Share count
3Bpeak FY2017
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NMR, Nomura Holdings Inc ADR
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
Nomura Group will also establish an earning structure not subject to market condition with proper cost control and risk management.
We are one of the leading financial services groups in Japan and we operate offices in countries and regions worldwide including Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Singapore and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong") through our subsidiaries.
As a global investment bank, the Company will provide high value-added solutions to clients globally, and recognizing its wider social responsibility, the Company will continue to contribute to the economic growth and development of society.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
¥2.16T
+14.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue ¥2.16T 5-yr avg ¥1.67T
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| ¥1.40T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.12T | ¥1.31T | ¥1.39T | ¥1.36T | ¥1.37T | ¥1.57T | ¥1.89T | ¥2.16T | ¥2.16T | RevenueRevenue |
| ¥128.7B | ¥110.5B | ¥58.6B | ¥129.8B | ¥141.1B | ¥54.1B | (¥36.5B) | ¥25.6B | ¥83.6B | ¥78.9B | ¥78.9B | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| ¥1.27T | ¥1.38T | ¥1.07T | ¥1.18T | ¥1.25T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.40T | ¥1.55T | ¥1.81T | ¥2.08T | ¥2.08T | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| ¥535M | ¥146M | ¥805M | ¥7.6B | ¥38.0B | ¥12.2B | ¥1.6B | ¥30M | ¥164M | ¥104M | ¥104M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| ¥242.6B | ¥224.3B | (¥94.7B) | ¥219.4B | ¥160.4B | ¥146.5B | ¥91.7B | ¥177.2B | ¥347.3B | ¥374.4B | ¥374.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 25% | 32% | — | 12% | 30% | 35% | 39% | 35% | 26% | 31% | 31% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 0.6% | 0.6% | -0.2% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Return on assetsROA |
| 9% | 8% | -4% | 8% | 6% | 5% | 3% | 5% | 10% | 10% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 6% | −5% | 6% | 3% | 3% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 9% | 8% | -4% | 8% | 6% | 5% | 3% | 5% | 10% | 11% | 11% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 77% | 78% | 103% | 79% | 84% | 84% | — | 82% | 75% | 75% | 75% | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| ¥42.85T | ¥40.34T | ¥40.97T | ¥44.00T | ¥42.52T | ¥43.41T | ¥47.77T | ¥55.15T | ¥56.80T | ¥62.65T | ¥62.65T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥1.13T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.39T | ¥1.28T | ¥1.34T | ¥1.76T | ¥2.14T | ¥2.36T | ¥3.11T | ¥3.67T | ¥3.67T | DepositsDeposits |
| ¥80.4B | ¥78.5B | ¥474M | ¥472M | ¥13.1B | ¥14.4B | ¥17.6B | ¥19.3B | ¥17.2B | ¥172.5B | ¥172.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.79T | ¥2.75T | ¥2.63T | ¥2.65T | ¥2.69T | ¥2.91T | ¥3.15T | ¥3.35T | ¥3.47T | ¥3.71T | ¥3.71T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 3.65B | 3.54B | 3.36B | 3.28B | 3.15B | 3.16B | 3.11B | 3.14B | 3.07B | 3.04B | 2.90B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥66.50 | ¥63.29 | ¥-28.19 | ¥66.95 | ¥50.96 | ¥46.39 | ¥29.44 | ¥56.36 | ¥113.24 | ¥123.10 | ¥129.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥11.74 | ¥19.81 | ¥14.13 | ¥17.83 | ¥24.26 | ¥22.39 | ¥18.39 | ¥19.13 | ¥36.70 | ¥59.10 | ¥61.95 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥764.84 | ¥775.85 | ¥783.15 | ¥809.85 | ¥856.26 | ¥922.72 | ¥1011.00 | ¥1065.40 | ¥1131.89 | ¥1219.22 | ¥1277.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| ¥742.79 | ¥753.70 | ¥783.01 | ¥809.70 | ¥852.08 | ¥918.16 | ¥1005.34 | ¥1059.27 | ¥1126.28 | ¥1162.50 | ¥1218.53 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.0%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| EPS | +7.1%/yr | +19.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +19.7%/yr | +19.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.4%/yr | +25.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.3%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
¥2.16Tlow FY2019
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%AdequateNet income ¥374.4B ÷ equity ¥3.71TIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill ¥172.5B − intangibles ¥0)Industry peers: median 17%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 75%Cost-income, not comparable to the US gradesNoninterest expense ¥1.63T ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 72%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs. A 20-F/IFRS filer structures its income statement differently from a US bank, so this figure is not comparable to the US thresholds and is shown without a lean/bloated grade — read it against the bank's own history, not across the pool.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 5.9%ThinEquity ¥3.71T ÷ assets ¥62.65T
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 0%LowProvision for credit losses ¥104M ÷ net interest income ¥78.9B
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NMRNomura Holdings Inc ADR | ¥2.16T | 7% | 7% | 79% | 0.1% |
| MSMorgan Stanley | $70.6B | 11% | 13% | 72% | 0.6% |
| GSGoldman Sachs Group Inc. (The) | $58.3B | 10% | 10% | 65% | 0.4% |
| SCHWCharles Schwab Corporation (The) | $23.9B | 13% | 18% | — | 1.9% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc. | $15.9B | 16% | 18% | 82% | 2.1% |
| SFStifel Financial | $6.3B | 12% | 17% | — | — |
| FRHCFreedom Holding Corp. | $2.2B | 17% | 18% | — | 1.5% |
| OPYOppenheimer Holdings Inc. | $1.6B | 7% | 9% | — | — |
| Group median | — | 12% | 15% | 76% | 1.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one share of Common”; Nomura Holdings Inc ADR reports in JPY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at JPY 1 = $0.0062 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in JPY.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Nomura Holdings Inc ADR’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered7%/yr’21→’26
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity7%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’24–’26)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $21.8B on 3041190068M shares, a 7% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Nomura Holdings Inc ADR (NMR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NMR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← NMM its page in the Manual NNNN →
Industry order: ← NDAQ the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter NOAH →