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MA, Mastercard Incorporated
Mastercard runs a global payments network that moves money between the banks that issue its branded cards, the merchants that accept them, and the consumers who pay. It does not lend or carry the credit risk; it takes a fee on each transaction routed across its rails and sells value-added services and solutions to the same banks and merchants. Most of its revenue comes from the core network, with the rest from those services.
We make payments easier and more efficient by providing a wide range of payment solutions and services using our family of well-known and trusted brands, including our primary brand Mastercard , as well as our Maestro and Cirrus brands.
We operate a payments network that provides choice and flexibility for consumers, merchants and our customers.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Payment network (59%) and Value-added services and solutions (41%).
- What moves the needle
- The question is whether this is a true two-sided network or a toll road that can be re-routed around: a system worth more to each bank and merchant because the other side is already on it, which would show up as durable pricing and the ability to layer services on top of the rails. Watch the customer roster, since the five largest supply an outsized slice of revenue and any one re-pricing or switching rails would bite. Watch, too, the filing's own worry that regulators and rival processors may commoditize the data and the transaction, the path by which a network moat erodes. The record below carries the margins, returns and concentration figures.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 81%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 42% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Payment network at 59%.
- Payment network59%$19.5B
- Value-added services and solutions41%$13.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $10.8B | $12.5B | $21.8B | $25.0B | $23.6B | $29.8B | $22.2B | $25.1B | $28.2B | $32.8B | $33.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 36% | 37% | 24% | 23% | 25% | 24% | 36% | 36% | 36% | 35% | 35% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $5.8B | $6.6B | $7.3B | $9.7B | $8.1B | $10.1B | $12.3B | $14.0B | $15.6B | $18.9B | $19.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 53.5% | 53.0% | 33.4% | 38.7% | 34.2% | 33.8% | 55.2% | 55.8% | 55.3% | 57.6% | 57.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $4.1B | $3.9B | $5.9B | $8.1B | $6.4B | $8.7B | $9.9B | $11.2B | $12.9B | $15.0B | $15.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | 40% | 19% | 17% | 17% | 16% | 15% | 18% | 16% | 19% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $4.6B | $5.7B | $6.2B | $8.2B | $7.2B | $9.5B | $11.2B | $12.0B | $14.8B | $17.6B | $18.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $373M | $437M | $459M | $522M | $580M | $726M | $750M | $799M | $897M | $1.1B | $1.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $56M | $1.1B | ($291M) | ($707M) | ($21M) | ($223M) | $220M | ($474M) | $483M | $940M | $926M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $215M | $300M | $330M | $422M | $339M | $407M | $442M | $371M | $474M | $489M | $484M | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 2.4% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.5% | 1.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $4.4B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $7.8B | $6.9B | $9.1B | $10.8B | $11.6B | $14.3B | $17.2B | $17.8B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 41.0% | 42.9% | 27.0% | 31.1% | 29.2% | 30.3% | 48.4% | 46.3% | 50.8% | 52.3% | 52.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $4.4B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $7.8B | $6.9B | $9.1B | $10.8B | $11.6B | $14.3B | $17.2B | $17.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 41.0% | 42.9% | 27.0% | 31.1% | 29.2% | 30.3% | 48.4% | 46.3% | 50.8% | 52.3% | 52.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $1.2B | $0 | $1.4B | $989M | $4.4B | $313M | $0 | $2.5B | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $837M | $942M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $2.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.9B | $6.5B | $4.5B | $5.9B | $8.8B | $9.0B | $11.0B | $11.7B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 101% | 80% | 117% | 108% | 75% | 62% | 78% | 82% | 81% | 94% | 89% | ROICROIC |
| 72% | 72% | 109% | 138% | 100% | 119% | 158% | 162% | 199% | 193% | 232% | Return on equityROE |
| 57% | 54% | 89% | 115% | 75% | 95% | 127% | 130% | 161% | 158% | 189% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $6.7B | $5.9B | $6.7B | $7.0B | $10.1B | $7.4B | $7.0B | $8.6B | $8.4B | $10.6B | $9.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $4.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $609M | $933M | $438M | $489M | $527M | $738M | $926M | $834M | $929M | $999M | $1.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $807M | $1.0B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $3.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $13.2B | $13.8B | $16.2B | $16.9B | $19.1B | $16.9B | $16.6B | $19.0B | $19.7B | $23.6B | $22.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7.2B | $8.8B | $11.6B | $11.9B | $11.8B | $13.2B | $14.2B | $16.3B | $19.2B | $22.8B | $22.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.8× | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.8B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $7.7B | $7.5B | $7.7B | $9.2B | $9.6B | $9.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $18.7B | $21.3B | $24.9B | $29.2B | $33.6B | $37.7B | $38.7B | $42.4B | $48.1B | $54.2B | $52.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $5.2B | $5.4B | $6.3B | $8.5B | $12.7B | $13.9B | $14.0B | $15.7B | $18.2B | $19.0B | $19.0B | Total debtDebt |
| ($1.5B) | ($509M) | ($348M) | $1.5B | $2.6B | $6.5B | $7.0B | $7.1B | $9.8B | $8.4B | $9.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 60.6× | 43.0× | 39.2× | 43.1× | 21.3× | 23.4× | 26.0× | 24.4× | 24.1× | 26.2× | 27.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.7B | $5.5B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.4B | $7.3B | $6.3B | $6.9B | $6.5B | $7.7B | $6.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.4% | 1.4% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.10B | 1.07B | 1.05B | 1.02B | 1.01B | 992M | 971M | 946M | 927M | 906M | 893M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.79 | $11.66 | $20.85 | $24.44 | $23.48 | $30.09 | $22.90 | $26.53 | $30.39 | $36.19 | $38.01 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.69 | $3.65 | $5.60 | $7.94 | $6.37 | $8.76 | $10.23 | $11.83 | $13.89 | $16.52 | $17.44 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.02 | $5.00 | $5.63 | $7.59 | $6.84 | $9.13 | $11.07 | $12.27 | $15.43 | $18.94 | $19.91 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.02 | $5.00 | $5.63 | $7.59 | $6.84 | $9.13 | $11.07 | $12.27 | $15.43 | $18.94 | $19.91 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.76 | $0.88 | $1.00 | $1.32 | $1.60 | $1.76 | $1.96 | $2.28 | $2.64 | $3.04 | $3.18 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.20 | $0.28 | $0.32 | $0.41 | $0.34 | $0.41 | $0.46 | $0.39 | $0.51 | $0.54 | $0.54 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $5.14 | $5.10 | $5.15 | $5.77 | $6.35 | $7.37 | $6.49 | $7.32 | $7.00 | $8.54 | $7.52 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.6%/yr | +9.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +18.8%/yr | +22.6%/yr |
