Share count
1.4Bpeak FY2019
← All companies ← LTM Manual LUXE → ← LPLA Capital Markets & Asset Management LX →
LU, Lufax Holding Ltd
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
CN¥8.2B
−46.7% YoY · −28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥8.2B 5-yr avg CN¥26.4B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 15%, above 12% in 4 of 7 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| CN¥32.2B | CN¥41.9B | CN¥41.2B | CN¥38.3B | CN¥29.2B | CN¥15.3B | CN¥8.2B | CN¥8.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| (CN¥707M) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥2.5B) | (CN¥175M) | CN¥135M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥945M | CN¥945M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| CN¥13.6B | CN¥13.3B | CN¥12.4B | CN¥16.8B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥810M | (CN¥3.9B) | (CN¥3.9B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 27% | 31% | 31% | 28% | 35% | 44% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| — | 8.9% | 5.0% | 4.7% | 2.2% | 0.3% | -1.9% | -1.9% | Return on assetsROA |
| 39% | 28% | 15% | 18% | 8% | 1% | -5% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| 39% | 28% | 15% | 18% | 0% | −1% | −11% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 57% | 36% | 17% | 20% | 9% | 1% | -5% | -5% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | CN¥149.5B | CN¥248.9B | CN¥360.4B | CN¥359.7B | CN¥234.4B | CN¥203.5B | CN¥203.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| CN¥9.1B | CN¥9.0B | CN¥9.0B | CN¥8.9B | CN¥8.9B | CN¥8.9B | CN¥9.2B | CN¥9.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| CN¥34.9B | CN¥48.0B | CN¥81.6B | CN¥93.1B | CN¥92.8B | CN¥90.9B | CN¥81.8B | CN¥81.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 1076.87B | 1086.70B | 1.10B | 1.18B | 1.15B | 1.15B | 1.40B | 1.15B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.01 | CN¥11.19 | CN¥14.22 | CN¥6.79 | CN¥0.71 | CN¥-2.77 | CN¥-3.38 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.00 | CN¥6.74 | CN¥1.25 | CN¥3.68 | CN¥4.48 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| CN¥0.03 | CN¥0.04 | CN¥73.87 | CN¥78.74 | CN¥81.08 | CN¥79.34 | CN¥58.61 | CN¥71.35 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| CN¥0.02 | CN¥0.03 | CN¥63.97 | CN¥70.43 | CN¥72.51 | CN¥70.80 | CN¥51.35 | CN¥62.51 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/984.19 into 2020 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +140.9%/yr | +173.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +249.0%/yr | +321.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
CN¥8.2Blow FY2024
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -5%Loss on equityNet income (CN¥3.9B) ÷ equity CN¥81.8BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill CN¥9.2B − intangibles CN¥956M)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 40.2%Well capitalizedEquity CN¥81.8B ÷ assets CN¥203.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Since 2024, with the iterative advancement of AI technology, taken into account business risk performance as well as user experience, we upgraded the approval process for general unsecured loan borrowers to 100% AI-assisted online interviews or fully AI-driven interviews.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LULufax Holding Ltd | CN¥8.2B | 15% | 17% | — | -0.0% |
| DFSDiscover Financial Services | $17.9B | 25% | 26% | 39% | 8.6% |
| BKKTBakkt Inc. | $2.3B | -146% | -252% | — | 0.5% |
| GDOTGreen DOT Corp | $2.0B | 5% | 13% | — | -0.1% |
| UPSTUpstart | $1.0B | -7% | -8% | — | 0.0% |
| SOFISoFi Technologies | $3.6B | -6% | -9% | 85% | 3.6% |
| SYFSynchrony Financial | $19.0B | 21% | 25% | 27% | 15.5% |
| OMFOneMain Holdings Inc. | $4.9B | 23% | 48% | 39% | 15.3% |
| Group median | — | 10% | 15% | — | 2.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares (each representing two ordinary”; Lufax Holding Ltd reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Lufax Holding Ltd’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered−4%/yr’19→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity17%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $10.6B on 867M shares, a 17% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lufax Holding Ltd (LU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LU, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← LTM its page in the Manual LUXE →
Industry order: ← LPLA the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter LX →