Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← MATV Manual MATX → ← MA Commercial Services & Supplies MAX →

MATW, Matthews International Corporation

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

Revenue is Memorialization (54%), Brand Solutions (23%) and Industrial Technologies (23%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MATW · Matthews International Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.5B
−16.6% YoY · −0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Gross margin 36% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 13.1% 5-yr avg 1.8%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin −8% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin −8% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 35% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 2.5% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.3% and 8.6% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Memorialization at 54%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Memorialization54%$810M
  • Brand Solutions23%$346M
  • Industrial Technologies23%$342M
By geographyNorth America71%Europe24%Asia3%Australia1%Central and South America0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.8B$1.5B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
37%36%35%33%32%30%31%29%34%36%Gross marginGross mgn
18%17%18%18%17%17%16%19%23%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$121M$139M$10M($64M)$42M($44M)$88M($12M)$75M$158MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.0%8.6%0.7%−4.3%2.5%−2.5%4.7%−0.7%5.0%13.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$74M$107M($38M)($87M)$3M($100M)$39M($60M)($24M)$10MNet incomeNet inc.
23%-9%4%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$149M$148M$131M$180M$163M$127M$80M$79M($24M)($72M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$68M$77M$91M$119M$134M$104M$97M$95M$72M$55MDepreciationDeprec.
($8M)($50M)$71M$140M$11M$105M($74M)$26M($94M)($159M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$45M$43M$38M$35M$34M$61M$51M$45M$36M$27MCapexCapex
3.0%2.7%2.5%2.3%2.1%3.5%2.7%2.5%2.4%2.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$104M$104M$93M$146M$128M$66M$29M$34M($59M)($99M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.9%6.5%6.1%9.7%7.7%3.7%1.5%1.9%−4.0%−8.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$104M$104M$93M$146M$128M$66M$29M$34M($59M)($99M)Free cash flowFCF
6.9%6.5%6.1%9.7%7.7%3.7%1.5%1.9%−4.0%−8.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$98M$121M$12M$1M$16M$44M$15M$6M$56M$54MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$22M$25M$26M$26M$28M$28M$28M$31M$33M$33MDividends paidDiv. paid
$14M$21M$26M$4M$12M$42M$3M$21M$12MBuybacksBuybacks
6%8%-4%2%-3%7%-1%3%6%ROICROIC
9%12%-5%-14%0%-20%7%-14%-5%2%Return on equityROE
7%10%−9%−19%−4%−26%2%−21%−12%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$58M$42M$35M$41M$49M$69M$42M$41M$32M$37MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$320M$331M$319M$295M$310M$221M$208M$206M$133M$101MReceivablesReceiv.
$171M$180M$180M$175M$189M$225M$260M$238M$203M$196MInventoryInvent.
$67M$70M$75M$83M$113M$121M$114M$108M$98M$102MAccounts payablePayables
$424M$442M$424M$387M$386M$325M$354M$336M$237M$194MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$595M$615M$584M$576M$624M$629M$648M$633M$520M$480MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$285M$286M$280M$317M$354M$411M$395M$435M$350M$293MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×2.1×2.1×1.8×1.8×1.5×1.6×1.5×1.5×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$898M$949M$847M$765M$774M$675M$698M$697M$488M$433MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.2B$2.4B$2.2B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7B$1.5BTotal assetsAssets
$911M$961M$941M$835M$764M$799M$790M$776M$711M$941MTotal debtDebt
$854M$919M$905M$793M$715M$730M$748M$736M$678M$903MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.6×3.7×0.3×-1.8×1.5×-1.6×2.0×-0.2×1.2×2.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$790M$868M$718M$611M$637M$487M$526M$437M$481M$512MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%0.8%0.5%0.5%0.9%1.0%0.9%1.0%1.5%1.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$78M$90M$82M$17MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
32.6M31.9M31.4M31.2M32.0M31.4M31.3M30.9M31.1M31.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$46.53$50.30$48.93$48.04$52.24$56.19$60.11$58.09$48.16$38.18Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.28$3.37$-1.21$-2.79$0.09$-3.18$1.26$-1.93$-0.79$0.31EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.20$3.28$2.97$4.67$4.02$2.09$0.92$1.10$-1.91$-3.12Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.20$3.28$2.97$4.67$4.02$2.09$0.92$1.10$-1.91$-3.12Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.67$0.77$0.82$0.85$0.87$0.88$0.90$1.02$1.05$1.05Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.38$1.36$1.20$1.12$1.07$1.95$1.62$1.46$1.15$0.85Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$24.25$27.25$22.86$19.58$19.90$15.54$16.80$14.14$15.47$16.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.4%/yr+0.1%/yr
Dividends / share+5.9%/yr+4.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.2%/yr+0.6%/yr
Book value / share−5.5%/yr−4.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
31Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
3%low FY2020
Gross margin
34%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
21.6×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($59M)owner earningsvs.($24M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $24M loss but ($59M) of owner earnings: $35M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($24M)($60M)$39M($100M)$3M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$72M+$95M+$97M+$104M+$134M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$23M+$18M+$17M+$17M+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$94M+$26M−$74M+$105M+$11M
Cash from operations($24M)$79M$80M$127M$163M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$36M−$45M−$51M−$61M−$34M
Owner earnings($59M)$34M$29M$66M$128M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-4%2%2%4%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer ($82M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $75M ÷ interest expense $63M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $907M · 12.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $32M + ST investments $1M − debt $941M
    What this means

