Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← LNN Manual LNTH → ← GNE Multi-Utilities MGEE →

LNT, Alliant Energy

Multi-Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

Alliant Energy's primary focus is to provide regulated electric and natural gas service to approximately 1,010,000 electric and approximately 435,000 natural gas customers in the Midwest through its two public utility subsidiaries, IPL and WPL.

Alliant Energy operates as a regulated investor-owned public utility holding company, and its purpose-driven strategy is to serve its customers and build stronger communities.

IPL provides utility services to incorporated communities as directed by the IUC and utilizes non-exclusive franchises, which cover the use of public right-of-ways for utility facilities in incorporated communities for a maximum term of 25 years.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LNT · Alliant Energy
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.4B
+9.6% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.4B 5-yr avg $4.0B
Gross margin 86% 5-yr avg 86%
Operating margin 23.0% 5-yr avg 22.6%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin −18% 5-yr avg −22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Electric (85%) and Gas (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 86% and operating margin about 22% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (17%–23% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −280 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Electric is 85% of revenue, with Gas the other meaningful segment at 12%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Electric85%$3.7B
  • Gas12%$525M
  • Other2%$89M
  • Other Utility1%$51M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.3B$3.4B$3.5B$3.6B$3.4B$3.7B$4.2B$4.0B$4.0B$4.4B$4.4BRevenueRevenue
86%86%87%87%85%86%86%85%86%86%Gross marginGross mgn
$554M$671M$694M$778M$740M$795M$928M$943M$886M$1.0B$1.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
16.7%19.8%19.6%21.3%21.7%21.7%22.1%23.4%22.3%23.5%23.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$382M$468M$522M$567M$624M$674M$686M$703M$690M$810M$821MNet incomeNet inc.
13%12%8%11%3%1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$393M$522M$528M$660M$501M$582M$486M$867M$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$412M$462M$507M$567M$615M$657M$671M$676M$772M$846M$858MDepreciationDeprec.
($401M)($408M)($501M)($474M)($738M)($749M)($871M)($512M)($295M)($487M)($391M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4B$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1BCapexCapex
36.0%43.4%46.2%45.0%40.0%31.9%35.3%43.0%51.5%52.2%46.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($19M)$60M$21M$93M($114M)($75M)($185M)$191M$395M$323M$430MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−0.6%1.8%0.6%2.5%−3.3%−2.0%−4.4%4.7%9.9%7.4%9.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($804M)($945M)($1.1B)($980M)($865M)($587M)($998M)($864M)($885M)($1.1B)($777M)Free cash flowFCF
−24.2%−27.9%−31.3%−26.9%−25.3%−16.0%−23.7%−21.5%−22.2%−25.4%−17.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$267M$288M$312M$337M$377M$403M$428M$456M$492M$521M$528MDividends paidDiv. paid
6%7%6%6%6%6%6%6%5%5%6%ROICROIC
9%11%11%11%11%11%11%10%10%11%11%Return on equityROE
3%4%5%4%4%5%4%4%3%4%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$8M$28M$21M$16M$54M$39M$20M$62M$81M$556M$365MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$493M$483M$350M$402M$412M$440M$516M$475M$427M$476M$497MReceivablesReceiv.
$445M$477M$543M$422M$377M$436M$756M$611M$532M$498M$459MAccounts payablePayables
$48M$6M($193M)($20M)$35M$4M($240M)($136M)($105M)($22M)$38MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$877M$905M$785M$876M$887M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.7B$1.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.2B$2.1B$1.6B$2.1B$1.3B$2.1B$2.4B$2.3B$2.7B$2.1B$1.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×0.4×0.5×0.4×0.7×0.5×0.5×0.6×0.4×0.8×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$13.4B$14.2B$15.4B$16.7B$17.7B$18.6B$20.2B$21.2B$22.7B$25.0B$24.8BTotal assetsAssets
$4.3B$4.9B$5.5B$6.2B$6.8B$7.4B$8.1B$9.0B$9.8B$12.0B$11.0BTotal debtDebt
$4.3B$4.8B$5.5B$6.2B$6.7B$7.3B$8.1B$9.0B$9.8B$11.5B$10.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.8×3.1×2.8×2.8×2.7×2.9×2.9×2.4×2.0×2.0×1.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.1B$4.2B$4.6B$5.2B$5.7B$6.0B$6.3B$6.8B$7.0B$7.3B$7.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
227M230M234M239M249M251M251M253M257M258M259MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.62$14.72$15.13$15.26$13.74$14.64$16.74$15.90$15.50$16.92$17.07Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.68$2.04$2.23$2.37$2.51$2.69$2.73$2.78$2.69$3.14$3.17EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.08$0.26$0.09$0.39$-0.46$-0.30$-0.74$0.75$1.54$1.25$1.66Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.54$-4.12$-4.73$-4.10$-3.48$-2.34$-3.97$-3.41$-3.45$-4.30$-3.00Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.17$1.26$1.34$1.41$1.52$1.61$1.70$1.80$1.92$2.02$2.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.27$6.39$6.99$6.86$5.49$4.66$5.91$6.83$7.99$8.83$7.98Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.89$18.21$19.63$21.78$22.87$23.89$24.98$26.75$27.27$28.45$28.68Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.6%/yr+4.3%/yr
EPS+7.2%/yr+4.6%/yr
Dividends / share+6.2%/yr+5.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.9%/yr+10.0%/yr
Book value / share+5.3%/yr+4.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
258Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2024
Gross margin
86%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
35.5×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$323Mowner earningsvs.$810Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $323M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $846M it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.1B).

