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LNT, Alliant Energy
Alliant Energy's primary focus is to provide regulated electric and natural gas service to approximately 1,010,000 electric and approximately 435,000 natural gas customers in the Midwest through its two public utility subsidiaries, IPL and WPL.
Alliant Energy operates as a regulated investor-owned public utility holding company, and its purpose-driven strategy is to serve its customers and build stronger communities.
IPL provides utility services to incorporated communities as directed by the IUC and utilizes non-exclusive franchises, which cover the use of public right-of-ways for utility facilities in incorporated communities for a maximum term of 25 years.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Electric (85%) and Gas (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 86% and operating margin about 22% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (17%–23% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −280 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Electric is 85% of revenue, with Gas the other meaningful segment at 12%.
- Electric85%$3.7B
- Gas12%$525M
- Other2%$89M
- Other Utility1%$51M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $4.2B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 86% | 86% | 87% | 87% | 85% | 86% | 86% | 85% | 86% | 86% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $554M | $671M | $694M | $778M | $740M | $795M | $928M | $943M | $886M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 16.7% | 19.8% | 19.6% | 21.3% | 21.7% | 21.7% | 22.1% | 23.4% | 22.3% | 23.5% | 23.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $382M | $468M | $522M | $567M | $624M | $674M | $686M | $703M | $690M | $810M | $821M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | 12% | 8% | 11% | — | — | 3% | 1% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $393M | $522M | $528M | $660M | $501M | $582M | $486M | $867M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $412M | $462M | $507M | $567M | $615M | $657M | $671M | $676M | $772M | $846M | $858M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($401M) | ($408M) | ($501M) | ($474M) | ($738M) | ($749M) | ($871M) | ($512M) | ($295M) | ($487M) | ($391M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.1B | CapexCapex |
| 36.0% | 43.4% | 46.2% | 45.0% | 40.0% | 31.9% | 35.3% | 43.0% | 51.5% | 52.2% | 46.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($19M) | $60M | $21M | $93M | ($114M) | ($75M) | ($185M) | $191M | $395M | $323M | $430M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.6% | 1.8% | 0.6% | 2.5% | −3.3% | −2.0% | −4.4% | 4.7% | 9.9% | 7.4% | 9.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($804M) | ($945M) | ($1.1B) | ($980M) | ($865M) | ($587M) | ($998M) | ($864M) | ($885M) | ($1.1B) | ($777M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −24.2% | −27.9% | −31.3% | −26.9% | −25.3% | −16.0% | −23.7% | −21.5% | −22.2% | −25.4% | −17.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $267M | $288M | $312M | $337M | $377M | $403M | $428M | $456M | $492M | $521M | $528M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 6% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 9% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $8M | $28M | $21M | $16M | $54M | $39M | $20M | $62M | $81M | $556M | $365M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $493M | $483M | $350M | $402M | $412M | $440M | $516M | $475M | $427M | $476M | $497M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $445M | $477M | $543M | $422M | $377M | $436M | $756M | $611M | $532M | $498M | $459M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $48M | $6M | ($193M) | ($20M) | $35M | $4M | ($240M) | ($136M) | ($105M) | ($22M) | $38M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $877M | $905M | $785M | $876M | $887M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.2B | $2.1B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $1.3B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.1B | $1.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.8× | 0.4× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.7× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.4× | 0.8× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $13.4B | $14.2B | $15.4B | $16.7B | $17.7B | $18.6B | $20.2B | $21.2B | $22.7B | $25.0B | $24.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4.3B | $4.9B | $5.5B | $6.2B | $6.8B | $7.4B | $8.1B | $9.0B | $9.8B | $12.0B | $11.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $4.3B | $4.8B | $5.5B | $6.2B | $6.7B | $7.3B | $8.1B | $9.0B | $9.8B | $11.5B | $10.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.8× | 3.1× | 2.8× | 2.8× | 2.7× | 2.9× | 2.9× | 2.4× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $4.1B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.8B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 227M | 230M | 234M | 239M | 249M | 251M | 251M | 253M | 257M | 258M | 259M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $14.62 | $14.72 | $15.13 | $15.26 | $13.74 | $14.64 | $16.74 | $15.90 | $15.50 | $16.92 | $17.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.68 | $2.04 | $2.23 | $2.37 | $2.51 | $2.69 | $2.73 | $2.78 | $2.69 | $3.14 | $3.17 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.08 | $0.26 | $0.09 | $0.39 | $-0.46 | $-0.30 | $-0.74 | $0.75 | $1.54 | $1.25 | $1.66 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-3.54 | $-4.12 | $-4.73 | $-4.10 | $-3.48 | $-2.34 | $-3.97 | $-3.41 | $-3.45 | $-4.30 | $-3.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.17 | $1.26 | $1.34 | $1.41 | $1.52 | $1.61 | $1.70 | $1.80 | $1.92 | $2.02 | $2.04 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $5.27 | $6.39 | $6.99 | $6.86 | $5.49 | $4.66 | $5.91 | $6.83 | $7.99 | $8.83 | $7.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $17.89 | $18.21 | $19.63 | $21.78 | $22.87 | $23.89 | $24.98 | $26.75 | $27.27 | $28.45 | $28.68 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.6%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
