Owner Scorecard


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NMM, Navios Maritime Partners LP Common

Marine Shipping capital-intensive

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
NMM · Navios Maritime Partners LP Common
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.3B
+0.8% YoY · 43% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.2B
Gross margin 90% 5-yr avg 90%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 22%
Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Whether the heavy assets earn more than they cost to keep. What decides it: the return on the capital sunk into them, how much of the capex is merely standing still versus growing, and what a downturn does to a fixed-cost base. Here the balance sheet is the defense and cyclicality the enemy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$191M$212M$231M$219M$227M$713M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
97%98%96%94%95%95%90%88%89%90%90%Gross marginGross mgn
($53M)($15M)($13M)($62M)($69M)$511M$579M$434M$367M$285M$285MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$62M$53M$68M$70M$94M$277M$506M$560M$483M$505M$505MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$92M$73M$58M$53M$56M$113M$202M$261M$292M$349M$349MDepreciationDeprec.
$22M($4M)$23M$79M$107M($347M)($275M)($134M)($176M)($129M)($129M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$15M$158M$116M$21M$72M$217M$434M$183M$747M$224M$183MCapexCapex
8.1%74.8%50.1%9.6%31.9%30.4%35.8%14.0%56.0%16.7%13.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$46M($19M)$10M$49M$38M$164M$305M$377M$191M$281M$322MOwner earningsOwner earn.
24.4%−9.1%4.3%22.4%16.8%23.0%25.2%28.9%14.3%20.9%24.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$46M($105M)($48M)$49M$22M$60M$73M$377M($264M)$281M$322MFree cash flowFCF
24.4%−49.5%−20.6%22.4%9.6%8.4%6.0%28.9%−19.8%20.9%24.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$10M$14M$8M$5M$6M$6M$6M$6M$6MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$4M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
Balance sheet
$17M$24M$59M$23M$19M$159M$158M$240M$270M$403M$403MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$10M$14M$14M$11M$17M$24M$75M$42M$33M$34M$34MReceivablesReceiv.
$220K$220K$1M$6M$6M$21M$33M$38M$33M$32M$32MInventoryInvent.
$3M$4M$5M$8M$6M$21M$27M$25M$18M$18M$18MAccounts payablePayables
$7M$11M$11M$9M$17M$24M$81M$54M$48M$48M$48MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$56M$60M$111M$76M$61M$226M$310M$400M$443M$512M$512MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$99M$54M$52M$80M$253M$396M$618M$460M$410M$455M$455MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×1.1×2.1×1.0×0.2×0.6×0.5×0.9×1.1×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$3.6B$4.9B$5.1B$5.7B$5.9B$5.9BTotal assetsAssets
$524M$493M$484M$400M$424M$814M$864M$898M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BTotal debtDebt
$506M$469M$425M$377M$405M$654M$706M$658M$810M$706M$706MNet debt / (cash)Net debt

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Gross margin
90%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.5×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$281Mowner earningsvs.$285Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $285M of profit but $281M of owner earnings: $4M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$285M
Owner earnings$281M · 21% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$285M$367M$434M$579M$511M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$349M+$292M+$261M+$202M+$113M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$129M−$176M−$134M−$275M−$347M
Cash from operations$505M$483M$560M$506M$277M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$224M−$292M−$183M−$202M−$113M
Owner earnings$281M$191M$377M$305M$164M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$455M−$232M−$104M
Free cash flow$281M($264M)$377M$73M$60M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue21%14%29%25%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Not enough data
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Operating income wasn't found in the filing data.

  • Net debt
    Cash $403M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $403M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $706M owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 9 + DIO 91 − DPO 51 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -9%–29%; latest $322M = operating cash $505M − maintenance capex $183M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $505M ÷ net income $285M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $6M ÷ Owner Earnings $322M
    What this means

    Of $322M Owner Earnings, $6M (2%) went back to shareholders, $6M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.52×
    Harvesting
    Capex $183M ÷ depreciation $349M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.13×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $57M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.20/share (latest year $1.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$512M
  • Cash & short-term investments$403M
  • Receivables$34M
  • Inventory$32M
  • Other current assets$43M
Current liabilities$455M
  • Debt due within a year$134M
  • Accounts payable$18M
  • Other current liabilities$303M
Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.88×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$57Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$134M due · $403M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Net current asset value($2.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$27M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$61Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$2.2B · 82%
  • Dividends$61M · 2%
  • Buybacks$4M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$427M · 16%
  • Returned to owners$65M

    5% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $61M as dividends and $4M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $585M and cash and short-term investments rose $385M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $4M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (165M to 165M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.08/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained14%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $271M, so each retained $1 added about 0.14 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Navios Maritime Partners LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$199M · 15% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “For the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, only one customer accounted for 10.0% or more of our total revenues and represented approximately 14.8% and 11.3%, respectively, of our total revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
NMMNavios Maritime Partners LP Common$1.3B95%22%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Navios Maritime Partners LP Common reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Navios Maritime Partners LP Common has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Navios Maritime Partners LP Common earns about $306M on its 22.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $322M on 165M diluted shares; net debt $706M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Navios Maritime Partners LP Common (NMM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NMM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NIU its page in the Manual NMR →

Industry order: ← NCLH the Marine Shipping chapter NVGS →