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LPTH, LightPath Technologies Inc.

Semiconductors asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

LightPath is a global company with facilities in the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Latvia.

We expanded our addressable market with the acquisition of ISP (as defined below), a manufacturer of infrared optical components, in December 2016.

The acquisition of Visimid (as defined below) in 2023 and the acquisition of G5 Infrared (as defined below) in 2025 were completed to enhance our abilities on cameras and sensors and speed our movement up the value chain in line with our strategy of value-add infrared systems.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LPTH · LightPath Technologies Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$37M

+17.3% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $63M 5-yr avg $35M

Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 31%

Operating margin −31.6% 5-yr avg −15.9%

ROIC −41% 5-yr avg −21%

Owner-earnings margin −16% 5-yr avg −9%

Free cash flow margin −16% 5-yr avg −9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Infrared Components (38%) and Visible Components (32%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 15% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.8%) on a 35% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −5%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Infrared Components at 38%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Infrared Components38%$14M
Visible Components32%$12M
Assemblies and Modules21%$8M
Engineering Services9%$3M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$28M	$33M	$34M	$35M	$38M	$36M	$33M	$32M	$37M	$63M	RevenueRevenue
52%	39%	37%	40%	35%	33%	34%	27%	27%	32%	Gross marginGross mgn
30%	28%	31%	26%	31%	32%	35%	39%	43%	34%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	5%	6%	5%	6%	6%	7%	8%	8%	6%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$4M	$374K	($1M)	$2M	($2M)	($3M)	($4M)	($8M)	($12M)	($20M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.6%	1.1%	−3.4%	6.1%	−4.8%	−7.4%	−10.8%	−24.7%	−31.8%	−31.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$8M	$1M	($3M)	$867K	($3M)	($4M)	($4M)	($8M)	($15M)	($23M)	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
$5M	$3M	$411K	$4M	$5M	$1M	($3M)	$521K	($8M)	($8M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$5M	DepreciationDeprec.
($5M)	($2M)	($767K)	($809K)	$4M	$563K	($3M)	$3M	$1M	$10M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$3M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$2M	$3M	$2M	$1M	$3M	CapexCapex
7.8%	7.7%	5.7%	7.0%	8.2%	4.6%	9.3%	6.9%	3.4%	4.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3M	$101K	($2M)	$1M	$2M	($162K)	($6M)	($2M)	($10M)	($10M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.8%	0.3%	−4.5%	3.7%	4.1%	−0.5%	−17.9%	−5.2%	−25.8%	−16.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3M	$101K	($2M)	$1M	$2M	($162K)	($6M)	($2M)	($10M)	($10M)	Free cash flowFCF
9.8%	0.3%	−4.5%	3.7%	4.1%	−0.5%	−17.9%	−5.2%	−25.8%	−16.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$18M	$18M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
13%	1%	-3%	3%	-5%	-8%	-9%	-23%	-60%	-41%	ROICROIC
26%	3%	-8%	3%	-9%	-12%	-11%	-27%	-95%	-26%	Return on equityROE
26%	3%	−8%	3%	−9%	−12%	−11%	−27%	−95%	−26%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$8M	$6M	$5M	$5M	$7M	$6M	$5M	$3M	$5M	$55M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$6M	$5M	$6M	$6M	$5M	$5M	$7M	$5M	$9M	$11M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$5M	$6M	$8M	$9M	$9M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$13M	$13M	InventoryInvent.
$2M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$7M	$6M	Accounts payablePayables
$9M	$10M	$12M	$13M	$10M	$9M	$11M	$8M	$15M	$18M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$20M	$19M	$20M	$21M	$21M	$18M	$22M	$16M	$28M	$83M	Current assetsCur. assets
$6M	$6M	$6M	$7M	$8M	$8M	$7M	$8M	$17M	$22M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.4×	3.3×	3.1×	2.9×	2.5×	2.3×	3.2×	1.9×	1.7×	3.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$7M	$14M	$19M	GoodwillGoodwill
$47M	$47M	$46M	$48M	$55M	$51M	$54M	$48M	$82M	$144M	Total assetsAssets
$10M	$5M	$5M	$4M	$4M	$3M	$2M	$326K	$5M	$5M	Total debtDebt
$2M	($389K)	$395K	($950K)	($3M)	($2M)	($3M)	($3M)	($72K)	($50M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	-8.6×	-11.4×	-12.5×	-40.8×	-10.6×	-14.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$30M	$35M	$33M	$35M	$34M	$30M	$36M	$30M	$16M	$89M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%	1.1%	1.2%	0.7%	1.7%	2.3%	4.0%	3.2%	2.8%	2.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
21.7M	26.8M	25.8M	27.5M	26.3M	27.0M	31.6M	37.9M	40.9M	49.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.31	$1.21	$1.31	$1.27	$1.46	$1.32	$1.04	$0.84	$0.91	$1.27	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.36	$0.04	$-0.10	$0.03	$-0.12	$-0.13	$-0.13	$-0.21	$-0.36	$-0.47	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.13	$0.00	$-0.06	$0.05	$0.06	$-0.01	$-0.19	$-0.04	$-0.23	$-0.21	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.13	$0.00	$-0.06	$0.05	$0.06	$-0.01	$-0.19	$-0.04	$-0.23	$-0.21	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.10	$0.09	$0.07	$0.09	$0.12	$0.06	$0.10	$0.06	$0.03	$0.05	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.37	$1.32	$1.30	$1.26	$1.28	$1.10	$1.14	$0.80	$0.38	$1.80	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−4.4%/yr	−6.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.9%/yr	−19.1%/yr
Book value / share	−14.7%/yr	−21.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+17.3%
“Our revenue increased by approximately 17%, for fiscal year 2025, as compared to the prior fiscal year, primarily driven by increases in assemblies and modules and engineering services, as well as increases in both infrared and visible components.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

41Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−60%low FY2025

Gross margin

27%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($10M)owner earningsvs.($15M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $15M loss into ($10M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($15M)	($8M)	($4M)	($4M)	($3M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$4M	+$4M	+$3M	+$4M	+$4M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$1M	+$1M	+$1M	+$825K	+$643K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1M	+$3M	−$3M	+$563K	+$4M
Cash from operations	($8M)	$521K	($3M)	$1M	$5M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1M	−$2M	−$3M	−$2M	−$3M
Owner earnings	($10M)	($2M)	($6M)	($162K)	$2M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-26%	-5%	-18%	0%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1M), owner earnings is nearer ($11M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -10.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($12M) ÷ interest expense $1M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$72K

Net cash

Cash $5M − debt $5M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $72K, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 166d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 93 + DIO 173 − DPO 100 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -5%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -60%–13%; -60% latest = NOPAT ($9M) ÷ invested capital $16M

Industry peers: median -19%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -60% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -0%

Consumes cash through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -26%–10%; latest ($10M) = operating cash ($8M) − maintenance capex $1M

Industry peers: median -10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -26% of revenue this year, a -0% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1M of SBC) leaves ($11M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($8M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($15M) · cash from operations ($8M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.30×

Harvesting

Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $4M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $37M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.66×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $5M vs $11M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −543%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.14/share (latest year $-0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → −22% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to −22% lately, median −5% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2025 · −31.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$83M

Cash & short-term investments$55M
Receivables$11M
Inventory$13M
Other current assets$4M

Current liabilities$22M

Accounts payable$6M
Other current liabilities$16M

Current ratio3.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.24×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$61Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway5.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+108.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 3.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$52Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$52MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$15M$10M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$199Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$20M · 278%

Source of funding−$13M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $13M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Net change in share count128.8%
The diluted count rose from 22M to 50M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$30M36% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity88%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$30Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $20M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Shmuel Rubin	$554k	$472k	($6M)
2024	Shmuel Rubin	$478k	$461k	($2M)
2025	Shmuel Rubin	$693k	$1.3M	($10M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership24.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$1M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LightPath Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−16.3% vs 1.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 1.9% early in the record and −16.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?128.8%
Diluted shares grew 128.8% over 2017–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AXTIAXT Inc	$88M	32%	6.0%	4%	-16%
AMBQAmbiq Micro Inc.	$73M	44%	-54.5%	-141%	—
AIPArteris Inc.	$71M	90%	-56.0%	—	-3%
MPTIM-tron Industries Inc.	$54M	—	10.4%	19%	9%
NVTSNavitas Semiconductor Corporation	$46M	33%	-196.7%	-41%	-108%
KOPNKopin Corporation	$39M	35%	-65.8%	-70%	-40%
LPTHLightPath Technologies Inc.	$37M	35%	-4.8%	-5%	-0%
NVECNVE Corporation	$26M	79%	61.3%	21%	52%
Group median	—	35%	-29.7%	-5%	-3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

LightPath Technologies Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−1%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−16%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh LPTH against another business →

The owners of LPTH: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LightPath Technologies Inc. (LPTH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LPTH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LPRO its page in the Manual LPX →

Industry order: ← LASR the Semiconductors chapter LSCC →