Share count
418Mpeak FY2025
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LYFT, Lyft Inc.
Lyft Inc. operates as a global mobility platform offering a mix of rideshare, taxis, private hire vehicles, executive chauffeur services, car sharing, bikes and scooters.
Our established, scaled network of users is brought together by our robust technology platform (the "Lyft Platform") that powers rides and connections every day.
Our Lyft mobile application ("Lyft App") connect riders with drivers for on-demand ride services and supports a variety of other multimodal solutions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$5.9B
+9.9% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.1B 5-yr avg $4.4B
Revenue $1.7B +13.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −0.3% yr-ago −2.0%
Net income $14M yr-ago $3M
Net margin 0.9% yr-ago 0.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −38% through the cycle on a 38% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −56%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $1.1B | $2.1B | $3.5B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 38% | 41% | 37% | 34% | 42% | 36% | 38% | 38% | 37% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 21% | 34% | 43% | 31% | 34% | 21% | 17% | 17% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 13% | 14% | 43% | 41% | 31% | 22% | 14% | 7% | 8% | 8% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($708M) | ($978M) | ($2.7B) | ($1.8B) | ($1.1B) | ($1.5B) | ($476M) | ($119M) | ($188M) | ($165M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −66.8% | −46.4% | −78.0% | −81.9% | −38.4% | −38.3% | −11.6% | −2.2% | −3.2% | −2.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($688M) | ($911M) | ($2.6B) | ($1.8B) | ($1.1B) | ($1.6B) | ($340M) | $23M | $2.8B | $2.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ($394M) | ($281M) | ($106M) | ($1.4B) | ($102M) | ($237M) | ($98M) | $850M | $1.2B | $1.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $19M | $108M | $157M | $139M | $155M | $117M | $149M | $135M | $138M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $283M | $603M | $789M | ($349M) | $97M | $442M | ($359M) | $347M | ($2.1B) | ($2.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $258M | $12M | $12M | $0 | $146M | $0 | $0 | $307M | $307M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $50M | $500M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -86% | -70% | -56% | -122% | -44% | -17% | -5% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -91% | -105% | -79% | -408% | -63% | 3% | 87% | 94% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −91% | −105% | −79% | −408% | −63% | 3% | 87% | 94% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $1.1B | $2.0B | $2.9B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $32M | $39M | $84M | $130M | $108M | $72M | $98M | $120M | $115M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $2.3B | $3.2B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $2.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.4B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.9B | $4.5B | $4.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.1× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $152M | $159M | $183M | $181M | $262M | $258M | $251M | $440M | $435M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $3.8B | $5.7B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $4.6B | $4.6B | $5.4B | $9.0B | $8.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | $0 | $680M | $711M | $839M | $865M | $605M | $1.1B | $1.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | ($2.9B) | ($1.6B) | ($1.5B) | ($957M) | ($820M) | ($1.4B) | ($784M) | ($678M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | -55.3× | -22.0× | -73.9× | -18.1× | -4.1× | -9.1× | -8.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($2.0B) | ($2.9B) | $2.9B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $389M | $542M | $767M | $3.3B | $3.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.9% | 0.4% | 46.1% | 25.6% | 24.5% | 19.7% | 11.8% | 6.2% | 5.5% | 5.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 19.4M | 21.2M | 227M | 312M | 335M | 355M | 385M | 414M | 418M | 402M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $54.71 | $99.45 | $15.23 | $7.08 | $8.84 | $10.75 | $10.68 | $12.97 | $14.12 | $15.15 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-35.53 | $-43.04 | $-11.44 | $-5.61 | $-3.17 | $-4.47 | $-0.88 | $0.06 | $6.81 | $7.10 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-102.19 | $-135.59 | $12.55 | $5.37 | $4.01 | $1.10 | $1.41 | $1.85 | $7.84 | $7.52 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×10.74 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −15.6%/yr | +14.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +7.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−5%low FY2022
Gross margin
37%low FY2020
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -9.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($188M) ÷ interest expense $21M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $1.1B + ST investments $705M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $784M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -122%–-5%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($149M) ÷ invested capital $3.2BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $2.8B
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs ($1.6B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.22/share (latest year $7.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −64% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −64% early to −6% lately, median −38% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −81.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.7B
- Other current assets$1.0B
Current liabilities$4.7B
- Debt due within a year$56M
- Accounts payable$115M
- Other current liabilities$4.5B
Current ratio0.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.58×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.9B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$56M due · $1.7B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$181M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Green | $13.9M | $10.3M | ($1.1B) |
| 2022 | Mr. Green | $13.3M | −$175k | ($1.6B) |
| 2023 | Mr. Green | $814k | $1.3M | ($340M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Risher | $78.2M | $135.4M | ($340M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Risher | $1.3M | −$41.1M | $23M |
| 2025 | Mr. Risher | $2.8M | $37.0M | $2.8B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$322M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNXCConcentrix Corporation | $9.8B | 36% | 6.5% | 6% | 7% |
| BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc. | $6.9B | 28% | 14.4% | 18% | 13% |
| LYFTLyft Inc. | $5.9B | 38% | -38.4% | -56% | — |
| MMSMaximus | $5.4B | 23% | 9.7% | 16% | 8% |
| TNETTriNet Group Inc. | $5.0B | — | 7.1% | 38% | 7% |
| RBARB Global Inc. | $4.6B | — | 16.4% | 8% | 17% |
| WUWestern Union | $3.9B | 39% | 19.6% | 42% | 15% |
| ADVAdvantage Solutions Inc. | $3.5B | — | -1.2% | -8% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 36% | 8.4% | 12% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFLyft Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered21%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lyft Inc. (LYFT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LYFT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← LYEL its page in the Manual LYTS →
Industry order: ← LQDT the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter MA →