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NTRA, Natera Inc.

Life Sciences Tools & Services asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a diagnostics company with proprietary molecular and bioinformatics technology that we are applying to change disease management worldwide.

We focus on applying our technology to three main areas of healthcare oncology, women's health, and organ health.

Since 2009, we have launched a comprehensive suite of products to improve patient care outcomes in these areas.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NTRA · Natera Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.3B

+35.9% YoY · 43% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Operating margin −13.0% 5-yr avg −41.7%

ROIC −26% 5-yr avg −64%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg −24%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg −27%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −48% through the cycle on a 37% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 13% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −62%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$213M	$210M	$258M	$302M	$391M	$625M	$820M	$1.1B	$1.7B	$2.3B	$2.5B	RevenueRevenue
37%	35%	39%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	94%	Gross marginGross mgn
64%	74%	60%	68%	78%	82%	72%	57%	50%	51%	50%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
20%	24%	20%	17%	26%	42%	39%	30%	24%	27%	28%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($101M)	($135M)	($115M)	($116M)	($216M)	($468M)	($541M)	($446M)	($222M)	($310M)	($324M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−47.6%	−64.6%	−44.5%	−38.5%	−55.3%	−74.8%	−66.0%	−41.2%	−13.1%	−13.4%	−13.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($100M)	($138M)	($128M)	($125M)	($230M)	($472M)	($548M)	($435M)	($190M)	($208M)	($226M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($74M)	($98M)	($71M)	($63M)	($183M)	($335M)	($432M)	($247M)	$136M	$215M	$211M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M	$7M	$8M	$8M	$9M	$11M	$17M	$24M	$31M	$42M	$47M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	$21M	$36M	$25M	($12M)	$10M	($53M)	($28M)	$21M	$27M	$19M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M	$10M	$4M	$5M	$20M	$41M	$48M	$39M	$66M	$106M	$107M	CapexCapex
10.9%	4.7%	1.5%	1.6%	5.0%	6.6%	5.8%	3.6%	3.9%	4.6%	4.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($80M)	($105M)	($74M)	($68M)	($191M)	($346M)	($448M)	($271M)	$105M	$174M	$164M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−37.8%	−50.1%	−28.9%	−22.6%	−48.9%	−55.4%	−54.6%	−25.0%	6.2%	7.5%	6.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($97M)	($108M)	($74M)	($68M)	($202M)	($376M)	($479M)	($286M)	$69M	$109M	$105M	Free cash flowFCF
−45.7%	−51.4%	−28.9%	−22.6%	−51.7%	−60.2%	−58.4%	−26.4%	4.1%	4.7%	4.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	$9M	—	—	—	$16M	$16M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
-62%	-836%	—	-42%	-39%	-44%	-82%	-87%	-70%	-38%	-26%	ROICROIC
-70%	-541%	-398%	-45%	-47%	-72%	-78%	-57%	-16%	-12%	-13%	Return on equityROE
−70%	−541%	−398%	−45%	−47%	−72%	−78%	−57%	−16%	−12%	−13%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$146M	$119M	$154M	$441M	$737M	$914M	$898M	$879M	$968M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$13M	$44M	$62M	$53M	$79M	$122M	$244M	$278M	$314M	$297M	$418M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$6M	$9M	$14M	$12M	$20M	$27M	$35M	$41M	$45M	$68M	$71M	InventoryInvent.
$11M	$9M	$15M	$9M	$8M	$27M	$31M	$15M	$35M	$33M	$62M	Accounts payablePayables
$8M	$45M	$61M	$57M	$91M	$122M	$249M	$304M	$324M	$332M	$426M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$174M	$181M	$241M	$523M	$863M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$96M	$106M	$114M	$180M	$199M	$219M	$310M	$307M	$344M	$441M	$558M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.7×	2.1×	2.9×	4.3×	5.0×	3.9×	4.1×	4.0×	3.4×	3.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$211M	$215M	$268M	$583M	$932M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	—	$280M	$282M	$283M	—	—	$283M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	—	—	($634M)	($617M)	($596M)	—	—	($806M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-189.6×	-32.1×	-10.9×	-10.9×	-14.3×	-56.4×	-58.1×	-35.3×	-20.8×	-76.2×	-82.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$144M	$25M	$32M	$279M	$486M	$653M	$706M	$765M	$1.2B	$1.7B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
5.0%	5.4%	5.5%	9.5%	12.8%	18.4%	18.6%	17.7%	16.2%	15.4%	14.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
51.6M	53.6M	57.8M	69.6M	81.0M	90.6M	98.4M	115M	125M	137M	142M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.12	$3.91	$4.45	$4.35	$4.83	$6.91	$8.33	$9.41	$13.61	$16.87	$17.67	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.95	$-2.57	$-2.22	$-1.79	$-2.84	$-5.21	$-5.57	$-3.78	$-1.53	$-1.52	$-1.60	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.56	$-1.96	$-1.29	$-0.98	$-2.36	$-3.83	$-4.55	$-2.36	$0.84	$1.27	$1.16	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.88	$-2.01	$-1.29	$-0.98	$-2.49	$-4.15	$-4.87	$-2.49	$0.56	$0.80	$0.74	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.45	$0.18	$0.07	$0.07	$0.24	$0.45	$0.48	$0.34	$0.53	$0.78	$0.75	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.78	$0.47	$0.56	$4.01	$6.00	$7.21	$7.17	$6.66	$9.58	$12.52	$12.54	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+17.0%/yr	+28.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.3%/yr	+26.3%/yr
Book value / share	+18.2%/yr	+15.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

137Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−38%low FY2017

Gross margin

39%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$174Mowner earningsvs.($208M)net incomelow FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $174M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $42M it takes just to hold its position. It put $64M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $109M.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($208M)	($190M)	($435M)	($548M)	($472M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$42M	+$31M	+$24M	+$17M	+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$354M	+$274M	+$192M	+$152M	+$115M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$27M	+$21M	−$28M	−$53M	+$10M
Cash from operations	$215M	$136M	($247M)	($432M)	($335M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$42M	−$31M	−$24M	−$17M	−$11M
Owner earnings	$174M	$105M	($271M)	($448M)	($346M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$64M	−$35M	−$15M	−$31M	−$30M
Free cash flow	$109M	$69M	($286M)	($479M)	($376M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	6%	-25%	-55%	-55%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $42M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $64M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $354M), owner earnings is nearer ($181M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -76.2×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($310M) ÷ interest expense $4M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$816M

Net cash

Cash $1.1B + ST investments $23M − debt $283M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $816M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 128d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 47 + DIO 158 − DPO 77 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -62%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -836%–-38%; -27% latest = NOPAT ($245M) ÷ invested capital $919M

Industry peers: median -10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -27% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $174M = operating cash $215M − maintenance capex $42M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -38%)

Industry peers: median -8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -38% median across 10 years. It chose to put $64M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $109M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $354M of SBC) leaves ($181M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $215M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($208M) · cash from operations $215M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 2.54×

Expanding

Capex $106M ÷ depreciation $42M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.39×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $283M vs $1.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.94/share (latest year $-1.45), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −52% → −23% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −52% early to −23% lately, median −48% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2021 · −74.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B

Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
Receivables$418M
Inventory$71M
Other current assets$75M

Current liabilities$558M

Accounts payable$62M
Other current liabilities$496M

Current ratio2.96×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.83×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.95×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+38.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 3.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$811MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$443M$160M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$54Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$515M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$25Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $362M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Steven Chapman	$23.3M	$17.8M	($346M)
2022	Steven Chapman	$8.2M	−$10.5M	($448M)
2023	Steven Chapman	$12.7M	$32.8M	($271M)
2024	Steven Chapman	$13.0M	$95.4M	$105M
2025	Steven Chapman	$15.0M	$60.8M	$174M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio101:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$354M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Natera Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 20% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $20M to $488M while revenue grew 1077%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 20% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SGRYSurgery Partners Inc.	$3.3B	26%	12.4%	6%	6%
TDOCTeladoc Health Inc.	$2.5B	69%	-24.6%	-8%	6%
NTRANatera Inc.	$2.3B	37%	-46.0%	-62%	-33%
VCYTVeracyte Inc.	$517M	62%	-24.0%	-11%	-8%
WGSGeneDx Holdings Corp.	$428M	42%	-89.2%	-44%	-58%
OMDAOmada Health Inc.	$260M	61%	-25.7%	-124%	-20%
TALKTalkspace Inc.	$229M	52%	-28.9%	4%	-51%
LFMDPLifemd, Inc.	$194M	80%	-23.9%	—	4%
Group median	—	56%	-25.2%	-11%	-14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Natera Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle (($36M)) Net of stock comp (−$372M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($169M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+58%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $105M on 143M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $806M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($107M) runs well above depreciation ($47M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $169M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NTRA against another business →

The owners of NTRA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Natera Inc. (NTRA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NTRA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NTNX its page in the Manual NTRS →

Industry order: ← NRC the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter OABI →