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SD, SandRidge Energy Inc.

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

We are an independent oil and natural gas company, organized in 2006, with a principal focus on acquisition, development and production activities in the U.S.

Our primary operations are the production, development and acquisition of hydrocarbon resources.

Average daily net production for the year ended December 31, 2025.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SD · SandRidge Energy Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$156M

+24.8% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $164M 5-yr avg $171M

Operating margin 40.7% 5-yr avg 49.0%

ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 46%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 46%

Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 46%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −604% and 69% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 36% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$769M	$357M	$349M	$267M	$115M	$169M	$254M	$149M	$125M	$156M	$164M	RevenueRevenue
($4.6B)	$40M	($10M)	($447M)	($274M)	$114M	$175M	$64M	$33M	$61M	$67M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−604.0%	11.1%	−3.0%	−167.4%	−237.9%	67.6%	69.0%	43.2%	26.5%	39.0%	40.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($3.7B)	$47M	($9M)	($449M)	($277M)	$117M	$242M	$61M	$63M	$70M	$76M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	0%	—	19%	—	-9%	-8%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$374M	$181M	$146M	$121M	$36M	$110M	$165M	$116M	$74M	$100M	$100M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$367M	$132M	$139M	$159M	$58M	$15M	$18M	$22M	$32M	$43M	$44M	DepreciationDeprec.
$3.7B	($14M)	($8M)	$408M	$252M	($23M)	($97M)	$31M	($24M)	($16M)	($23M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$879M	$48M	$25M	$192M	$8M	$12M	$44M	$26M	$26M	$59M	$73M	CapexCapex
114.4%	13.5%	7.1%	71.8%	7.2%	6.9%	17.3%	17.7%	21.1%	37.5%	44.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($506M)	$133M	$121M	($70M)	$28M	$99M	$121M	$89M	$48M	$42M	$27M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−65.8%	37.2%	34.6%	−26.4%	24.2%	58.4%	47.4%	60.0%	37.9%	26.6%	16.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($506M)	$133M	$121M	($70M)	$28M	$99M	$121M	$89M	$48M	$42M	$27M	Free cash flowFCF
−65.8%	37.2%	34.6%	−26.4%	24.2%	58.4%	47.4%	60.0%	37.9%	26.6%	16.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$82M	$72M	$16M	$16M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$233K	$6M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-245%	5%	-1%	-77%	-172%	106%	76%	24%	9%	15%	16%	ROICROIC
—	6%	-1%	-112%	-217%	48%	50%	13%	14%	14%	14%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	48%	50%	−4%	−2%	11%	11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$446M	$99M	$18M	$4M	$22M	$137M	$256M	$252M	$98M	$111M	$112M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$127M	$71M	$46M	$29M	$20M	$22M	$35M	$22M	$24M	$26M	$30M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$428M	$139M	$112M	$65M	$51M	$46M	$46M	$39M	$51M	$59M	$50M	Accounts payablePayables
($301M)	($68M)	($66M)	($36M)	($32M)	($24M)	($12M)	($17M)	($27M)	($33M)	($16M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$674M	$195M	$73M	$39M	$51M	$162M	$305M	$278M	$128M	$148M	$143M	Current assetsCur. assets
$437M	$199M	$137M	$88M	$69M	$64M	$63M	$49M	$61M	$68M	$59M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.0×	0.5×	0.4×	0.7×	2.5×	4.8×	5.6×	2.1×	2.2×	2.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.0B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$608M	$261M	$353M	$600M	$574M	$582M	$644M	$652M	Total assetsAssets
$3.6B	$38M	$0	$58M	$20M	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	Total debtDebt
$3.2B	($62M)	($18M)	$53M	($2M)	($137M)	—	—	—	—	($112M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-14.4×	10.2×	-3.7×	-150.2×	-136.9×	282.4×	—	—	—	—	320.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.7B)	$840M	$848M	$402M	$128M	$245M	$488M	$468M	$461M	$511M	$526M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%	4.4%	6.7%	1.6%	2.6%	0.8%	0.6%	1.3%	1.9%	1.8%	1.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
522M	32.7M	35.1M	35.4M	35.7M	37.3M	37.2M	37.1M	37.2M	36.9M	37.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.47	$10.94	$9.97	$7.53	$3.22	$4.53	$6.84	$4.00	$3.37	$4.24	$4.42	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-7.08	$1.44	$-0.26	$-12.68	$-7.77	$3.13	$6.52	$1.64	$1.69	$1.90	$2.05	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.97	$4.07	$3.44	$-1.99	$0.78	$2.65	$3.25	$2.40	$1.28	$1.13	$0.72	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.97	$4.07	$3.44	$-1.99	$0.78	$2.65	$3.25	$2.40	$1.28	$1.13	$0.72	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$2.20	$1.95	$0.43	$0.42	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.68	$1.48	$0.71	$5.41	$0.23	$0.31	$1.19	$0.71	$0.71	$1.59	$1.98	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-3.25	$25.72	$24.18	$11.36	$3.59	$6.58	$13.13	$12.61	$12.38	$13.84	$14.22	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/15.98 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	10-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.1%/yr	+5.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+7.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.6%/yr	+46.8%/yr
Book value / share	—	+31.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

