Owner Scorecard


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NUS, Nu Skin

Drug & Medical Distributors consumer brand Cyclical

Skin Enterprises, Inc. develops and distributes a comprehensive line of premium-quality beauty and wellness solutions in nearly 50 markets worldwide.

We operate in the direct selling channel, primarily utilizing person-to-person marketing to promote and sell our products, including through the use of social and digital platforms.

Our Rhyz businesses primarily consist of consumer, technology and manufacturing companies.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
NUS · Nu Skin
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.5B
−14.3% YoY · −10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Gross margin 69% 5-yr avg 71%
Operating margin 5.5% 5-yr avg 2.4%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Wellness (46%), Beauty (38%) and Other (15%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 75% and operating margin about 8.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −8.8% to 12% — on a steadier 75% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Wellness at 46%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Wellness46%$689M
  • Beauty38%$568M
  • Other15%$228M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.2B$2.3B$2.7B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7B$2.2B$2.0B$1.7B$1.5B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
77%78%76%76%75%75%72%69%68%69%69%Gross marginGross mgn
25%25%25%25%25%24%25%28%28%29%29%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$231M$274M$241M$267M$258M$234M$111M$48M($152M)$66M$80MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.5%12.0%9.0%11.0%10.0%8.7%5.0%2.5%−8.8%4.4%5.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$143M$129M$122M$174M$191M$147M$105M$9M($147M)$160M$55MNet incomeNet inc.
33%51%45%32%25%37%18%15%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$275M$303M$203M$178M$379M$142M$108M$119M$112M$80M$76MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$72M$72M$83M$77M$74M$76M$73M$71M$70M$52M$50MDepreciationDeprec.
$51M$82M($29M)($82M)$90M($105M)($82M)$23M$174M($156M)($47M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$50M$60M$70M$66M$64M$69M$59M$58M$42M$34M$34MCapexCapex
2.3%2.6%2.6%2.7%2.5%2.5%2.7%3.0%2.4%2.3%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$225M$242M$132M$112M$315M$73M$49M$60M$70M$46M$42MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.2%10.6%4.9%4.6%12.2%2.7%2.2%3.1%4.1%3.1%2.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$225M$242M$132M$112M$315M$73M$49M$60M$70M$46M$42MFree cash flowFCF
10.2%10.6%4.9%4.6%12.2%2.7%2.2%3.1%4.1%3.1%2.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9M$32M$39M$8M$15M$19M$0$77M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$78M$76M$81M$82M$78M$76M$77M$78M$12M$12M$12MDividends paidDiv. paid
$247M$72M$70M$825K$144M$80M$70M$13M$0$20MBuybacksBuybacks
21%21%16%20%23%16%11%2%-14%7%8%ROICROIC
22%18%16%20%21%16%12%1%-23%20%7%Return on equityROE
10%8%5%10%13%8%3%−8%−24%18%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$368M$438M$398M$344M$424M$355M$279M$268M$198M$240M$200MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$63M$41M$47M$59M$51M$40M$45MReceivablesReceiv.
$250M$253M$296M$276M$314M$400M$346M$280M$190M$179M$179MInventoryInvent.
$41M$50M$48M$39M$66M$50M$54M$43M$35M$26M$29MAccounts payablePayables
$209M$203M$248M$287M$312M$391M$340M$296M$206M$192M$195MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$714M$778M$799M$740M$903M$873M$760M$702M$539M$548M$523MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$399M$447M$440M$357M$543M$530M$359M$329M$297M$264M$257MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.7×1.8×2.1×1.7×1.6×2.1×2.1×1.8×2.1×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$115M$115M$197M$197M$203M$206M$206M$218M$84M$84M$84MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$417M$389M$430M$362M$335M$376M$402M$503M$394M$224M$224MTotal debtDebt
$49M($50M)$32M$18M($89M)$21M$124M$235M$196M($16M)$23MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
14.8×12.4×11.0×13.9×19.7×21.3×8.2×1.9×-5.7×4.7×5.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$664M$705M$782M$875M$894M$913M$897M$822M$651M$805M$794MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.8%1.0%0.4%0.9%0.9%0.6%0.8%0.9%1.6%1.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
56.1M54.9M56.5M55.9M52.8M51.4M50.5M49.9M49.7M50.3M49.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$39.36$41.55$47.44$43.28$48.93$52.42$44.05$39.49$34.88$29.53$29.16Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.55$2.36$2.16$3.10$3.63$2.86$2.07$0.17$-2.95$3.18$1.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.01$4.42$2.34$2.00$5.98$1.42$0.97$1.21$1.41$0.91$0.84Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.01$4.42$2.34$2.00$5.98$1.42$0.97$1.21$1.41$0.91$0.84Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.40$1.39$1.43$1.47$1.49$1.48$1.52$1.56$0.24$0.24$0.24Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.90$1.10$1.25$1.18$1.21$1.33$1.17$1.17$0.84$0.68$0.70Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.84$12.85$13.84$15.65$16.95$17.75$17.76$16.49$13.12$16.01$16.07Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−3.1%/yr−9.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−15.1%/yr−31.3%/yr
EPS+2.5%/yr−2.6%/yr
Dividends / share−18.0%/yr−30.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−3.0%/yr−10.8%/yr
Book value / share+3.4%/yr−1.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
50Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
7%low FY2024
Gross margin
69%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.3×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$46Mowner earningsvs.$160Mnet incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $160M of profit but $46M of owner earnings: $114M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$160M
Owner earnings$46M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$160M($147M)$9M$105M$147M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$52M+$70M+$71M+$73M+$76M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$15M+$16M+$12M+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$156M+$174M+$23M−$82M−$105M
Cash from operations$80M$112M$119M$108M$142M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$34M−$42M−$58M−$59M−$69M
Owner earnings$46M$70M$60M$49M$73M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%4%3%2%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $22M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $66M ÷ interest expense $14M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • Net cash
    Cash $239M + ST investments $1M − debt $224M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $16M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 10 + DIO 144 − DPO 21 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -14%–23%; 7% latest = NOPAT $54M ÷ invested capital $791M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–12%; latest $46M = operating cash $80M − maintenance capex $34M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $22M.