Reported net income$810M
Owner earnings$323M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$810M$690M$703M$686M$674M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$846M+$772M+$676M+$671M+$657M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$487M−$295M−$512M−$871M−$749M
Cash from operations$1.2B$1.2B$867M$486M$582M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$846M−$772M−$676M−$671M−$657M
Owner earnings$323M$395M$191M($185M)($75M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1.4B−$1.3B−$1.1B−$813M−$512M
Free cash flow($1.1B)($885M)($864M)($998M)($587M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%10%5%-4%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $846M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $1.0B ÷ interest expense $512M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $11.5B · 11.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $556M − debt $12.0B
    What this means

    Netting $556M of cash and short-term investments against $12.0B of debt leaves $11.5B owed, about 11.2× a year's operating profit (11.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 40 + DIO 0 − DPO 291 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–7%; 5% latest = NOPAT $1.0B ÷ invested capital $18.8B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $323M = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $846M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.1B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $810M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $521M ÷ Owner Earnings $323M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $323M of Owner Earnings, $521M (161%) went back to shareholders, $521M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.69×
    Expanding
    Capex $2.3B ÷ depreciation $846M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $12.0B vs ($426M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +61%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.84/share (latest year $3.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.40/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 23% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 16.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$365M
  • Receivables$497M
  • Other current assets$362M
Current liabilities$1.8B
  • Accounts payable$459M
  • Other current liabilities$1.3B
Current ratio0.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($554M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$7.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$11.0B$21M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$16.0B · 233%
  • Dividends$3.9B · 56%
  • Returned to owners$3.9B

    562% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.9B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$13.0B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $13.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $4.3B to $11.0B.

  • Net change in share count14.0%

    The diluted count rose from 227M to 259M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.02/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained13%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $282M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$10.4M$10.2M($75M)
2022$7.3M$5.4M($185M)
2023Mr. Larsen$9.7M$7.2M$191M
2024Ms. Barton$7.0M$8.5M$395M
2025$9.0M$10.8M$323M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

    Inverting the record

    Invert: instead of why Alliant Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

    1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

    • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.0%

      Diluted shares grew 14.0% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

    And these came back clean
    • Is it less profitable than it was?
    • Did debt outgrow the business?
    • Did reported profit become cash?
    • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
    • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

    Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

    What an owner would ask, FY2025

    read the 10-K →
    • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
      Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Contingencies as critical estimates

      each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

    The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

    Peers, Multi-Utilities

    The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

    CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
    WECWEC Energy Group Inc.$9.8B64%22.1%6%18%
    AEEAmeren Corporation$8.8B21.5%5%18%
    CMSCMS Energy Corporation$8.3B18.7%5%12%
    NINiSource Inc$6.5B68%20.5%6%10%
    EVRGEvergy$5.7B24.7%6%17%
    LNTAlliant Energy$4.4B86%21.7%6%1%
    AVAAvista$2.0B16.7%5%11%
    NWENorthWestern Energy$1.6B20.2%5%-9%
    Group median68%21.0%6%12%
    IV

    The price

    What a price has to assume.

    What the price implies

    reverse-DCF

    Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Alliant Energy has delivered.

    Alliant Energy’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

    $

    Through the cycle, Alliant Energy earns about $52M on its 1.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

    Base

    The assumptions

    9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

    Enter a price above to run it.

    Implied by the price
    Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+37%/yr
    Owner-earnings yield
    P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
    P/B
    Graham’s price gate

    Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

    Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

    Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

    Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

    Free cash flow ($777M) on 258M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $10.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2.1B) runs well above depreciation ($858M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $442M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

    Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Alliant Energy (LNT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LNT, data as of 2026-07-09.

    Manual order: ← LNN its page in the Manual LNTH →

    Industry order: ← GNE the Multi-Utilities chapter MGEE →