Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← LFUS Manual LGN → ← LEN Homebuilders MHO →

LGIH, LGI Homes Inc.

Homebuilders capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

We are engaged in the design, construction and sale of new homes in markets in Texas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, Washington, Tennessee, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Alabama, California, Oregon, Nevada, West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Utah.

Opportunities Since December 2013, we have grown substantially, expanding our operations from eight markets in four states to 36 markets in 21 states.

Driven by commitment to our customers and our desire to make their dreams of homeownership a reality, we offer multiple product lines, including attached and detached entry-level homes and active adult offerings that are marketed and sold under our LGI Homes brand and luxury homes that are marketed and sold under our Terrata Homes brand.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LGIH · LGI Homes Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.7B
−22.6% YoY · −6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $2.3B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 25%
Operating margin 4.7% 5-yr avg 11.8%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin −4% 5-yr avg −8%
Free cash flow margin −4% 5-yr avg −8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Central (28%) and Central (25%), with 3 more segments behind.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Central at 28%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Central28%$472M
  • Central25%$419M
  • Northwest23%$387M
  • West14%$238M
  • Southeast11%$189M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$838M$1.3B$1.5B$1.8B$2.4B$3.1B$2.3B$2.4B$2.2B$1.7B$1.7BRevenueRevenue
26%25%25%24%25%27%28%23%24%21%20%Gross marginGross mgn
5%4%5%4%4%3%5%5%6%7%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$111M$170M$200M$228M$365M$548M$390M$233M$212M$80M$79MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.3%13.5%13.3%12.4%15.4%18.0%16.9%9.9%9.6%4.7%4.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$75M$113M$155M$179M$324M$430M$327M$199M$196M$73M$71MNet incomeNet inc.
34%34%22%23%12%21%22%24%24%26%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($108M)($68M)($117M)($42M)$202M$22M($370M)($57M)($144M)($140M)($68M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1M$791K$711K$643K$710K$1M$2M$2M$3M$4M$5MDepreciationDeprec.
($188M)($187M)($279M)($229M)($136M)($423M)($708M)($268M)($353M)($223M)($151M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1M$1M$2M$924K$789KCapexCapex
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($372M)($58M)($146M)($141M)($69M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−16.1%−2.5%−6.6%−8.3%−4.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($372M)($58M)($146M)($141M)($69M)Free cash flowFCF
−16.1%−2.5%−6.6%−8.3%−4.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$74M$0$0$67M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$2M$0$48M$194M$95M$0$31M$24MBuybacksBuybacks
10%13%12%12%20%20%11%6%5%2%2%ROICROIC
21%23%24%21%28%31%20%11%10%3%3%Return on equityROE
21%23%24%21%28%31%20%11%10%3%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$50M$68M$47M$38M$36M$51M$32M$49M$53M$61M$61MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$17M$45M$43M$56M$116M$58M$25M$41M$29M$32M$45MReceivablesReceiv.
$17M$45M$43M$56M$116M$58M$25M$41M$29M$32M$45MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12M$12MGoodwillGoodwill
$815M$1.1B$1.4B$1.7B$1.8B$2.4B$3.1B$3.4B$3.8B$3.9B$4.0BTotal assetsAssets
$400M$475M$654M$691M$538M$805M$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7BTotal debtDebt
$351M$408M$607M$652M$502M$755M$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$355M$490M$656M$845M$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.6%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.5%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
22.0M23.9M24.9M25.4M25.4M24.9M23.7M23.6M23.6M23.3M23.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$38.06$52.56$60.44$72.28$93.30$122.45$97.11$99.73$93.29$73.34$72.09Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.41$4.73$6.24$7.02$12.76$17.25$13.76$8.42$8.30$3.12$3.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$-15.66$-2.47$-6.17$-6.06$-2.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-15.66$-2.47$-6.17$-6.06$-2.98Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.06$0.08$0.04$0.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.13$20.47$26.35$33.23$44.88$56.04$69.21$78.48$86.28$90.15$90.55Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.6%/yr−4.7%/yr
EPS−1.0%/yr−24.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−7.4%/yr (3-yr)−7.4%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+21.1%/yr+15.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Net income-63.0%
    “Net income for the year ended December 31, 2025 was $72.6 million, a decrease of $123.5 million, or 63.0%, from $196.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease in net income was primarily attributed to overall lower number of homes closed, lower home sales revenues and gross margin, as well as an inventory impairment charge during the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
23Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
2%low FY2025
Gross margin
21%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($141M)owner earningsvs.$73Mnet incomelow FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $73M of profit but ($141M) of owner earnings: $213M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$73M$196M$199M$327M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$4M+$3M+$2M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$6M+$10M+$9M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$223M−$353M−$268M−$708M
Cash from operations($140M)($144M)($57M)($370M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$924K−$2M−$1M−$1M
Owner earnings($141M)($146M)($58M)($372M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-8%-7%-2%-16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $6M), owner earnings is nearer ($147M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 20.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $61M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $61M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 20.0× a year's operating profit (20.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–20%; 2% latest = NOPAT $59M ÷ invested capital $3.7B
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range -16%–-2%; latest ($141M) = operating cash ($140M) − maintenance capex $924K
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a -8% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $6M of SBC) leaves ($147M).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ($140M) ÷ net income $73M

    In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 14% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips here too. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which. And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.21×
    Harvesting
    Capex $924K ÷ depreciation $4M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +36%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.71/share (latest year $3.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $90.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 8% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2025 · 4.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Eric Lipar$6.5M$18.8M
2022Eric Lipar$5.8M−$7.8M($372M)
2023Eric Lipar$6.6M$8.5M($58M)
2024Eric Lipar$6.2M$2.0M($146M)
2025Eric Lipar$5.2M−$3.3M($141M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership12.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio50:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$6M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LGI Homes Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$400M → $1.7B

    Debt rose from $400M to $1.7B while owner earnings went from about ($192M) to ($115M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-0.40×

    Across the record the business reported $2.1B of net income but generated ($823M) of operating cash, a -0.40-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 3% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $17M to $45M while revenue grew 100%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 3% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Homebuilders

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DFHDream Finders Homes Inc.$4.3B16%7.8%41%3%
CCSCentury Communities Inc.$4.1B7.9%6%-1%
ECGEverus Construction Group Inc.$3.7B12%6.7%29%4%
HOVHovnanian Enterprises Inc.$3.0B1.8%3%7%
BZHBeazer Homes USA Inc.$2.4B16%3.9%5%3%
GRBKGreen Brick Partners Inc.$2.0B26%15.8%15%-0%
LGIHLGI Homes Inc.$1.7B25%13.3%11%-7%
SDHCSmith Douglas Homes Corp.$971M26%2.4%33%2%
Group median21%7.2%13%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

LGI Homes Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−7%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−4%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LGI Homes Inc. (LGIH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LGIH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LFUS its page in the Manual LGN →

Industry order: ← LEN the Homebuilders chapter MHO →