| EPS | +7.2%/yr | +4.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +6.2%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.9%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.3%/yr | +4.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $323M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $846M it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.1B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $810M | $690M | $703M | $686M | $674M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$846M | +$772M | +$676M | +$671M | +$657M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$487M | −$295M | −$512M | −$871M | −$749M |
| Cash from operations | $1.2B | $1.2B | $867M | $486M | $582M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$846M | −$772M | −$676M | −$671M | −$657M |
| Owner earnings | $323M | $395M | $191M | ($185M) | ($75M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$1.4B | −$1.3B | −$1.1B | −$813M | −$512M |
| Free cash flow | ($1.1B) | ($885M) | ($864M) | ($998M) | ($587M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 10% | 5% | -4% | -2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $846M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.0B ÷ interest expense $512M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $11.5B · 11.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $556M − debt $12.0B
What this means
Netting $556M of cash and short-term investments against $12.0B of debt leaves $11.5B owed, about 11.2× a year's operating profit (11.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 40 + DIO 0 − DPO 291 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–7%; 5% latest = NOPAT $1.0B ÷ invested capital $18.8BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest $323M = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $846M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)Industry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.1B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $810M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $521M ÷ Owner Earnings $323M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $323M of Owner Earnings, $521M (161%) went back to shareholders, $521M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.69×ExpandingCapex $2.3B ÷ depreciation $846M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $12.0B vs ($426M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +61%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.84/share (latest year $3.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.40/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 19% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 23% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 16.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.4%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$365M
- Receivables$497M
- Other current assets$362M
- Accounts payable$459M
- Other current liabilities$1.3B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $6.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$16.0B · 233%
- Dividends$3.9B · 56%
- Returned to owners$3.9B
562% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.9B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$13.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $13.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $4.3B to $11.0B.
- Net change in share count14.0%
The diluted count rose from 227M to 259M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$2.02/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained13%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $282M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | — | $10.4M | $10.2M | ($75M) |
| 2022 | — | $7.3M | $5.4M | ($185M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Larsen | $9.7M | $7.2M | $191M |
| 2024 | Ms. Barton | $7.0M | $8.5M | $395M |
| 2025 | — | $9.0M | $10.8M | $323M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Alliant Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.0%
Diluted shares grew 14.0% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Multi-Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WECWEC Energy Group Inc. | $9.8B | 64% | 22.1% | 6% | 18% |
| AEEAmeren Corporation | $8.8B | — | 21.5% | 5% | 18% |
| CMSCMS Energy Corporation | $8.3B | — | 18.7% | 5% | 12% |
| NINiSource Inc | $6.5B | 68% | 20.5% | 6% | 10% |
| EVRGEvergy | $5.7B | — | 24.7% | 6% | 17% |
| LNTAlliant Energy | $4.4B | 86% | 21.7% | 6% | 1% |
| AVAAvista | $2.0B | — | 16.7% | 5% | 11% |
| NWENorthWestern Energy | $1.6B | — | 20.2% | 5% | -9% |
| Group median | — | 68% | 21.0% | 6% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Alliant Energy has delivered.
Alliant Energy’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Alliant Energy earns about $52M on its 1.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($777M) on 258M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $10.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2.1B) runs well above depreciation ($858M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $442M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LNN its page in the Manual LNTH →
Industry order: ← GNE the Multi-Utilities chapter MGEE →