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $80M ÷ net income $160M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $32M ÷ Owner Earnings $46M
    What this means

    Of $46M Owner Earnings, $32M (69%) went back to shareholders, $12M dividends, $20M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.66×
    Harvesting
    Capex $34M ÷ depreciation $52M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.08×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $224M vs $284M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −94%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.15/share (latest year $3.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 11% early to −1% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −8.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Disruptions, latency, or failures of AI-enabled systems—whether operated by us or by third parties—could impair our ability to serve our customers and sales force, negatively affect customer experiences, reduce sales, increase costs, or otherwise adversely affect our business.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$523M
  • Cash & short-term investments$200M
  • Receivables$45M
  • Inventory$179M
  • Other current assets$99M
Current liabilities$257M
  • Debt due within a year$20M
  • Accounts payable$29M
  • Other current liabilities$208M
Current ratio2.03×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.34×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$266Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$20M due · $200M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−12.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$671Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($60M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$296M$72M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$573M · 30%
  • Dividends$650M · 34%
  • Buybacks$717M · 38%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    103% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $650M as dividends and $717M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $717M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−11.9%

    The diluted count fell from 56M to 49M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.24/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$2.7M$1.1M$73M
2021$4.7M$3.7M$73M
2022$4.8M−$116k$49M
2023$5.8M$2.7M$60M
2024$6.0M$1.7M$70M
2025$6.0M$9.2M$46M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio8,853:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 37% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Nu Skin is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.4% vs 8.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.6% early in the record and 3.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $297M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HLFHerbalife Ltd.$5.0B79%11.0%46%5%
LNTHLantheus Holdings$1.5B51%17.2%24%17%
BRCBrady Corporation$1.5B50%14.6%17%12%
IPARInter Parfums$1.5B63%15.8%19%10%
NUSNu Skin$1.5B75%8.8%16%4%
ALKSAlkermes$1.5B84%-4.8%-7%3%
CRSRCorsair Gaming Inc.$1.5B25%1.4%1%2%
SMPLThe Simply Good Foods Company$1.5B39%15.4%8%13%
Group median57%12.8%16%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nu Skin has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Nu Skin earns about $64M on its 4.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $42M on 49M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $23M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Nu Skin (NUS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NUS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NUE its page in the Manual NUTX →

Industry order: ← MCK the Drug & Medical Distributors chapter