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NGS, Natural Gas Services Group Inc.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a premier provider of natural gas and electric compression equipment, technology and services to the energy industry.

We rent, design, install, service and maintain natural gas engine and electric motor drive compressors for oil and gas production and processing facilities.

We are headquartered in Southlake, Texas, with administrative offices in Midland, Texas, an engineering facility located in Tulsa, Oklahoma and service facilities located in several major oil and gas producing basins in the U.S.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NGS · Natural Gas Services Group Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$172M

+9.9% YoY · 89% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $179M 5-yr avg $73M

Operating margin 22.8% 5-yr avg −4.9%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin −29% 5-yr avg −254%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 4.2% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −141% and 70% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 211% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$38M	$22M	$18M	$22M	$7M	$9M	$10M	$15M	$157M	$172M	$179M	RevenueRevenue
24%	47%	51%	49%	146%	122%	134%	113%	13%	13%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$8M	$1M	($507K)	($15M)	($4M)	($12M)	$431K	$10M	$33M	$37M	$41M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
22.4%	6.8%	−2.9%	−69.7%	−49.8%	−141.1%	4.2%	69.7%	21.3%	21.6%	22.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$6M	$20M	($466K)	($14M)	$2M	($9M)	($569K)	$5M	$17M	$20M	$22M	Net incomeNet inc.
24%	—	—	—	—	—	—	28%	20%	25%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$32M	$17M	$24M	$29M	$33M	$29M	$28M	$18M	$66M	$63M	$65M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$22M	$21M	$22M	$23M	$25M	$25M	$24M	$27M	$31M	$37M	$38M	DepreciationDeprec.
$1M	($28M)	($310K)	$17M	$3M	$11M	$2M	($15M)	$16M	$4M	$2M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$14M	$40M	$70M	$15M	$26M	$65M	$154M	$72M	$121M	$117M	CapexCapex
8.8%	62.5%	226.2%	321.7%	211.1%	292.3%	628.6%	n/m	45.9%	70.5%	65.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$28M	$4M	$2M	$6M	$17M	$3M	$4M	($9M)	$35M	$26M	$26M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
75.6%	18.3%	9.1%	28.3%	240.6%	32.0%	35.2%	−56.7%	22.4%	15.2%	14.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$28M	$4M	($16M)	($41M)	$17M	$3M	($37M)	($136M)	($5M)	($59M)	($53M)	Free cash flowFCF
75.6%	18.3%	−92.5%	−186.4%	240.6%	32.0%	−360.6%	−905.6%	−3.5%	−34.0%	−29.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$3M	$3M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	$0	$0	$490K	$0	$8M	$7M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	1%	-0%	-5%	-1%	-5%	—	2%	6%	6%	6%	ROICROIC
3%	8%	-0%	-6%	1%	-4%	-0%	2%	7%	7%	8%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2%	7%	6%	7%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$64M	$69M	$53M	$12M	$29M	$23M	$3M	$3M	$2M	$0	$2M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$7M	$9M	$7M	$9M	$12M	$10M	$15M	$39M	$16M	$18M	$23M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$21M	$26M	$30M	$21M	$20M	$19M	$23M	$22M	$18M	$21M	$22M	InventoryInvent.
$971K	$4M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$5M	$6M	$18M	$10M	$14M	$11M	Accounts payablePayables
$28M	$31M	$35M	$28M	$29M	$25M	$32M	$43M	$24M	$25M	$33M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$95M	$108M	$95M	$42M	$73M	$65M	$54M	$76M	$48M	$57M	$63M	Current assetsCur. assets
$7M	$7M	$11M	$6M	$11M	$20M	$30M	$33M	$17M	$25M	$23M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
14.7×	14.5×	8.7×	7.7×	6.7×	3.2×	1.8×	2.3×	2.8×	2.3×	2.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$10M	$10M	$10M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$294M	$298M	$304M	$287M	$307M	$299M	$328M	$479M	$493M	$587M	$589M	Total assetsAssets
$0	$417K	$417K	$0	—	$0	$25M	$164M	$170M	$230M	$226M	Total debtDebt
($64M)	($69M)	($52M)	($12M)	—	($23M)	$22M	$161M	$168M	$230M	$224M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1053.8×	105.1×	-7.3×	-1010.2×	-257.1×	-190.9×	1.2×	2.6×	2.8×	2.7×	2.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$233M	$257M	$259M	$248M	$252M	$236M	$230M	$236M	$255M	$275M	$281M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
6.1%	18.7%	13.5%	11.9%	30.4%	19.8%	18.4%	13.7%	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
12.9M	13.1M	13.0M	13.1M	13.3M	13.1M	12.3M	12.4M	12.6M	12.7M	12.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.91	$1.65	$1.37	$1.66	$0.55	$0.67	$0.84	$1.21	$12.49	$13.57	$14.07	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.50	$1.51	$-0.04	$-1.06	$0.14	$-0.70	$-0.05	$0.38	$1.37	$1.57	$1.71	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.20	$0.30	$0.12	$0.47	$1.31	$0.22	$0.30	$-0.69	$2.80	$2.07	$2.07	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.20	$0.30	$-1.26	$-3.09	$1.31	$0.22	$-3.04	$-10.98	$-0.43	$-4.61	$-4.14	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.21	$0.21	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.26	$1.03	$3.09	$5.33	$1.15	$1.96	$5.29	$12.43	$5.73	$9.57	$9.22	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.01	$19.62	$19.99	$18.89	$18.97	$18.01	$18.70	$19.05	$20.32	$21.64	$22.01	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+18.7%/yr	+90.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−0.7%/yr	+9.6%/yr
EPS	+13.6%/yr	+63.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+49.5%/yr	+52.8%/yr
Book value / share	+2.1%/yr	+2.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