| EPS | +18.1%/yr | +21.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +16.7%/yr | +13.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.0%/yr | +9.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.8%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+16.4%
“Net revenue from our payment network included $20,522 million of rebates and incentives provided to customers, which increased 16%, on both an as-reported and currency-neutral basis, in 2025 versus the prior year, primarily due to an increase in our key drivers as well as new and renewed deals.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $15.0B of profit into $17.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $15.0B | $12.9B | $11.2B | $9.9B | $8.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.1B | +$897M | +$799M | +$750M | +$726M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$597M | +$526M | +$460M | +$295M | +$273M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$940M | +$483M | −$474M | +$220M | −$223M |
| Cash from operations | $17.6B | $14.8B | $12.0B | $11.2B | $9.5B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$489M | −$474M | −$371M | −$442M | −$407M |
| Owner earnings | $17.2B | $14.3B | $11.6B | $10.8B | $9.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 52% | 51% | 46% | 48% | 30% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $597M), owner earnings is nearer $16.6B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 26.2×ComfortableOperating income $18.9B ÷ interest expense $722M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.3B · 0.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $10.6B + ST investments $1.2B − debt $19.0B
What this means
Netting $11.7B of cash and short-term investments against $19.0B of debt leaves $7.3B owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $11M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $7.3B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range 62%–117%; 94% latest = NOPAT $15.2B ÷ invested capital $16.2BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 94% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 27%–52%; latest $17.2B = operating cash $17.6B − maintenance capex $489MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 52% of revenue this year, a 41% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $597M of SBC) leaves $16.6B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $17.6B ÷ net income $15.0B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $14.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $17.2B
What this means
Of $17.2B Owner Earnings, $14.5B (84%) went back to shareholders, $2.8B dividends, $11.7B buybacks. Net of $597M stock comp, the real buyback was about $11.1B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.43×HarvestingCapex $489M ÷ depreciation $1.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $32.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $19.0B vs $796M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +182%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $14.60/share (latest year $16.80), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 47% → 56% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 47% early to 56% lately, median 53% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 33.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.
“We create a range of products and services for our customers using our data and artificial intelligence ("AI") assets, technology, platforms and expertise.”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$9.5B
- Receivables$4.7B
- Other current assets$8.3B
- Debt due within a year$1.7B
- Accounts payable$1.0B
- Other current liabilities$20.2B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $97.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3.8B · 4%
- Dividends$16.8B · 17%
- Buybacks$69.5B · 72%
- Retained (debt / cash)$6.9B · 7%
- Returned to owners$86.3B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $16.8B as dividends and $69.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $69.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−18.9%
The diluted count fell from 1101M to 893M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$3.04/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 17% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Miebach | $16.1M | — | $9.1B |
| 2022 | Mr. Miebach | $21.1M | — | $10.8B |
| 2023 | Mr. Miebach | $25.7M | — | $11.6B |
| 2024 | Mr. Miebach | $30.1M | — | $14.3B |
| 2025 | Mr. Miebach | $35.4M | $35.7M | $17.2B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$597M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Mastercard Incorporated is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$5.2B → $19.0B
Debt rose from $5.2B to $19.0B while owner earnings went from about $5.2B to $14.4B — about 1.0 year of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACNAccenture PLC | $69.7B | 32% | 14.6% | 54% | 14% |
| UBERUber Technologies Inc. | $52.0B | — | -22.0% | -12% | -4% |
| VVisa Inc. | $40.0B | — | 64.4% | 28% | 53% |
| PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc. | $33.2B | — | 15.8% | 16% | 19% |
| MAMastercard Incorporated | $32.8B | — | 53.2% | 81% | 42% |
| MELIMercadoLibre Inc. | $20.3B | 36% | 11.0% | 14% | 23% |
| AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc. | $14.4B | 10% | 2.5% | 3% | 1% |
| DASHDoorDash Inc. | $13.7B | — | -12.2% | -14% | 8% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.8% | 15% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Mastercard Incorporated has delivered.
Mastercard Incorporated’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Mastercard Incorporated earns about $13.8B on its 42.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 52.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $17.8B on 891M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $9.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← M its page in the Manual MAA →
Industry order: ← LYFT the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter MATW →