Share count
11.4Bpeak FY2017
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MUFG, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.
Banks financial
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group is one of Japan's large banking groups: a holding company whose subsidiaries take in deposits and lend that money to households, companies, and governments, in Japan and abroad. It earns the spread between what it pays depositors and what it charges borrowers, and adds fees from the trust, lending, and related services it sells alongside. Like any bank, it is in the business of renting out other people's money and being paid for credit, time, and convenience.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
¥6.94T
+22.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue ¥6.94T 5-yr avg ¥5.33T
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- A bank is a commodity wearing a brand: money is the same everywhere, so the lasting question is whether MUFG can fund itself more cheaply and lend more wisely than rivals over a full cycle — the test of a deposit franchise is a low, steady cost of funding that holds when others scramble. Watch credit discipline, since the filing's own emphasis on nonaccrual loans and default classification is the reminder that the danger is not the loans that stay quiet but the ones that go bad together; one bad lending decade can erase a good one. Watch too the regulatory leash — capital and loss-absorbing (TLAC) requirements set how much of the balance sheet can be put to work — and litigation, which the company flags as a recurring cost of operating at scale. The figures for spread, returns, and leverage are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 6%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| ¥4.06T | ¥4.17T | ¥3.89T | ¥4.12T | ¥5.16T | ¥4.05T | ¥4.52T | ¥5.50T | ¥5.66T | ¥6.94T | ¥6.94T | RevenueRevenue |
| ¥2.22T | ¥2.23T | ¥2.30T | ¥2.24T | ¥2.00T | ¥1.97T | ¥2.40T | ¥2.62T | ¥3.09T | ¥3.68T | ¥3.68T | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| ¥1.20T | ¥1.94T | ¥1.60T | ¥1.88T | ¥3.16T | ¥1.39T | ¥1.50T | ¥2.88T | ¥2.57T | ¥3.25T | ¥3.25T | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| ¥253.7B | (¥240.8B) | ¥34.3B | ¥321.7B | — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥321.7B | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| ¥178.1B | ¥1.25T | ¥737.6B | ¥318.7B | ¥1.16T | (¥44.2B) | ¥414.6B | ¥1.38T | ¥1.27T | ¥1.88T | ¥1.88T | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 35% | 25% | 15% | 26% | 28% | — | 10% | 27% | 29% | 25% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.3% | -0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Return on assetsROA |
| 1% | 8% | 5% | 2% | 7% | -0% | 3% | 8% | 7% | 10% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| −0% | 7% | 3% | 0% | 5% | −2% | 0% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 1% | 9% | 5% | 2% | 8% | -0% | 3% | 9% | 8% | 11% | 11% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 85% | 66% | 77% | 82% | 59% | 93% | 88% | 61% | 66% | 61% | 61% | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| ¥297.19T | ¥300.57T | ¥305.23T | ¥331.75T | ¥353.82T | ¥367.65T | ¥382.18T | ¥397.82T | ¥405.94T | ¥425.58T | ¥425.58T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥190.40T | ¥195.67T | ¥199.28T | ¥203.95T | ¥229.21T | ¥224.59T | ¥235.28T | ¥247.14T | ¥249.42T | ¥260.76T | ¥260.76T | DepositsDeposits |
| ¥450.1B | ¥441.3B | ¥433.9B | ¥517.6B | ¥370.9B | ¥303.6B | ¥296.8B | ¥493.8B | ¥558.2B | ¥566.5B | ¥566.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥13.99T | ¥14.97T | ¥15.20T | ¥15.02T | ¥15.66T | ¥15.61T | ¥15.76T | ¥17.68T | ¥18.29T | ¥19.57T | ¥19.57T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 13.58B | 13.29B | 13.06B | 12.91B | 12.86B | 12.80B | 12.32B | 11.98B | 11.65B | 11.40B | 11.40B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥13.11 | ¥94.33 | ¥56.48 | ¥24.68 | ¥90.47 | ¥-3.45 | ¥33.65 | ¥114.98 | ¥108.76 | ¥165.28 | ¥165.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥18.13 | ¥18.09 | ¥21.10 | ¥23.52 | ¥24.96 | ¥26.09 | ¥30.81 | ¥36.62 | ¥45.63 | ¥74.28 | ¥74.28 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥1029.49 | ¥1126.13 | ¥1163.90 | ¥1162.90 | ¥1217.83 | ¥1219.33 | ¥1279.61 | ¥1475.36 | ¥1568.92 | ¥1717.19 | ¥1717.19 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| ¥921.25 | ¥1016.87 | ¥1059.67 | ¥1026.82 | ¥1096.84 | ¥1105.86 | ¥1160.20 | ¥1325.83 | ¥1400.69 | ¥1538.08 | ¥1538.08 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.2%/yr | +8.7%/yr |
| EPS | +32.5%/yr | +12.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +17.0%/yr | +24.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +13.4%/yr | +24.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.8%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
¥6.94Tlow FY2019
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%Below the cost of equityNet income ¥1.88T ÷ equity ¥19.57TIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill ¥566.5B − intangibles ¥1.48T)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 61%Cost-income, not comparable to the US gradesNoninterest expense ¥4.20T ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 62%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs. A 20-F/IFRS filer structures its income statement differently from a US bank, so this figure is not comparable to the US thresholds and is shown without a lean/bloated grade — read it against the bank's own history, not across the pool.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 4.6%ThinEquity ¥19.57T ÷ assets ¥425.58T
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 61%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits ¥260.76T ÷ assets ¥425.58T
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 9%LowProvision for credit losses ¥321.7B ÷ net interest income ¥3.68T
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“In addition, development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain has also allowed non-financial institutions to enter the financial services industry with alternative services, thus changing the nature of competition from other financial institutions as well as from other types of businesses.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUFGMitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. | ¥6.94T | 6% | 7% | 71% | 0.7% |
| JPMJPMorgan Chase & Co. | $182.4B | 13% | 16% | 57% | 2.0% |
| BACBank of America Corp. | $113.1B | 10% | 13% | 64% | 1.8% |
| CCitigroup Inc. | $85.2B | 7% | 8% | 62% | 2.3% |
| WFCWells Fargo & Co. | $83.7B | 11% | 13% | 67% | 2.5% |
| COFCapital One Financial Corporation | $53.4B | 8% | 12% | 54% | 6.0% |
| USBU.S. Bancorp | $28.7B | 12% | 17% | 59% | 2.5% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corporation | $20.3B | 8% | 11% | 63% | 2.7% |
| Group median | — | 9% | 12% | 63% | 2.4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each of which represents one share of common”; Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. reports in JPY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at JPY 1 = $0.0062 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in JPY.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered8%/yr’21→’26
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity7%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’24–’26)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $108.0B on 11868M shares, a 7% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. (MUFG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MUFG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MTLS its page in the Manual MWC →
Industry order: ← MTB the Banks chapter MVBF →