37Mpeak FY2015

ROIC

15%low FY2015

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$42Mowner earningsvs.$70Mnet incomelow FY2015

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $70M of profit but $42M of owner earnings: $29M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$70M

Owner earnings$42M · 27% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$70M	$63M	$61M	$242M	$117M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$43M	+$32M	+$22M	+$18M	+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$3M	+$2M	+$2M	+$2M	+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$16M	−$24M	+$31M	−$97M	−$23M
Cash from operations	$100M	$74M	$116M	$165M	$110M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$59M	−$26M	−$26M	−$44M	−$12M
Owner earnings	$42M	$48M	$89M	$121M	$99M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	27%	38%	60%	47%	58%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $39M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 150.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $61M ÷ interest expense $404K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$111M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $111M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $111M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $10M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $121M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -768d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 61 + DIO 54 − DPO 883 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -245%–106%; 15% latest = NOPAT $61M ÷ invested capital $400M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 35%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -66%–60%; latest $42M = operating cash $100M − maintenance capex $59M

Industry peers: median 50%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 35% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $39M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.43×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $100M ÷ net income $70M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 54%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $22M ÷ Owner Earnings $42M

What this means
Of $42M Owner Earnings, $22M (54%) went back to shareholders, $16M dividends, $6M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $4M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.37×

Expanding

Capex $59M ÷ depreciation $43M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $156M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.17×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $80M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.75/share (latest year $1.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −199% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −199% early to 36% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2015 · −604.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2015, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$143M

Cash & short-term investments$103M
Receivables$30M
Inventory$4M
Other current assets$6M

Current liabilities$59M

Accounts payable$50M
Other current liabilities$10M

Current ratio2.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.34×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$83Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters5.1× → 2.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$526Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$17MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.3B · 93%
Dividends$170M · 12%
Buybacks$7M · 0%

Returned to owners$176M
171% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $170M as dividends and $7M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$73M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $73M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $333M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $7M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count−92.9%
The diluted count fell from 522M to 37M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.43/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.0M	$3.9M	$99M
2021	$235k	−$1.6M	$99M
2022	$720k	$3.8M	$121M
2023	$999k	−$44k	$89M
2024	$865k	$419k	$48M
2025	$992k	$1.1M	$42M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why SandRidge Energy Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $5.2B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$111M · 68% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“During the year ended December 31, 2025, our three largest customers accounted for approximately 68% of our revenue, with our largest two customers representing 32.6% and 21.5% of our revenue.”verify →
Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“In prior years, we determined that the deferred tax assets did not meet the more likely than not threshold of being utilized and thus recorded a valuation allowance.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GRNTGranite Ridge Resources Inc.	$450M	—	19.3%	9%	56%
BSMBlack Stone Minerals L.P. Common	$422M	—	50.6%	—	65%
TXOTXO Partners L.P. Common	$363M	—	-5.7%	—	25%
EGYVAALCO Energy Inc.	$359M	—	27.2%	18%	23%
KRPKimbell Royalty Partners	$334M	—	20.1%	—	39%
VTSVitesse Energy Inc.	$274M	—	15.9%	4%	50%
SDSandRidge Energy Inc.	$156M	84%	18.8%	7%	36%
DMLPDorchester Minerals L.P. Common	$153M	—	67.0%	—	87%
Group median	—	—	19.7%	8%	45%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SandRidge Energy Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($59M) Net of stock comp (−$3M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($41M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2020+8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $27M on 37M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $112M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($73M) runs well above depreciation ($44M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $41M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SD against another business →

The owners of SD: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SandRidge Energy Inc. (SD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SCVL its page in the Manual SDGR →

Industry order: ← RRC the Oil & Gas Producers chapter SHEL →