    Netting $34M of cash and short-term investments against $941M of debt leaves $907M owed, about 12.0× a year's operating profit (12.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 32 + DIO 75 − DPO 36 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -4%–8%; 3% latest = NOPAT $38M ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -4%–10%; latest ($59M) = operating cash ($24M) − maintenance capex $36M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -4% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves ($82M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($24M) · cash from operations ($24M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.50×
    Harvesting
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $72M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.48×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $941M vs $170M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −131%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.48/share (latest year $-0.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to 3% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −4.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$480M
  • Cash & short-term investments$37M
  • Receivables$101M
  • Inventory$196M
  • Other current assets$145M
Current liabilities$293M
  • Debt due within a year$7M
  • Accounts payable$102M
  • Other current liabilities$183M
Current ratio1.64×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.97×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$186Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $37M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−39.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($13M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($540M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$636M$56M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$388M · 38%
  • Dividends$246M · 24%
  • Buybacks$155M · 15%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$244M · 24%
  • Returned to owners$401M

    62% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $246M as dividends and $155M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$34.56

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $155M, about $34.56 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $21.54 (2025) to $66.02 (2017); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $30.59 ($42M).

  • Net change in share count−2.6%

    The diluted count fell from 33M to 32M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.05/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$594M35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$369Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $388M of capital spent building

$267M written down across 4 years (2019, 2020, 2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 72% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Bartolacci$6.7M$11.4M$128M
2022Mr. Bartolacci$6.1M$1.8M$66M
2023Mr. Bartolacci$6.5M$13.6M$29M
2024Mr. Bartolacci$5.8M$545k$34M
2025Mr. Bartolacci$5.7M$7.8M($59M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio77:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$23M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 31% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Matthews International Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.2% vs 6.5%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.5% early in the record and −0.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 9 years, $402M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CENXCentury Aluminum Company$2.5B3%-0.9%-1%-1%
NXQuanex Building Products Corporation$1.8B23%4.2%6%5%
SXCSunCoke Energy Inc.$1.8B7.8%8%6%
TWITitan International Inc. (DE)$1.8B13%1.5%2%0%
MATWMatthews International Corporation$1.5B33%2.5%2%6%
MTUSMetallus Inc.$1.2B8%0.3%0%3%
WORWorthington$1.2B17%2.4%4%8%
ROCKGibraltar Industries Inc.$1.1B25%9.6%12%11%
Group median17%2.5%3%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Matthews International Corporation has delivered.

Matthews International Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Matthews International Corporation earns about $91M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −4.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($99M) on 31M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $903M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Matthews International Corporation (MATW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MATW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MATV its page in the Manual MATX →

Industry order: ← MA the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter MAX →