Owner Scorecard


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LTM, LATAM Airlines Group S.A.

Airlines capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

An airline, a high-fixed-cost business selling a perishable seat.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 2000 ordinary shares
LTM · LATAM Airlines Group S.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$14.3B
+11.2% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $14.3B 5-yr avg $10.6B
Gross margin 29% 5-yr avg 18%
Operating margin 16.4% 5-yr avg −3.9%
ROIC 32%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 12% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 21% and operating margin about 9.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −115% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −32 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on load factor against unit cost, and fuel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 regions, the largest Brazil at 43%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • Brazil43%$6.1B
  • Chile15%$2.1B
  • United States10%$1.4B
  • Peru9%$1.3B
  • Europe8%$1.1B
  • Asia Pacific and rest of Latin America5%$763M
  • Other10%$1.4B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$9.0B$9.6B$9.9B$10.1B$3.9B$4.9B$9.4B$11.6B$12.8B$14.3B$14.3BRevenueRevenue
22%24%21%21%−15%−2%13%24%25%29%29%Gross marginGross mgn
$493M$862M$940M$753M($4.5B)($3.4B)$1.2B$1.1B$1.5B$2.3B$2.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.5%9.0%9.5%7.5%−115.5%−70.1%12.9%9.3%12.0%16.4%16.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$69M$109M$310M$190M($4.5B)($4.6B)$1.3B$582M$977M$1.5B$1.5BNet incomeNet inc.
59%19%1%3%2%10%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$981M$2.2B$2.1B$2.8B($495M)($174M)$97M$2.3B$3.1B$3.7B$3.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$960M$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.7B$1.7BDepreciationDeprec.
($49M)$701M$391M$1.2B$2.7B$3.3B($2.4B)$476M$682M$541M$541MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$694M$404M$661M$1.3B$324M$597M$781M$796M$1.3B$1.8B$1.8BCapexCapex
7.7%4.2%6.7%12.7%8.3%12.2%8.3%6.8%10.3%12.4%12.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$287M$1.8B$1.4B$1.6B($819M)($771M)($684M)$1.5B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.2%18.5%14.3%15.4%−20.9%−15.8%−7.3%12.6%13.9%13.7%13.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$287M$1.8B$1.4B$1.6B($819M)($771M)($684M)$1.5B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BFree cash flowFCF
3.2%18.5%14.3%15.4%−20.9%−15.8%−7.3%12.6%13.9%13.7%13.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$41M$67M$73M$55M$571K$0$0$175M$605M$605MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$585MBuybacksBuybacks
2%4%8%10%-99%32%ROICROIC
2%3%9%6%3168%129%135%109%109%Return on equityROE
1%1%7%4%n/m129%111%64%64%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.7B$1.7B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.1B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.2B$2.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$599M$882M$1.0B$1.4B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$241M$237M$279M$354M$324M$287M$478M$593M$439M$459M$459MInventoryInvent.
$359M$1.7B$499M$2.2B$2.3B$4.8B$1.6B$1.8B$2.1B$2.7B$2.7BAccounts payablePayables
$990M($229M)$983M($624M)($1.4B)($3.7B)($142M)$214M($531M)($844M)($844M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.6B$3.8B$3.3B$4.0B$3.1B$2.6B$3.5B$4.2B$3.9B$4.4B$4.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$6.2B$6.2B$5.9B$7.0B$7.5B$12.3B$5.1B$5.7B$6.3B$7.3B$7.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.6×0.6×0.6×0.4×0.2×0.7×0.7×0.6×0.6×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.7B$2.7B$2.3B$2.2B$2.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$19.2B$21.7B$20.1B$21.1B$15.7B$13.3B$13.2B$14.7B$15.3B$17.6B$17.6BTotal assetsAssets
$8.6B$7.9B$7.3B$5.8B$7.7B$7.4B$7.4BTotal debtDebt
$6.9B$6.2B$5.8B$4.2B$6.0B$6.3B$5.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.2×1.5×1.7×1.3×-7.7×-4.3×1.3×1.5×1.7×3.2×3.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.1B$3.9B$3.4B$3.1B($2.4B)($7.1B)$42M$450M$723M$1.3B$1.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
606M96.61B604.44B604.44B589.30B589.30BShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.05$0.10$0.02$0.02$0.02$0.02Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-7.66$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.27$-0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.27$-0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.98$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-11.64$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×159.32 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×6.26 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−76.6%/yr (4-yr)−76.6%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share−76.5%/yr (4-yr)−76.5%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
589.3Bpeak FY2024
ROIC
−99%low FY2020
Gross margin
29%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.7×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.0Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.5B of profit into $2.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.5B
Owner earnings$2.0B · 14% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.5B$977M$582M$1.3B($4.6B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.7B+$1.4B+$1.2B+$1.2B+$1.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$541M+$682M+$476M−$2.4B+$3.3B
Cash from operations$3.7B$3.1B$2.3B$97M($174M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1.8B−$1.3B−$796M−$781M−$597M
Owner earnings$2.0B$1.8B$1.5B($684M)($771M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%14%13%-7%-16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $2.3B ÷ interest expense $721M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.2B · 2.2× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $2.2B + ST investments $71M − debt $7.4B
    What this means

    Netting $2.2B of cash and short-term investments against $7.4B of debt leaves $5.2B owed, about 2.2× a year's operating profit (3.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 35 + DIO 17 − DPO 97 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -99%–10%; 32% latest = NOPAT $2.1B ÷ invested capital $6.6B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 32% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -21%–19%; latest $2.0B = operating cash $3.7B − maintenance capex $1.8B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $3.7B ÷ net income $1.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.2B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.0B
    What this means

    Of $2.0B Owner Earnings, $1.2B (61%) went back to shareholders, $605M dividends, $585M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.02×
    Maintaining
    Capex $1.8B ÷ depreciation $1.7B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $14.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.60×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $7.4B vs ($2.9B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +519%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.00/share (latest year $0.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 13% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −115.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.2B
  • Receivables$1.4B
  • Inventory$459M
  • Other current assets$322M
Current liabilities$7.3B
  • Debt due within a year$3.9B
  • Accounts payable$2.7B
  • Other current liabilities$741M
Current ratio0.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.54×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.9B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3.9B due · $2.2B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($11.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$7.4Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $16.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$8.6B · 52%
  • Dividends$1.0B · 6%
  • Buybacks$585M · 4%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$6.4B · 38%
  • Returned to owners$1.6B

    20% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.0B as dividends and $585M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $585M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count97079.2%

    The diluted count rose from 606M to 589302M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LATAM Airlines Group S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?97079.2%

    Diluted shares grew 97079.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $585M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UALUnited Airlines Holdings$59.1B7.9%12%9%
AALAmerican Airlines Group$54.6B5.3%8%2%
LUVSouthwest Airlines Co.$28.1B7.6%11%11%
LTMLATAM Airlines Group S.A.$14.3B22%9.1%4%13%
ALKAlaska Air$14.2B6.3%7%10%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B12%11.3%6%22%
ULCCFrontier Group Holdings Inc.$3.7B-1.4%-24%-4%
Group median7.0%6%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares (as evidenced by American Depositary Receipts), each representing 2,000 shares of Common”; LATAM Airlines Group S.A. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LATAM Airlines Group S.A. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, LATAM Airlines Group S.A. earns about $1.9B on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.0B on 287M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $5.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (LTM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LTM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LSPD its page in the Manual LU →

Industry order: ← JBLU the Airlines chapter LUV →