Owner Scorecard


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SGRY, Surgery Partners Inc.

Health Care Providers & Services asset-light UnprofitableSerial acquirer

Surgery Partners, Inc., a Delaware corporation, acting through its subsidiaries, owns and operates a national network of surgical facilities and ancillary services.

We are a leading healthcare services company with an integrated outpatient delivery model focused on providing high-quality, cost-effective solutions for surgical and related ancillary care in support of both patients and physicians.

We are one of the largest and fastest growing surgical services businesses in the United States ("U.S."), with more than 200 locations in 30 states, including ambulatory surgery centers ("ASCs"), short-stay surgical hospitals ("surgical hospitals"), and multi-specialty physician practices, among others.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SGRY · Surgery Partners Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.3B
+6.2% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $2.8B
Operating margin 11.8% 5-yr avg 12.4%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Private insurance (51%) and Government (42%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 64% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 9 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 4.4% to 17% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Private insurance at 51%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Private insurance51%$1.7B
  • Government42%$1.4B
  • Self-pay3%$88M
  • Other Services2%$82M
  • Other2%$71M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$960M$1.1B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$2.2B$2.5B$2.7B$3.1B$3.3B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
30%28%23%23%58%Gross marginGross mgn
6%5%5%5%5%5%4%4%4%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$145M$196M$78M$236M$183M$302M$345M$328M$349M$390M$393MOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.1%17.2%4.4%12.9%9.8%13.6%13.6%12.0%11.2%11.8%11.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1M$9M($206M)($75M)($116M)($71M)($55M)($12M)($168M)($78M)($76M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$84M$125M$145M$130M$247M$87M$159M$294M$300M$274M$280MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$35M$40M$67M$77M$95M$99M$115M$118M$153M$176M$178MDepreciationDeprec.
$41M$74M$274M$118M$255M$42M$80M$170M$282M$161M$165MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$33M$39M$40M$74M$43M$58M$81M$89M$90M$79M$72MCapexCapex
3.5%3.4%2.2%4.0%2.3%2.6%3.2%3.2%2.9%2.4%2.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$51M$86M$105M$56M$204M$30M$78M$205M$210M$196M$208MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.3%7.5%5.9%3.1%11.0%1.3%3.1%7.5%6.7%5.9%6.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$51M$86M$105M$56M$204M$30M$78M$205M$210M$196M$208MFree cash flowFCF
5.3%7.5%5.9%3.1%11.0%1.3%3.1%7.5%6.7%5.9%6.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$113M$146M$107M$14M$105M$286M$146M$80M$379M$162M$122MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$2M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
9%8%2%7%5%7%6%6%6%6%6%ROICROIC
98%-51%-25%-100%-7%-3%-1%-9%-5%-5%Return on equityROE
98%−51%−25%−100%−7%−3%−1%−9%−5%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$58M$70M$184M$93M$318M$390M$283M$196M$270M$240M$182MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$178M$221M$308M$327M$382M$430M$456M$496M$579M$602M$603MReceivablesReceiv.
$26M$29M$43M$46M$56M$61M$71M$75M$88M$97M$101MInventoryInvent.
$45M$50M$83M$97M$100M$125M$152M$172M$209M$209M$169MAccounts payablePayables
$158M$200M$268M$277M$338M$366M$376M$400M$459M$490M$535MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$311M$362M$588M$526M$802M$946M$921M$895M$1.1B$1.2B$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$181M$187M$349M$398M$557M$537M$493M$523M$624M$616M$582MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.9×1.7×1.3×1.4×1.8×1.9×1.7×1.8×1.9×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.4B$1.6B$3.4B$3.4B$3.5B$3.9B$4.1B$4.3B$5.1B$5.2B$5.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.1B$2.3B$4.7B$5.0B$5.4B$6.1B$6.7B$6.9B$7.9B$8.1B$8.0BTotal assetsAssets
$1.3B$1.5B$2.3B$2.6B$2.9B$3.0B$2.6B$2.8B$3.4B$3.7B$3.7BTotal debtDebt
$1.2B$1.4B$2.1B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B$2.4B$2.6B$3.1B$3.5B$3.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
($4M)$10M$405M$297M$116M$1.1B$2.0B$2.0B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.2%0.5%0.6%0.7%0.8%0.7%0.6%1.1%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$61M$5M$5MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
56.2M72.3M72.0M72.4M73.2M72.4M92.0M126M126M127M128MShares out (diluted)Shares
$17.08$15.85$24.59$25.29$25.42$30.72$27.62$21.84$24.69$26.01$26.05Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.03$0.13$-2.86$-1.03$-1.59$-0.98$-0.59$-0.09$-1.33$-0.61$-0.59EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.91$1.19$1.45$0.77$2.79$0.41$0.85$1.63$1.66$1.54$1.62Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.91$1.19$1.45$0.77$2.79$0.41$0.85$1.63$1.66$1.54$1.62Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.60$0.54$0.55$1.02$0.59$0.80$0.88$0.71$0.72$0.62$0.56Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.07$0.13$5.62$4.10$1.58$15.04$21.73$15.82$14.19$13.47$13.15Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.3%/yr+0.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.4%/yr−11.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.4%/yr+1.1%/yr
Book value / share+53.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
127Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2018
Gross margin
23%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
17.9×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$196Mowner earningsvs.($78M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2015FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $78M loss into $196M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($78M)($168M)($12M)($55M)($71M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$176M+$153M+$118M+$115M+$99M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$15M+$33M+$18M+$18M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$161M+$282M+$170M+$80M+$42M
Cash from operations$274M$300M$294M$159M$87M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$79M−$90M−$89M−$81M−$58M
Owner earnings$196M$210M$205M$78M$30M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%7%7%3%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer $181M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.5B · 9.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $240M − debt $3.7B
    What this means

