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MX, Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation

Semiconductors capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MX · Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$179M

−8.9% YoY · −19% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $180M 5-yr avg $283M

Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 24%

Operating margin −20.9% 5-yr avg −8.5%

ROIC −9% 5-yr avg −3%

Owner-earnings margin −30% 5-yr avg −7%

Free cash flow margin −30% 5-yr avg −7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 0.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −25% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$688M	$680M	$465M	$521M	$507M	$474M	$338M	$230M	$196M	$179M	$180M	RevenueRevenue
23%	28%	25%	22%	25%	32%	30%	22%	20%	18%	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
12%	12%	10%	9%	10%	11%	15%	21%	19%	20%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
10%	10%	10%	9%	9%	11%	16%	22%	13%	15%	16%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$3M	$39M	$22M	$24M	$27M	$83M	($5M)	($58M)	($26M)	($36M)	($38M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.4%	5.8%	4.7%	4.6%	5.3%	17.6%	−1.6%	−25.1%	−13.2%	−20.0%	−20.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($30M)	$85M	($4M)	($22M)	$345M	$57M	($8M)	($37M)	($54M)	($30M)	($25M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$9M	($20M)	$39M	$50M	$7M	$88M	$5M	($3M)	($6M)	($24M)	($24M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$25M	$28M	$32M	$33M	$16M	$14M	$15M	$17M	$16M	$13M	$13M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	($136M)	$7M	$33M	($361M)	$9M	($8M)	$10M	$26M	($10M)	($14M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$19M	$33M	$29M	$23M	$36M	$32M	$23M	$7M	$12M	$30M	$30M	CapexCapex
2.7%	4.8%	6.2%	4.4%	7.1%	6.8%	6.9%	3.0%	5.9%	16.8%	16.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($9M)	($53M)	$10M	$28M	($29M)	$56M	($18M)	($10M)	($18M)	($54M)	($54M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.4%	−7.8%	2.2%	5.3%	−5.6%	11.7%	−5.4%	−4.3%	−9.0%	−30.3%	−30.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($9M)	($53M)	$10M	$28M	($29M)	$56M	($18M)	($10M)	($18M)	($54M)	($54M)	Free cash flowFCF
−1.4%	−7.8%	2.2%	5.3%	−5.6%	11.7%	−5.4%	−4.3%	−9.0%	−30.3%	−30.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$11M	$2M	$3M	$1M	$2M	$14M	$52M	$13M	$4M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
5%	29%	11%	14%	12%	37%	-2%	-24%	-12%	-15%	-9%	ROICROIC
—	—	—	—	100%	13%	-2%	-11%	-20%	-12%	-11%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$102M	$129M	$132M	$152M	$280M	$280M	$225M	$158M	$139M	$104M	$125M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$62M	$92M	$80M	$47M	$64M	$51M	$35M	$33M	$28M	$26M	$24M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$57M	$73M	$30M	$41M	$39M	$39M	$40M	$33M	$31M	$34M	$33M	InventoryInvent.
$52M	$66M	$56M	$40M	$52M	$38M	$18M	$24M	$22M	$21M	$21M	Accounts payablePayables
$67M	$99M	$54M	$48M	$51M	$53M	$57M	$41M	$37M	$39M	$36M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$243M	$330M	$353M	$379M	$410M	$409M	$338M	$245M	$219M	$177M	$170M	Current assetsCur. assets
$153M	$138M	$133M	$134M	$174M	$85M	$47M	$47M	$46M	$43M	$72M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	2.4×	2.7×	2.8×	2.4×	4.8×	7.2×	5.2×	4.7×	4.1×	2.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$442M	$559M	$583M	$595M	$572M	$584M	$517M	$420M	$379M	$352M	$335M	Total assetsAssets
$221M	$303M	$304M	$305M	$167M	—	—	$0	$27M	$45M	$204M	Total debtDebt
$119M	$175M	$171M	$153M	($113M)	—	—	($158M)	($111M)	($59M)	$79M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($72M)	($40M)	($17M)	($15M)	$346M	$453M	$428M	$345M	$277M	$248M	$233M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.3%	0.9%	1.3%	1.3%	1.6%	1.8%	3.1%	3.2%	1.2%	1.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
34.8M	44.8M	34.5M	34.3M	46.5M	47.7M	44.9M	41.0M	37.8M	36.2M	36.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$19.75	$15.19	$13.50	$15.17	$10.90	$9.94	$7.53	$5.61	$5.20	$4.94	$4.95	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.85	$1.90	$-0.11	$-0.64	$7.42	$1.19	$-0.18	$-0.89	$-1.44	$-0.82	$-0.70	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.27	$-1.18	$0.30	$0.80	$-0.62	$1.16	$-0.41	$-0.24	$-0.47	$-1.50	$-1.49	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.27	$-1.18	$0.30	$0.80	$-0.62	$1.16	$-0.41	$-0.24	$-0.47	$-1.50	$-1.49	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.54	$0.73	$0.84	$0.67	$0.78	$0.68	$0.52	$0.17	$0.31	$0.83	$0.82	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.07	$-0.89	$-0.50	$-0.44	$7.43	$9.49	$9.55	$8.40	$7.33	$6.85	$6.39	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−14.3%/yr	−14.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+4.9%/yr	+1.3%/yr
Book value / share	—	−1.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

36Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

−15%low FY2023

Gross margin

18%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($54M)owner earningsvs.($30M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $30M loss but ($54M) of owner earnings: $24M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($30M)	($54M)	($37M)	($8M)	$57M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$13M	+$16M	+$17M	+$15M	+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$2M	+$6M	+$7M	+$6M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$10M	+$26M	+$10M	−$8M	+$9M
Cash from operations	($24M)	($6M)	($3M)	$5M	$88M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$30M	−$12M	−$7M	−$23M	−$32M
Owner earnings	($54M)	($18M)	($10M)	($18M)	$56M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-30%	-9%	-4%	-5%	12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer ($56M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($36M) ÷ interest expense $23M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $100M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $104M − debt $204M

What this means
Netting $104M of cash and short-term investments against $204M of debt leaves $100M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 86d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 53 + DIO 85 − DPO 52 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -24%–37%; -8% latest = NOPAT ($28M) ÷ invested capital $348M

Industry peers: median -13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -5%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -30%–12%; latest ($54M) = operating cash ($24M) − maintenance capex $30M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -30% of revenue this year, a -5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves ($56M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($24M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($30M) · cash from operations ($24M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 2.31×

Expanding

Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $13M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $179M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $204M vs $133M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −335%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.10/share (latest year $-0.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → −19% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to −19% lately, median 0% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2023 · −25.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$170M

Cash & short-term investments$125M
Receivables$24M
Inventory$33M

Current liabilities$72M

Debt due within a year$26M
Accounts payable$21M
Other current liabilities$24M

Current ratio2.37×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.91×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$98Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$26M due · $125M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters5.0× → 2.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$229Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$67MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$44M$2M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $146M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$244M · 167%
Buybacks$102M · 70%

Returned to owners$102M
$0 as dividends and $102M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$199M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $199M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$6.35
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $11M, about $6.35 each.
Net change in share count4.5%
The diluted count rose from 35M to 36M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($201M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $10M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Young-Joon Kim	$5.9M	$3.1M	($10M)
2024	Young-Joon Kim	$3.1M	$1.3M	($18M)
2025	Camillo Martino	$930k	$776k	($54M)
2025	Young-Joon Kim	$3.5M	$1.1M	($54M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−14.6% vs −2.3%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −2.3%) and the loss has widened to −14.6% across the last three years, with the latest year at −30.3%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.5%
Diluted shares grew 4.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $102M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.48×
Across the record the business reported $303M of net income but generated $146M of operating cash, a 0.48-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$134M · 74% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, our ten largest customers accounted for 74.3% and 73.4% of net sales from our Power Solutions business, respectively.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FORMFormFactor	$785M	40%	8.4%	7%	12%
AAOIApplied Optoelectronics Inc.	$456M	26%	-19.9%	-13%	-13%
SITMSiTime	$327M	53%	-8.3%	-8%	8%
NRGVEnergy Vault Holdings Inc.	$204M	18%	-39.9%	-66%	-22%
NSSCNAPCO Security Technologies Inc.	$182M	43%	13.4%	23%	9%
MXMagnachip Semiconductor Corporation	$179M	24%	2.5%	8%	-5%
FCELFuelCell Energy Inc.	$158M	-14%	-101.7%	-26%	-85%
MRAMEverspin Technologies Inc.	$55M	52%	-14.1%	-29%	11%
Group median	—	33%	-11.2%	-10%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−21%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−30%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh MX against another business →

The owners of MX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation (MX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MWA its page in the Manual MXL →

Industry order: ← MU the Semiconductors chapter MXL →