Littelfuse Inc. earns about $325M on its 13.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’13→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $390M on 25M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $150M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Littelfuse Inc. (LFUS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LFUS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LFST its page in the Manual LGIH →

Industry order: ← KODK the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter LPL →