    Netting $240M of cash and short-term investments against $3.7B of debt leaves $3.5B owed, about 9.0× a year's operating profit (9.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 66 + DIO 25 − DPO 54 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–9%; 6% latest = NOPAT $308M ÷ invested capital $5.2B
    Industry peers: median -28%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–11%; latest $196M = operating cash $274M − maintenance capex $79M
    Industry peers: median -20%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $181M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($78M) · cash from operations $274M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $196M
    What this means

    Of $196M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.45×
    Harvesting
    Capex $79M ÷ depreciation $176M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.87×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.7B vs $535M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.66/share (latest year $-0.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 12% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 4.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$182M
  • Receivables$603M
  • Inventory$101M
  • Other current assets$196M
Current liabilities$582M
  • Accounts payable$169M
  • Other current liabilities$413M
Current ratio1.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$501Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($3.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.0B$314M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.0B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$99M
'27$91M
'28$83M
'29$72M
'30$1.4B
later$2.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$99Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$190Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.4Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$182M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$196M
Together, against $99M due next year3.8×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $378M against the $99M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 3.8 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$167M
'27$156M
'28$141M
'29$132M
'30$123M
later$1.7B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$167Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$5.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.0B, of which the leases are 25%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2015–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$625M · 34%
  • Buybacks$2M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 66%
  • Returned to owners$2M

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $124M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$8.50

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $2M, about $8.50 each.

  • Net change in share count128.4%

    The diluted count rose from 56M to 128M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.2B64% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $625M of capital spent building

$72M written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$4.3M$14.2M$30M
2022$6.1M−$3.3M$78M
2023$6.5M$7.3M$205M
2024$6.5M$3.3M$210M
2025$6.1M$1.2M$196M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio112:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$15M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Surgery Partners Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?128.4%

    Diluted shares grew 128.4% over 2015–2025, even as the company spent $2M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SGRYSurgery Partners Inc.$3.3B26%12.4%6%6%
TDOCTeladoc Health Inc.$2.5B69%-24.6%-8%6%
NTRANatera Inc.$2.3B37%-46.0%-62%-33%
VCYTVeracyte Inc.$517M62%-24.0%-11%-8%
WGSGeneDx Holdings Corp.$428M42%-89.2%-44%-58%
OMDAOmada Health Inc.$260M61%-25.7%-124%-20%
TALKTalkspace Inc.$229M52%-28.9%4%-51%
LFMDPLifemd, Inc.$194M80%-23.9%4%
Group median56%-25.2%-11%-14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Surgery Partners Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Surgery Partners Inc. earns about $196M on its 5.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+39%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $208M on 131M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $3.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Surgery Partners Inc. (SGRY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SGRY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SGMT its page in the Manual SGU →

Industry order: ← SEM the Health Care Providers & Services chapter SHC →