13Mpeak FY2020

ROIC

6%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

8.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$26Mowner earningsvs.$20Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $26M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $37M it takes just to hold its position. It put $85M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($59M).

Reported net income$20M

Owner earnings$26M · 15% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$20M	$17M	$5M	($569K)	($9M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$37M	+$31M	+$27M	+$24M	+$25M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$2M	+$2M	+$2M	+$2M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$4M	+$16M	−$15M	+$2M	+$11M
Cash from operations	$63M	$66M	$18M	$28M	$29M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$37M	−$31M	−$27M	−$24M	−$26M
Owner earnings	$26M	$35M	($9M)	$4M	$3M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$85M	−$41M	−$127M	−$41M	—
Free cash flow	($59M)	($5M)	($136M)	($37M)	$3M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	15%	22%	-57%	35%	32%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $37M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $85M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $24M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.7×

Adequate

Operating income $37M ÷ interest expense $14M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $230M · 6.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $0 − debt $230M

What this means
Netting $0 of cash and short-term investments against $230M of debt leaves $230M owed, about 6.2× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 1%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -5%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $28M ÷ invested capital $505M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 22%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -57%–241%; latest $26M = operating cash $63M − maintenance capex $37M

Industry peers: median 23%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 22% median across 10 years. It chose to put $85M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($59M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $24M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.16×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $63M ÷ net income $20M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 10%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $26M

What this means
Of $26M Owner Earnings, $3M (10%) went back to shareholders, $3M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 3.31×

Expanding

Capex $121M ÷ depreciation $37M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $172M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.33×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $230M vs $33M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +62%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.11/share (latest year $1.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 38% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 38% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −141.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.2%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$63M

Cash & short-term investments$2M
Receivables$23M
Inventory$22M
Other current assets$16M

Current liabilities$23M

Accounts payable$11M
Other current liabilities$12M

Current ratio2.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.77×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$40Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$281Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($245M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$165M$2M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$275Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $339M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$580M · 171%
Dividends$3M · 1%
Buybacks$15M · 4%

Returned to owners$18M
15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3M as dividends and $15M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$259M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $259M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $0 to $226M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $62M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $15M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−1.5%
The diluted count fell from 13M to 13M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.21/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained22%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($28M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $6M, so each retained $1 added about 0.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership3.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Natural Gas Services Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−6.4% vs 34.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 34.3% early in the record and −6.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $226M
Debt rose from $0 to $226M while owner earnings went from about $11M to $18M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 13 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$106M · 59% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“We had two customers that accounted for an aggregate of approximately 59 percent of our revenue for each of the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
RNGRRanger Energy Services Inc.	$547M	—	1.1%	1%	6%
CLBCore Laboratories Inc.	$527M	20%	10.7%	11%	5%
WBIWaterbridge Infrastructure LLC	$526M	28%	17.8%	3%	0%
EGYVAALCO Energy Inc.	$359M	—	27.2%	18%	23%
KRPKimbell Royalty Partners	$334M	—	20.1%	—	39%
NGSNatural Gas Services Group Inc.	$172M	—	5.5%	1%	25%
SDSandRidge Energy Inc.	$156M	84%	18.8%	7%	36%
DMLPDorchester Minerals L.P. Common	$153M	—	67.0%	—	87%
Group median	—	—	18.3%	5%	24%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Natural Gas Services Group Inc. has delivered.

Natural Gas Services Group Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Natural Gas Services Group Inc. earns about $39M on its 22.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($39M) Net of stock comp (−$2M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($28M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+76%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($53M) on 13M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-08; net debt $224M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($117M) runs well above depreciation ($38M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $28M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NGS against another business →

The owners of NGS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Natural Gas Services Group Inc. (NGS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NGS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NGL its page in the Manual NGVC →

Industry order: ← NESR the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter NOA →